#Moldova_Russia: The implications of Russian aggression against Ukraine are qualitatively changing the symmetry in the Moldova-Russia relations in favor of Chisinau. This is one of the underlying conclusions reached by Ch. Smith (@StateDept) on Moldova. A 🧵:⤵️ 1) The US recognizes that there is no real threat from Russia, mainly because its capabilities in Ukraine are at the limit. This has always been the case since the full-scale war began because the Russian military has never come close to reaching the Ukraine-Moldova borders; ⤵️

#Critical_Infrastructure: The implications of Russian airstrikes against Ukraine's critical energy infrastructure in recent weeks (March-April) are still being assessed. Here are some intermediate findings:⤵️

https://twitter.com/dioniscenusa/status/1776132906395594853

1) Russian missiles targeted mainly thermal and hydropower production infrastructure; 2) Both generation and transmission infrastructure were severely damaged; 2) Up to 80% of Ukraine's thermal energy production was affected, with varying degrees of damage;⤵️

#Moldova_Russia: Meanwhile, the administration of the separatist regime asked the EUBAM mission to intervene and reduce tension, convincing Chisinau to remove urgent points (focusing on customs duties). The Feb 28 event of local deputies at all levels in the Transnistria region⤵️

https://twitter.com/dioniscenusa/status/1760626260269731963

was presented as an emergency meeting to discuss an eventual looming humanitarian crisis (as depicted by the separatist regime). It seems to be cry for attention of a (separatist) regime for its survival in conditions of falling budget revenues in the region and⤵️

#Moldova_Russia: There are early signs of escalation in the dialogue between Chisinau and the Transnistrian region. The dispute revolves around economic interests and, closely linked, the stability of the regime in the separatist region. A thread 🧵:⤵️ 1) The Moldovan constitutional authorities are applying a new customs code, which generates costs for the separatist regime. About half of the region's $300 million annual budget could be retained through export and import duties by constitutional authorities. Some⤵️

#Critical_Infrastructure: The gas transit agreement, negotiated in 2019, will expire by the end of 2024. Ukraine & the EU are not willing to extend it. This raises the question of what future awaits the pipeline that transports gas from Russia to Europe via Ukraine. A brief 🧵:⤵️

1) Until now, Russia has been reluctant to launch its missiles against gas infrastructure. Moscow had a utilitarian approach to the Ukrainian gas transportation network, as long as it could make money, but even more minimal geopolitical influence;⤵️

#EU_Enlargement: Today the EU Commission will suggest to EU member states to open Ukraine's accession negotiations, but will recognize that the 7 conditions were not fully implemented. Kyiv has expressed that it’s effort is not appreciated given the circumstances. Both⤵️ the EU and Ukraine have to keep in mind the following: 1) a reform is a process and includes enforcement, which is complicated by the war: 2) the most specific is a condition where it is easier to implement and monitor its progress (Ukraine has a larger number of⤵️

#Moldova: The govt announced the closure of 6 more television channels during the state of emergency period, recently extended for the tenth time (already two years ago). Other 6 TV were banned in 2022, replicating somewhat the EU sanctions. These media outlets are accused⤵️ of spreading disinformation and being linked to the fugitives Sor and Plahotniuc. The pro-Russian opposition speaks of a “state capture” by PAS-Sandu through the abusive use of the provisions of the state of emergency. Similar arguments are being invoked by⤵️

#Moldova: The country celebrates its 32nd year of independence, while at the same time multitasking in handling the following: 1) showing solidarity with Ukraine; 2) struggling to meet the conditions to start EU accession negotiations;⤵️ 3) maintaining balancing act in dealing with the breakaway region; 4) strategizing to discourage secessionist calls inside the Gagauzian autonomy; 5) facing serious socioeconomic challenges that pushes more people from the country into the emigration and diaspora;⤵️

#BRICS: The decision to invite the six countries to join the BRICS has geoeconomic and geopolitical reasons: 1. Ethiopia: The country will become the third largest economy in sub-Saharan Africa, with GDP expected to reach $156.1 billion in 2023. At the same time, Ethiopia owes⤵️

https://twitter.com/DionisCenusa/status/1694630064762028360

a debt of 13.7 billion dollars to China, which has invested 4.5 billion dollars in the construction of the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway. This infrastructure is part of China's BRI supply chain. Thus, China was very much in favor of Ethiopia's membership in the BRICS; ⤵️

#Russia: The US is willing to offer security guarantees to Russia's agri-food and fertilizer experts, if they return to the "grain deal." Would that mean that the sanctions on Rosselhozbank will be lifted? It's hard to say, but if the US makes such a proposal, the West seems to⤵️ be worried about the short- and long-term consequences of Russia's destruction of the Ukrainian ports in Odesa. Turkey is the most committed country in the negotiations with Russia on resumption of the grain deal. Two reasons why the US would propose guarantees now:⤵️

