Just sitting there, anchored off the coast of Guandong Province southwest of Hong Kong, are two large roll-on/roll-off passenger ferries, more than a thousand miles from their normal routes crossing the Yellow Sea.
The two ferries, which you can check out realtime for yourself via these links, are the BO HAI MA ZHU, built in 2015 at over 33000 gross tons, owned by Bo Hai ferries and homeported at Yantai on the Yellow Sea… marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details…
…and the HU LU DAO, built in 2005 at over 16000 gross tons, owned by China Shipping Passenger Liner Co. and homeported at Dalian, also on the Yellow Sea in northern China. marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details…
Both ferries appear to be anchored for more than 24 hrs, & each made a stop in a nearby port (2 different ones) before they moved to where they are now.
The nearest coastline appears to consist of sandy beaches, and is near the amphibious training area from the 2020 ramp tests.
So…we have two large ro/ro car ferries, one that’s part of an organized unit of the PRC Maritime Militia, just sitting there—not making money in their normal manner—at a known amphibious training area more than a thousand miles from home. digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewconten…
My guess: the PLA’s efforts to integrate China’s world-class merchant marine into its amphibious assault forces continue; if successful, this could potentially increase its cross-Strait Taiwan sealift capacity immensely, removing one of the major obstacles to invasion of Taiwan.
Would you like to know more? See section V of my recent testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: cnas.org/publications/c…
UPDATE: China confirms the use of civilian ships as part of "cross-sea exercises" in this article. globaltimes.cn/page/202107/12…
Looks like the units loaded onto the civilian ships were both from the PLAN Marine Corps...
...and also from the PLA Ground Force.
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One key thing the armchair “wHY dIdN'T THe hELicOpteR SEe ThE airLinER On A CLeAr NiGhT” folks miss is a concept folks in the maritime business call CBDR: constant bearing, decreasing range.
What that means is that if you’re on an intercept course with another vessel (or airplane), they will have no apparent relative motion when you look at them. eoceanic.com/sailing/tips/2…
Put simply, if you can see the other party moving right or left across your field of view, then you’re guaranteed not to hit them (if you both maintain your course and speed).
They’ll either pass ahead or behind.
However, if the other vessel/plane stays in the same spot in your field of view, but is just getting bigger, then you have a problem - CBDR.
Many folks probably saw @CovertShores' recent find: that China is building multiple special vessels seemingly intended to transfer vehicles ashore in support of a PRC invasion of Taiwan.
Let's start with overall numbers. @CovertShores indicated in his article that there are, "3 but likely 5 or more...".
I'd put the emphasis on "or more", as I count what looks like 7 in this image of the GSI Longxue Island shipyard taken on 28 November 2024:
Next, let's zoom in, starting with #1 above.
Since I know of no designation for this type of vessel, I'm going to make one up: the T-LPT (i.e., civilian-crewed auxiliary landing platform—transfer). And I'll call this one the Type 1.
I'm pleased to announce the release of a new report I co-authored with @timothyawalton for @HudsonInstitute titled Concrete Sky: Air Base Hardening in the Western Pacific.
Some folks may recall a preliminary assessment I posted in 2023 on this topic, as I came to realize that China appeared to be engaged in a nationwide, robust effort to harden its air bases - and that the US was doing relatively little in this area.
"Rattner [sic] said Xi Jinping’s goal of having his military ready to carry out a “short, sharp invasion” of Taiwan by 2027 “is not possible right now.”"
I was at this event, and that is not what I recall them saying. What I recall is them saying is... news.usni.org/2024/12/19/chi…
...that invasion was "neither imminent nor inevitable", that the PLA faced obstacles in reaching Xi's 2027 goal, and in terms of a short sharp invasion at acceptable cost, "they're not there today".
But judge for yourself, that portion is around 12:00:
IMO my recollection is consistent with this statement, provided at a separate brief to reporters—and released by DoD.
Again: not imminent or inevitable, Xi remains committed to 2027 goals but corruption could slow them down (i.e., not "not possible" to meet 2027 goals). 🤷♂️
Moving on, here's part 3 of my thoughts on the 2024 China Military Power report. We'll start with the PRC's nuclear forces.
Overall, DoD estimates the PRC has 600+ warheads. Last year's report said 500, with 1000 expected by 2030, so this 20% increase isn't really a surprise. 🤷♂️
We also get news the PLARF is doubling the size of the DF-5 liquid-fueled ICBM silo force.
We also get a new discussion of possible reasons for the massive nuclear expansion: in part due to concerns about US BMD (note: not US nuclear modernization).
While US BMD could have something to do with it, I think there's more to it: Xi has said China will have a "world-class" military, and this is probably part of that.
Also, a robust nuclear force is insurance against a US nuclear response to large-scale PRC conventional strikes.