Just sitting there, anchored off the coast of Guandong Province southwest of Hong Kong, are two large roll-on/roll-off passenger ferries, more than a thousand miles from their normal routes crossing the Yellow Sea.
The two ferries, which you can check out realtime for yourself via these links, are the BO HAI MA ZHU, built in 2015 at over 33000 gross tons, owned by Bo Hai ferries and homeported at Yantai on the Yellow Sea… marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details…
…and the HU LU DAO, built in 2005 at over 16000 gross tons, owned by China Shipping Passenger Liner Co. and homeported at Dalian, also on the Yellow Sea in northern China. marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details…
Both ferries appear to be anchored for more than 24 hrs, & each made a stop in a nearby port (2 different ones) before they moved to where they are now.
The nearest coastline appears to consist of sandy beaches, and is near the amphibious training area from the 2020 ramp tests.
So…we have two large ro/ro car ferries, one that’s part of an organized unit of the PRC Maritime Militia, just sitting there—not making money in their normal manner—at a known amphibious training area more than a thousand miles from home. digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewconten…
My guess: the PLA’s efforts to integrate China’s world-class merchant marine into its amphibious assault forces continue; if successful, this could potentially increase its cross-Strait Taiwan sealift capacity immensely, removing one of the major obstacles to invasion of Taiwan.
Would you like to know more? See section V of my recent testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: cnas.org/publications/c…
UPDATE: China confirms the use of civilian ships as part of "cross-sea exercises" in this article. globaltimes.cn/page/202107/12…
Looks like the units loaded onto the civilian ships were both from the PLAN Marine Corps...
...and also from the PLA Ground Force.
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I’m excited to share that @ChinaMaritime has just released a short paper I co-wrote with Mike Dahm titled “Flooding the Zone: The Use of Civilian Landing Craft (LCTs) in PLA Amphibious Operations”.
This paper follows the surprising observation last year that the PLA appears to be using civilian “LCTs” - a civilian derivative of WWII landing craft - to go straight to the beach in practice landing exercises.
...first up, China's nuclear warhead totals. This year's report says that warhead production has slowed, with a total in the low 600s, but that the PLA is still on track to have 1000+ warheads by 2030.
Regarding China's early warning capability, we get a lot more specificity than I've seen before: that China now has IR warning satellites that can detect and warn of an incoming ICBM within minutes.
Last week saw the release of the 2025 China Military Power Report (CMPR). For those not familiar, this is DoD’s Congressionally-mandated unclassified update on the Chinese military. It’s an annual feast of open-source data.
So, here are few thoughts (Part 1) on the report:
I'll focus on those things that I thought were most noteworthy: significant changes from previous reports, reveals of information not previously seen in the open-source world, etc.
Where there is a point of comparison I'll have the new report on the left, older on the right.
The new report is fairly different: for one thing, it clocks in at 100 pages to the previous report's 182.
From the top, the preface differs: the 2024 report's reads mostly like an intel product, where there's more proclamation of administration policy in the new one.
PRC SEALIFT UPDATE: based on a review of satellite imagery & AIS data from recent landing exercises, it appears China is practicing using dual-use civil-military landing craft for direct beach assault.
Of note, while info is sparse, these ships appear to exist in large numbers.
To the details: for a few years now, we've seen what've been known as "deck cargo ships" being used in PLA military transport exercises.
This has been making the rounds—another article calling for U.S. conventional submarines—so I suppose it's time to weigh in. In this case, the article is written by someone personally knowledgeable of submarine operations—a U.S. submariner.
...the article seems to be missing consideration of two key factors that IMO continue to make the idea of U.S. (manned) diesel-electric submarines a bad idea: advances in autonomy, and the PLA Rocket Force.
First, autonomy: he explicitly calls for these diesel boats as cruise missile platforms (SSGs), making a point to separate them from the multi-mission capabilities of U.S. SSNs.
No need for ISR, ASW, or torpedo capability. Ok, great—this sounds like a perfect job for an XXLUUV.
She's pretty clear about how we got where we are: close to a US-PRC war, that the problem started with Taiwan.
She says the situation is not pre-ordained, and that the best way to avoid a war is to restrain US military posture in the region and tell Taiwan they may be on their own.
(I'd say she's half-right: it didn't have to be this way; but I'd place the blame elsewhere.)