#Ukraine: There is a hidden debate that must be unpacked. I talk about the counteroffensive: 1) The counteroffensive has started, but it's reasonably slow; 2) Russian forces mined the land before and behind the defense line; 3) Ukraine needs to use resources wisely⤵️ because new aid is not guaranteed. The western industry is not willing to increase production due to the uncertainty of demand. As a general rule, the industry is private and not state owned; 4) The Russians counterattack in small areas of Donetsk; in other cases,⤵️

#Russia_Belarus: Not only Prigozhin moves to Belarus, but also the headquarters of the Wagner Group and its legal address. Lukashenko's solution included offering a new “home” for Prigozhin and his mercenary business. In other words:⤵️ 1) Russia is handing over to Belarus the implementer of certain hybrid warfare activities; 2) Prigozhin keeps his business alive against takeover by legitimate Russian force institutions;⤵️

#Critical_Infrastructure: Russian occupation forces are reportedly mining the Crimea Titan factory in Armiansk, the biggest titanium dioxide producer in Eastern Europe. Another weaponization of critical infrastructure in Ukraine by Russia. The factory is using ⤵️ technological ammonia for refrigeration purposes.
Such a sabotage action by Russia put at risk of explosion up to 200 tons of ammonia. The factory explosion will be another Russian man-made disaster to contaminate the southern part of Kherson, which is already facing a ⤵️

#Nagorno_Karabakh: The decoupling of the breakaway region from Armenia is creating sources of crisis. Since Armenia's electricity supply was cut off, allegedly by Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh increased power production from local hydropower. That leads to excessive⤵️ consumption of water from the reservoir. The restriction in the Lachin corridor has pushed local producers to substitute certain supplies from Armenia by increasing irrigation. The deconstruction of the interdependencies between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh⤵️

#EU: The European Political Community summit in Moldova is kicking off. This is a geopolitical event and the Russian aggression against Ukraine contributed to the mobilization of European leaders to join it. Read more about the nature and functions of EPC in our latest article👇

https://twitter.com/dioniscenusa/status/1663493478557384707

I am opening a thread on this event: 1) Zelensky was in Odessa and from there he can travel to Chisinau by train. Many international journalists are waiting at the main train station in Moldova’s capital; 2) Erdogan is not coming and Turkey will be underrepresented.⤵️

#EU_Enlargement: The EU is offering support to the new candidate states like Moldova. However, it is curious how the information about the support is communicated. Here are some short remarks:⤵️

https://twitter.com/vonderleyen/status/1663914866946572299

1) The lowering of the roaming tariffs is a right step, but this is a spillover effect from the recent decision adopted for the Western Balkans. In other words, the measure is not exceptional and it can be replicated to other⤵️

#Moldova_EU: The decision of the EU Council to sanction a list of 5 persons (including fugitive oligarchs and a Russian cleptocrat), considered destabilizing the country (in favor of Russia), is coming into force. The Moldovan govt has advocated for this decision. ⤵️ However, it seems that the scope of the EU sanctions is partly misinterpreted. The Moldovan president claims that the sanctions make it possible to confiscate the assets of the sanctioned politicians, some of whom are fugitive oligarchs. This is not exactly how ⤵️

#Georgia: PM Garibashvili basically excused Russia's aggression against Ukraine with Kyiv's intention to join NATO and warned the EU not to ignore Georgia's candidate status because serios costs could follow. A few observations:⤵️ 1) The ruling party in Georgia is deliberately antagonizing relations with Western & Ukrainian decision makers alike; 2) The discourse used by Garibashvili replicates what China, India and the actors of the Global South are operating based on distorted Russian interpretations;⤵️

#Armenia_Azerbaijan: Power politics dominates Azerbaijan's position in both peace deal and Nagorno-Karabakh separatist region future status:⤵️ 1) Aliyev offers amnesty to Nagorno-Karabakh de facto administration, but only if it dissolves bodies that govern the unrecognized region; 2) Baku says that it could use military force to take control if it wanted to, but it shows patience;⤵️

#Moldova: The ruling party announced that it will initiate a withdrawal from the CIS because it did not help resolve the Transnistrian conflict or guard against energy pressure from Russia. This contradicts previous statements by the ruling party on the gradual exit from⤵️ certain CIS agreements that may conflict with the future process of accession to the EU. From an economic point of view, trade with Russia has been falling in the last decade. In energy terms, Moldova now has alternative routes.⤵️

#Russia_Sanctions: The G7 and the EU are considering sanctioning the importation of Russian gas pipelines and partly also the oil pipeline (Druzhba northern branch) to prevent EU states from changing their position in the future. This seems a kind of self-sanction based on⤵️ the logic that the EU has found enough alternative sources, including large volumes of LNG from the US. An exemption will be needed for the import of Russian pipeline gas through Ukraine (daily up to 43 mcm).