Just sitting there, anchored off the coast of Guandong Province southwest of Hong Kong, are two large roll-on/roll-off passenger ferries, more than a thousand miles from their normal routes crossing the Yellow Sea.
The two ferries, which you can check out realtime for yourself via these links, are the BO HAI MA ZHU, built in 2015 at over 33000 gross tons, owned by Bo Hai ferries and homeported at Yantai on the Yellow Sea… marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details…
…and the HU LU DAO, built in 2005 at over 16000 gross tons, owned by China Shipping Passenger Liner Co. and homeported at Dalian, also on the Yellow Sea in northern China. marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details…
Both ferries appear to be anchored for more than 24 hrs, & each made a stop in a nearby port (2 different ones) before they moved to where they are now.
The nearest coastline appears to consist of sandy beaches, and is near the amphibious training area from the 2020 ramp tests.
So…we have two large ro/ro car ferries, one that’s part of an organized unit of the PRC Maritime Militia, just sitting there—not making money in their normal manner—at a known amphibious training area more than a thousand miles from home. digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewconten…
My guess: the PLA’s efforts to integrate China’s world-class merchant marine into its amphibious assault forces continue; if successful, this could potentially increase its cross-Strait Taiwan sealift capacity immensely, removing one of the major obstacles to invasion of Taiwan.
Would you like to know more? See section V of my recent testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: cnas.org/publications/c…
UPDATE: China confirms the use of civilian ships as part of "cross-sea exercises" in this article. globaltimes.cn/page/202107/12…
Looks like the units loaded onto the civilian ships were both from the PLAN Marine Corps...
...and also from the PLA Ground Force.
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Now that the 2023 ship launch numbers are in (or at least my best guess of them), it's time for an update on the last 10 years worth of PLA Navy shipbuilding, and how it compares the production from the U.S. and allied navies.
These estimates will generally cover ships launched from 2014-2023, and will include ships useful in high intensity combat/power projection: subs, carriers, amphibious assault ships, surface combatants, ocean going fleet auxiliaries (e.g., tankers), and mine warfare ships.
First, let’s look at hull count. By my estimate, the PLAN launched 157 warships over the years 2014-2023. As always, these numbers are from open source data for ship launches which China doesn't always publicize, so don't @ me if you have a niggle with them. 🤷♂️
UDPDATE: a few months back I provided this update on one of China's shipyard construction projects - the expansion of Hudong-Zhonghua Shipyard—a major supplier to the PLA Navy, building mostly frigates and amphibious assault ships.
So yesterday I decided to grab some imagery (from @planet via @SkyWatchApps) to see how things were proceeding. I expected to see continued construction progress.
What I didn't expect to see is that THEY ARE ALREADY BUILDING SHIPS THERE. 😯
There have been rumors in the media that this new yard would start construction of a new class of amphibious assault ship - the Type 076. And it looks like that might well be the case. scmp.com/news/china/mil…
This is an interesting & engaging article by @james_acton32 on counterforce vs. counter-value nuclear targeting. Which targeting philosophy to follow (or even what they mean) is a question on which reasonable people can and do disagree. warontherocks.com/2023/11/two-my…
That said, I think the "myths" that the article centers on and debunks in discussing the issue are a bit of a straw man - in that IMO few people who know anything about nuclear targeting/policy actually believe them.
Let's look at the evidence he puts forward in support of Myth 1. First, there's the primary link describing the them...
Oops, broken link!
Now, this happens. Authors can't control web site changes. (Most links for my older articles are broken.) But this article is 1 day old. 🤷♂️
Let’s get straight into the top-line numbers. The report shows major increases in every category of China’s long range missiles.
Fielded ICBM launchers jump from 300 to 500, and the number of missiles goes up from 300 to 350 (I guess they haven’t filled all those silos yet).
While the number of launchers stays the same, the estimate of the number of intermediate-range missiles (i.e., the “Guam Killers”) goes from a somewhat vague “250+” to a solid 500.
This week saw the release of the 2023 China Military Power Report (CMPR). For those not familiar, this is DoD’s congressionally-mandated unclassified update on the Chinese military. It’s an annual feast of open source data.
So, here are few thoughts (Part 1) on the report:
Big flick: the PRC, through the increasing military capability of the PLA, is taking more coercive action against its neighbors in the region (just ask the Philippines & Taiwan).
While improving its ability to fight the U.S., it seems largely uninterested in talking anymore.
On to the details: first up - the PLA Army section (yes, Army is repeated).
We get a bit of news that the PLAA used its new long-range rocket artillery during Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in 2022.
UPDATE: three of the Bo Hai ferries: Bo Hai Cui Zhu, Heng Da, and Bao Zhu; are now at what appears to be an industrial wharf in Xiamen, across the Strait from Taiwan. My guess is they're doing on-load/off-load ops for a PLA operation/exercise of some sort.
Bo Hai Fei Zhu appears to be at anchor off a beach just southwest of Xiamen. This is consistent with previous exercises that practiced amphibious landing operations at similar beaches nearby.
Bo Hai Jin Zhu is now broadcasting a destination that I think is supposed to be Yantai, back north on the Yellow Sea, so it may be heading home.