Even with the very weak current IMO regulations, UNCTAD expects the fleet to slow by 6.7% this decade. An extra ~1% of new ship capacity per year will be needed to offset in addition to ~2% per year to replace old ships. Compare this to a #drybulk orderbook of just 5.6% today.
#Drybulk demand grew at a CAGR of 4.7% per year since China was admitted to the WTO. Even if this slows SIGNIFICANTLY to 2.5%, this means to maintain the very tight supply/demand balance we see today, we will need 5%+ of new ship capacity to deliver each year this decade.
In DWT (capacity terms) this 5%+ per year of new ships needed is equivalent to ~50M DWT. This is more ship capacity than has been built in each of the past 8 years. Although not a problem in isolation, shipyards are already full through 2023 ships from other fast growing sectors
Over the same 8 year period shipbuilding capacity has actually been contracting and expected to contract further. All other sectors will need the same extra ~1% of new capacity per year to offset slow steaming and shipbuilding capacity is already sold out before this effect.
With shipbuilding capacity for large ships sold out through 2023 despite one of the lowest cross-sector orderbooks in history on a percentage basis of the global fleet, it is clear that shipbuilding capacity will be grossly insufficient by 2024.
Despite persistently high rates in the last cycle starting in 2003, it took many years to build enough shipbuilding capacity and then many more years to build enough ships to meet demand leading to a 7 year period of very high #drybulk shipping profits.
Although every cycle is different and this is NOT the last cycle, many of the same forces are at work. I expect an extended period of high profitability as forces constraining supply will cause supply to consistently lag demand making shipping a top performer in the coming years.
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I remember in fall 2023 when the unemployment rate first spiked 40bps nearly triggering Sahm rule, delinquencies started to go parabolic, student loans were supposed to go into repayment (before 2 more years of Biden can kicking) someone said that equities couldn't go lower when EVERYONE was bearish. This turned out to be the correct take. Markets went higher -> wealth effect -> reflexive economic strength along with fiscal can kicking heroics by Yellen and the Biden Admin to get through the election.
At the time, I tried to imagine a scenario where everyone was bullish DESPITE an incredibly bearish backdrop and couldn't. But here we are.
Read the comments on any bearish data or bearish takes today. Lots of "markets only go up". No rationale other than technicals and markets usually go up.
Sure the soft data hasn't been a reliable indicator in recent years but the hard data is starting to roll but nobody cares because "markets go up". And nobody is looking forward - the headwinds to the hard data are massive and obvious.
The response to a confluence of bearish factors is always "Fiscal dominance" or "Trump will jawbone the market up" or "who cares chart says up". Nothing like price to drive sentiment.
I'm personally exhausted. I'm starting to be concerned that the degens might actually be right and we go straight to Zimbabwe without the global margin call step.
At the same time my own feelings tell me we might be near that moment where positioning is back offsides and we are due for a mean reversion.
Logic tells me to stay the course - The bearish case is far clearer than it was in 2022 or anytime since yet sentiment is the most dislocated from reality today. And although I have always thought we would get the global margin call before the Zimbabwe, the fact that the Fed is not cooperating gives me more conviction that the Fed will require things to get MUCH worse before taking action to enable the Zimbabwe regime to begin.
I can only hope that the regime shift from margin call to Zimbabwe will be obvious when all is said and done and I can nail the turn from net short to levered long. Probably naive to think I can nail the path but this feels like the juice is worth the squeeze. GLTA.
Hydrocarbon trades (regardless of clean/dirty) are super fungible over any time period more than the next couple months. If profits in one size get out of whack, the WILL be quickly cannibalized by other ship sizes into a more typical $/ton distribution.
1/ FINALLY some good data on US port calls vs Chinese fleet proportion regarding the proposed Chinese ship fees.
🧵TLDR: Most shipping trades will easily find non-Chinese tonnage to call US ports to avoid the fees
h/t Omar/Jefferies the first reasonable take vs the hysterics
2/ Here are the ratios of non-Chinese fleet to US share of global trade to show how many times over US trade is covered for each segment by the non-Chinese fleet:
3/ Thats not to say there won't be disruption and extra costs. THERE WILL BE. Just not nearly to the hysterical estimates I keep seeing from shipping analysts and the liner company CEOs talking their book and threatening huge reductions in port calls. Not going to happen.
2/ With inventories at bottom of 5 year averages, it seems unlikely that inventories decline meaningfully from here. Just returning to flat inventories adds back the +30 VLCCs of demand. Adding the expected 1mm b/d supply/demand growth in 2025 requires another +30 VLCCs.
3/ Therefore my base case for 2025 sees +60 VLCC equivalents employed vs levels seen since June.
This is vs a fleet of ~900 VLCCS so +7% utilization relative to recent months.
1/ Buried under all of the Middle East and port strike chaos headlines, a very important debate about a carbon tax on shipping is ongoing at IMO meetings this week.
2/ Support for a carbon tax is gathering momentum as it would be one of the most simple, economic, and effective ways to lower carbon emissions in the shipping industry. On the other side of the debate are middle income countries responsible for the lion's share of world trade
3/ These major exporters oppose it because it will increase the cost of traded goods which is partially borne by the producer and partially borne by the consumer.
What few vessels the US has sanctioned due to Russian oil prior to Sovcomflot have been mostly stranded due to the sanctions.
I never trade after hours but felt compelled to today. Picked up a good chunk of $IMPP (had already been buying this dip earlier this week) and $TNK at fair prices. Tried for some $TNP as well but only got a bit.
I count 42x aframax and 15x suezmax in the sovcomflot fleet. If all of these are sidelined, I expect midsize rates to benefit the most which is why I bought the above. $NAT also a good option but already bid up much higher after hours.