One of the most difficult issues in researching & writing about electronic warfare in WW2’s Pacific Theater is it’s systematic exclusion from the USN’s official histories. This exclusion was as systematic was it was intentional.
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The war diaries of the US Navy are both digitized and available on the Fold3.com service.
A simple search on the radar decoy code name “Window” in the WW2 War Diaries gets thousands of hits. 2/ fold3.com
Window was one of the names for radar dipole decoys dropped from A/C, rockets, bombs and artillery.
The Japanese were both technically skilled and increasingly proficient in its use by 1945.
And, like those thousands of Fold3.com war diary hits, their efforts 3/
...using window didn't make USN WW2 institutional history.
My trail of Japanese window use started with a spread sheet from MacArthur’s Sec. 22 files that detailed 53 locations and 54 specific instances of Japanese window use.
These occurred between 31 Aug. 1943 & Jan. 1945. 4/
The first window use against a SWPA radar was at Hammond Island, Queenland, Australia.
This Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) radar site worked with No. 3 Fighter Sector (3FS) in covering the Torres Strait facing New Guinea, which operated between 1942 and 1943. 5/
The Japanese plane that did it was likely a IJN flying boat operating from Salamaua.
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The last Section 22 tactical window reference was from Jan 1945 to a cache of window captured from a belly landed Jill bomber found in Caguray River Bed (Philippines). 7/
Lt. Commander Sudo Hajime’s gima-shi “deceiving paper" was 1st used a Guadalcanal in May 1943.
In addition to pre-dating the Hammond Island drop, this was well before the Operation Gomora firebombing raid on Hamburg.
The USMC 10th Defense Battalion March 1944 war diary while on Kwajalein shows successful Japanese air raids on 8 March 1944 were aided by the use of gima-shi radar countermeasures vs it's 2-meter band SCR-268 GFC radars.
SSgt Jacob Marty from USMC Air Warning Squadron-1 was killed in that March 1944 attack.
Subsequently the 10th's SCR-268's were replaced by US Army SCR-584 to support 90mm gun while USN Mark 20 radars were adapted to ground based searchlight work.
Thomas Kolesa modified his Mk 20 at Okinawa to extend it's range from 25,000 to 30,000 yards when the Japanese figured out it's range based on when their planes were being illuminated.
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Returning to 1944, the 1st US Navy mention of a warship seeing Japanese window in FOLD3.com was 12 Feb 1944 at ~0200 in the morning by USS Mustin (DD413).
She was escorting CVE's off Roi Island. 13/
Pretty much every USMC amphibious landing from Eniwetok to Okinawa saw Japanese use of window.
The USMC early warning teams attached to IIIMAC & US Army XXIVth Corps at Okinawa recorded 43 separate window drops the nights of 12-19 April 1945.
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Yet how many naval histories of the Pacific War mention that even once?
There are a lot of history PhD's awaiting the ambitious willing to run this down.
The following text 🧵 is from Strategypage -=dot- com:
"Procurement: Economic Industrial Decline For Russia
May 8, 2025: The Ukraine war disrupted Russian manufacturing activity as production shifted to military needs. The large number of Russian men mobilized for the war...
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...caused labor shortages. Then there were over a million Russian men lost, killed, disabled, deserted or fled the country to avoid military service.
The labor shortage is made worse by the lack of high school and university graduates with technical training.
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Too many of those grads concentrated on the humanities rather than industrial and software engineering. As a result, firms manufacturing requiring a lot of people with technical skills cut production.
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The following is an article from the Strategypage -dot- com web page
"Leadership: How to End A Corrupt War
May 14, 2025: Since 2024 more and more Ukrainian generals and military analysts have been predicting the collapse of the Russian military by mid-2025.
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Now their Russian counterparts are agreeing that the end is near. One Russian general was so dismayed at this that he killed himself. Increasingly Russian men are not just evading military service, but helping those in the military to walk away.
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It’s not just the soldiers. Russian industry, starved by increasingly harsh economic sanctions since 2014 sanctions, is no longer able to produce military equipment. Worse, the capability to repair or refurbish existing equipment has disappeared.
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This Ukrainian video shared by @bayraktar_1love makes clear it wasn't US Patriots on German mobile launchers that nailed a Backfire bomber and a pair of A-50 AEW radar planes.
It was a Ukrainian 1960's era S-200 (Nato SA-5) SAM.
What that video showed was the remote control feature for the S-200's 5P72 launchers.
This Soviet PVO scheme allowed S-200 batteries to put the 5P72 launcher near the front lines and keep the 5N62 Square Pair illuminating target radar 100 km behind it,
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...out of range of NATO tactical ballistic missiles.
A lot of "expert" X accounts in Feb 2024 were saying that this video showed a Patriot engagement or Russian friendly fire engagement.
The A-50 countermeasures pattern was inconsistent with both.
The most important grand strategy scale decision of this conflict has been Ukraine's move to mass produce multi-copter drones, Propeller assault (OWA) drones, jet drone-missiles and increasing numbers of military spare parts via masses of 3D/AM printers.
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Ukraine is making 4 million drones a year including over 30,000 long range OWA drones and 3,000 "Drone-missiles" of three models a year.
That's over
33K small drones
2,500 OWA drones, and
250 Drone-missiles per month.
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I have a copy of Solly Zuckerman's book mentioned in the thread below and I can confirm it's applicability to the Russo-Ukrainian War for the Ukrainian cause.
To date, no strategic bombing campaign has been analyzed by serious historians as to how the targeting decisions for the various strategic bombing campaigns against Germany, Japan, North Korea, and North Vietnam/Laos/Cambodia were done.
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To quote the late Pierre Sprey:
"...strategic bombing targeting in every one of those campaigns was done by highly centralized, highly bureaucratized committees--and every one of those committees
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