#Russia_Moldova: Gazprom officially announces that it is stopping gas deliveries to Moldova: 1) The gas was used in the Transnistria region, mainly to generate electricity that was sold to the rest of Moldova. This was convenient for Chisinau, although indirect energy dependence on Russia continued;⤵️ 2) Gazprom claims that Moldovagaz (implicitly referring to the Moldovan government) failed to pay $700 million in debts. According to the 2021 contract negotiated by the Moldovan government, non-payment of debts could lead to the interruption of gas supplies;⤵️

#Romania: New findings from Romania’s ANAF, the body that oversees financial integrity, show that the pro-EU National Liberal Party (PNL) financed the TikTok campaign that ended up amplifying public visibility of Georgescu in the presidential election. Some important findings: ⤵️

https://twitter.com/dioniscenusa/status/1865016853778637299

1) The Russian factor seems to be exploited by local political elites against far-right parties; 2) The PNL-funded TikTok awareness campaign “Echilibru și Vrticalitate” conducted by Kensington Communication, which endorsed Georgescu to then officially support Elena Lasconi in the second round;⤵️

#Moldova: It is official: a state of emergency has been declared for 60 days in the field of energy security. The country is facing the second energy crisis since 2021. A🧵: ⤵️

https://twitter.com/dioniscenusa/status/1864693881167655304

1) The current crisis is more problematic because it affects not only the gas sector, but also power generation; 2) Russian gas is at the heart of the new crisis; 3) The Moldovan government overlooked the creation of the crisis and so did the EU; 4) Another inflationary shock is expected, which will have serious effects on the legislative elections in 2025.⤵️

#Moldova: The country is heading full speed towards a new energy crisis. This time it has three dimensions. A 🧵:⤵️ 1) As the gas transit contract between Ukraine and Russia expires, gas supplies to Moldova are at risk. That will primarily affect the power generation capacity of the Transnistrian region, which is largely supplied by the rest of Moldova.⤵️

#Georgia: This Sunday's elections will be crucial for the future of the political and social fabric of this country, still a EU candidate state. Both voters and the EU are faced with a dilemma: the continuity of the oligarchic regime or a political rejuvenation. A 🧵: 1) The oligarchic regime of Ivanishvili has not shown any fear of the threats of sanctions from the U.S. and the EU. Nor is the freezing of the EU candidate status perceived as a real risk, as local political interests prevail in the calculations of the Georgian Dream.⤵️

#Moldova: Voting has begun. Around 160,000 voters have cast their ballots in the country (6% turnout so far). Around 15,000 voted in the diaspora. A thread 🧵:

https://twitter.com/DionisCenusa/status/1842531601994891775

1) The Central Election Commission publishes the turnout for the presidential elections. It is not yet clear whether the figure matches that of the referendum.⤵️

#Moldova_Elections2024: In 15 days, Moldova will hold presidential elections and a constitutional referendum. Some pro-Russian proxies are vying to enter office. I open a thread related to Russian hybrid interference in Moldovan elections. A🧵:⤵️ 1) More than 130,000 Moldovan citizens have received money from Russia through accounts at Sberbank, which is subject to Western sanctions (since 2022). More than 50,000 are directly linked to the Shor Group/“Victory” ⤵️

#Hybrid: Durov’s arrest in France is suspicious: 1) he knew he was wanted for the quality of content moderation on Telegram platform, used by Russia for spreading disinformation; 2) Durov appears to have deliberately chosen to fly to Paris, even though he was avoiding Western ⤵️ jurisdiction so far; 3) The French arrest warrant was valid only for French territory, which may explain why Durov chose to fly to France and not another European country, where he was immediately arrested; 4) As a French citizen, he will not be extradited, although Russia ⤵️

#EU_Neighborhood: The three main narratives employed by the current govts in Georgia, Moldova & Armenia envisage the following: 1) War: The Georgian govt speaks of the risk of the “opening of a second front”, attributed to the West and local opposition forces.⤵️ In Moldova, Russian aggression against Ukraine is at the forefront of govt discourse. Some official narratives in Armenia hint at the danger of a war that could be started by Azerbaijan. 2) External interference: The Georgian govt frequently refers to the “Global War Party”⤵️

#Ukraine_Moldova: They have many things in common, but the most important is the presence of Russian occupation forces. Drawing parallels between the negotiations on the Transnistrian conflict and the peace talks that Kyiv would have to hold with Russia can be misleading. A🧵: 1) Negotiations on the Transnistria conflict in the 2000s were carried out with the mediation of the EU and the US, which rather accepted the terms set by Russian diplomacy (because it is unlikely that both they will be fooled). The conditions were dictated by the context in⤵️

#Moldova_Russia: The implications of Russian aggression against Ukraine are qualitatively changing the symmetry in the Moldova-Russia relations in favor of Chisinau. This is one of the underlying conclusions reached by Ch. Smith (@StateDept) on Moldova. A 🧵:⤵️ 1) The US recognizes that there is no real threat from Russia, mainly because its capabilities in Ukraine are at the limit. This has always been the case since the full-scale war began because the Russian military has never come close to reaching the Ukraine-Moldova borders; ⤵️

