Tom Shugart Profile picture
Jul 25, 2021 12 tweets 4 min read Read on X
UPDATE: it looks like the PLA may be at it again.

Poking around MarineTraffic.com last night, I noticed something a bit odd…
Just sitting there, anchored off the coast of Guandong Province southwest of Hong Kong, are two large roll-on/roll-off passenger ferries, more than a thousand miles from their normal routes crossing the Yellow Sea. Image
The two ferries, which you can check out realtime for yourself via these links, are the BO HAI MA ZHU, built in 2015 at over 33000 gross tons, owned by Bo Hai ferries and homeported at Yantai on the Yellow Sea… marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details…
…and the HU LU DAO, built in 2005 at over 16000 gross tons, owned by China Shipping Passenger Liner Co. and homeported at Dalian, also on the Yellow Sea in northern China. marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details…
Both ferries appear to be anchored for more than 24 hrs, & each made a stop in a nearby port (2 different ones) before they moved to where they are now.

The nearest coastline appears to consist of sandy beaches, and is near the amphibious training area from the 2020 ramp tests. Image
So…we have two large ro/ro car ferries, one that’s part of an organized unit of the PRC Maritime Militia, just sitting there—not making money in their normal manner—at a known amphibious training area more than a thousand miles from home. digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewconten… Image
My guess: the PLA’s efforts to integrate China’s world-class merchant marine into its amphibious assault forces continue; if successful, this could potentially increase its cross-Strait Taiwan sealift capacity immensely, removing one of the major obstacles to invasion of Taiwan.
Would you like to know more? See section V of my recent testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: cnas.org/publications/c…
UPDATE: China confirms the use of civilian ships as part of "cross-sea exercises" in this article. globaltimes.cn/page/202107/12…
Looks like the units loaded onto the civilian ships were both from the PLAN Marine Corps... Image
...and also from the PLA Ground Force. Image
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More from @tshugart3

Dec 20
"Rattner [sic] said Xi Jinping’s goal of having his military ready to carry out a “short, sharp invasion” of Taiwan by 2027 “is not possible right now.”"

I was at this event, and that is not what I recall them saying. What I recall is them saying is...
news.usni.org/2024/12/19/chi…
...that invasion was "neither imminent nor inevitable", that the PLA faced obstacles in reaching Xi's 2027 goal, and in terms of a short sharp invasion at acceptable cost, "they're not there today".

But judge for yourself, that portion is around 12:00:
IMO my recollection is consistent with this statement, provided at a separate brief to reporters—and released by DoD.

Again: not imminent or inevitable, Xi remains committed to 2027 goals but corruption could slow them down (i.e., not "not possible" to meet 2027 goals). 🤷‍♂️ Image
Read 4 tweets
Dec 19
A masterful summary by @AndrewSErickson on yesterday's 2024 China Military Power Report.
warontherocks.com/2024/12/what-t…
As fine of an intro as I've seen in some time: Image
Looking for a nice anti-ship ballistic missile? The PLA now has five flavors: the OG DF-21D, DF-26, DF-17, YJ-21, and now the DF-27. Image
Read 6 tweets
Dec 19
Moving on, here's part 3 of my thoughts on the 2024 China Military Power report. We'll start with the PRC's nuclear forces.

Overall, DoD estimates the PRC has 600+ warheads. Last year's report said 500, with 1000 expected by 2030, so this 20% increase isn't really a surprise. 🤷‍♂️ Image
We also get news the PLARF is doubling the size of the DF-5 liquid-fueled ICBM silo force.

We also get a new discussion of possible reasons for the massive nuclear expansion: in part due to concerns about US BMD (note: not US nuclear modernization). Image
While US BMD could have something to do with it, I think there's more to it: Xi has said China will have a "world-class" military, and this is probably part of that.

Also, a robust nuclear force is insurance against a US nuclear response to large-scale PRC conventional strikes.
Read 16 tweets
Dec 19
Moving on, here's part 2 of this thread on the 2024 China Military Power report.

First up, the PLA Rocket Force, which is where IMO biggest news resides.
First, the report provides a section on PLARF force structure, with an estimate ICBM brigades have 6-12 launchers, other brigades 24-48—a detail I don't recall from previous reports.

Also, it details there's probably different C2 for nuclear vs. conventional ops, also new AFAIK. Image
The report also reveals the DF-21C MRBM is on its way out, with no more dedicated brigades operating it (I assume there are still DF-21D anti-ship brigades?). Image
Read 17 tweets
Dec 19
Ok, here we go: some thoughts on the 2024 DoD China Military Power report, or CMPR, which was released yesterday (finally!).

I'll focus on updates I thought were interesting/consequential - areas new or different from last year's report.

(part 1) Image
In general, I'd say the report has few surprises this year (but one significant one, detailed in the next installment).

The PLA continues on its trajectory of significant improvements in reach and capability, with no signs of slowing down.
For comparisons between the 2024 and 2023 reports, this year's report will be on the left, last year's on the right.

First up: total numbers. The PLA remains the largest active-duty military in the world, though some numbers dropped a bit due to a change in counting methods. Image
Image
Read 20 tweets
Sep 27
1. Everyone involved in reporting this clearly understands that nuclear submarines had not—yet—been built in Wuhan, and that this was a new development: a significant expansion of nuclear submarine production outside of Huludao.
1. cont'd: rumors of a new "auxiliary nuclear powerplant for electricity generation for fitting into conventional submarine designs" (like the subs they've been building at Wuhan) have been circulating for years, so not that surprising of a development.cimsec.org/pla-navys-plan…
2. Everyone also understands the Yangtze is shallow, which is why for years the subs being built there have been taken downriver on barges. The new boat is only ~10% longer than previous classes, nothing like the size of PRC SSNs, so no reason to think it couldn't be so also.
Read 7 tweets

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