#Critical_Infrastructure: The implications of Russian airstrikes against Ukraine's critical energy infrastructure in recent weeks (March-April) are still being assessed. Here are some intermediate findings:⤵️

https://twitter.com/dioniscenusa/status/1776132906395594853

1) Russian missiles targeted mainly thermal and hydropower production infrastructure; 2) Both generation and transmission infrastructure were severely damaged; 2) Up to 80% of Ukraine's thermal energy production was affected, with varying degrees of damage;⤵️

#Moldova_Russia: Meanwhile, the administration of the separatist regime asked the EUBAM mission to intervene and reduce tension, convincing Chisinau to remove urgent points (focusing on customs duties). The Feb 28 event of local deputies at all levels in the Transnistria region⤵️

https://twitter.com/dioniscenusa/status/1760626260269731963

was presented as an emergency meeting to discuss an eventual looming humanitarian crisis (as depicted by the separatist regime). It seems to be cry for attention of a (separatist) regime for its survival in conditions of falling budget revenues in the region and⤵️

#Moldova_Russia: There are early signs of escalation in the dialogue between Chisinau and the Transnistrian region. The dispute revolves around economic interests and, closely linked, the stability of the regime in the separatist region. A thread 🧵:⤵️ 1) The Moldovan constitutional authorities are applying a new customs code, which generates costs for the separatist regime. About half of the region's $300 million annual budget could be retained through export and import duties by constitutional authorities. Some⤵️

#Critical_Infrastructure: The gas transit agreement, negotiated in 2019, will expire by the end of 2024. Ukraine & the EU are not willing to extend it. This raises the question of what future awaits the pipeline that transports gas from Russia to Europe via Ukraine. A brief 🧵:⤵️

1) Until now, Russia has been reluctant to launch its missiles against gas infrastructure. Moscow had a utilitarian approach to the Ukrainian gas transportation network, as long as it could make money, but even more minimal geopolitical influence;⤵️

#EU_Enlargement: Today the EU Commission will suggest to EU member states to open Ukraine's accession negotiations, but will recognize that the 7 conditions were not fully implemented. Kyiv has expressed that it’s effort is not appreciated given the circumstances. Both⤵️ the EU and Ukraine have to keep in mind the following: 1) a reform is a process and includes enforcement, which is complicated by the war: 2) the most specific is a condition where it is easier to implement and monitor its progress (Ukraine has a larger number of⤵️

#Moldova: The govt announced the closure of 6 more television channels during the state of emergency period, recently extended for the tenth time (already two years ago). Other 6 TV were banned in 2022, replicating somewhat the EU sanctions. These media outlets are accused⤵️ of spreading disinformation and being linked to the fugitives Sor and Plahotniuc. The pro-Russian opposition speaks of a “state capture” by PAS-Sandu through the abusive use of the provisions of the state of emergency. Similar arguments are being invoked by⤵️

#Moldova: The country celebrates its 32nd year of independence, while at the same time multitasking in handling the following: 1) showing solidarity with Ukraine; 2) struggling to meet the conditions to start EU accession negotiations;⤵️ 3) maintaining balancing act in dealing with the breakaway region; 4) strategizing to discourage secessionist calls inside the Gagauzian autonomy; 5) facing serious socioeconomic challenges that pushes more people from the country into the emigration and diaspora;⤵️

#BRICS: The decision to invite the six countries to join the BRICS has geoeconomic and geopolitical reasons: 1. Ethiopia: The country will become the third largest economy in sub-Saharan Africa, with GDP expected to reach $156.1 billion in 2023. At the same time, Ethiopia owes⤵️

https://twitter.com/DionisCenusa/status/1694630064762028360

a debt of 13.7 billion dollars to China, which has invested 4.5 billion dollars in the construction of the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway. This infrastructure is part of China's BRI supply chain. Thus, China was very much in favor of Ethiopia's membership in the BRICS; ⤵️

#Russia: The US is willing to offer security guarantees to Russia's agri-food and fertilizer experts, if they return to the "grain deal." Would that mean that the sanctions on Rosselhozbank will be lifted? It's hard to say, but if the US makes such a proposal, the West seems to⤵️ be worried about the short- and long-term consequences of Russia's destruction of the Ukrainian ports in Odesa. Turkey is the most committed country in the negotiations with Russia on resumption of the grain deal. Two reasons why the US would propose guarantees now:⤵️

#Ukraine: There is a hidden debate that must be unpacked. I talk about the counteroffensive: 1) The counteroffensive has started, but it's reasonably slow; 2) Russian forces mined the land before and behind the defense line; 3) Ukraine needs to use resources wisely⤵️ because new aid is not guaranteed. The western industry is not willing to increase production due to the uncertainty of demand. As a general rule, the industry is private and not state owned; 4) The Russians counterattack in small areas of Donetsk; in other cases,⤵️