With their cynical approach to the People's Republic of China 🇨🇳 the four chancellors Schmidt (1974-82), Kohl (1982-98), Schröder (1998-2005) and Merkel (2005-21) have done Germany 🇩🇪 a disservice. There is much to be learned from their leadership failures. A short thread 🧵 /1
Chancellor Helmut Kohl is best known for his role in Germany's re-unification. Yet he also helped normalising the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) after the 1989 Tiananmen massacre. In 1995 he was the "first Western leader to visit a Chinese military base" /2 nytimes.com/1995/11/09/wor…
Kohl's visit to the People's Liberation Army 196 Infantry Division outside Tianjin was highly symbolic. It was a clear signal to the Chinese Communist Party that the atrocities of 1989 were no longer an obstacle to western business engagement with China /3 scmp.com/article/138269…
Under Kohl German China policy was increasingly driven by mercantilist considerations. Kohl helped to "[convince] a generation of German political and business elites that China held the key to Germany’s long-term prosperity." /4 politico.eu/article/german…
Kohl's successor Chancellor Gerhard Schröder went further. He relegated human rights concerns to a toothless 'dialogue'. In 2005 he lobbied to lift the European arms embargo, which he saw as an obstacle to deepening Germany's commercial ties with China /5 dw.com/en/schr%C3%B6d…
Schröder admired former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. Despite retiring from front-line politics in the early 1980s, Schmidt exercised very problematic intellectual leadership in the early 2000s. Time and again Schmidt argued against China's democratisation /6 spiegel.de/politik/deutsc…
Schmidt argued that "in China all the prerequisites for a democracy were missing, there were no democratic traditions in Chinese history (author's translation)". He exaggerated the importance of Confucianism in Chinese political thought and practice /7 handelsblatt.com/meinung/kommen…
The German journalist Erling has portrayed Helmut Schmidt as part of the 'sceptic generation': Schmidt had grown up in the Third Reich; he was disillusioned, displayed a cynical attitude; rejected political visions and advocated pragmatism /8 welt.de/politik/auslan…
Erling critiqued Schmidt as an "authoritarian character dressed in the cloak of the sceptic. And therefore an admirer of all authoritarians in this world as long as they have power; and a despiser of anti-authoritarian democracy (author's translation)" /9
During a talk in 2012 "the former chancellor expressed his doubts about the export of Western democracy to the People's Republic". Gu Xuewu disagreed and told Schmidt that "a free system was always a better option than the naked exercise of power" /10 dw.com/en/magnet-chin…
Sieren has argued that "Germans should think hard about how to address [Schmidt's] legacy". Yet Schmidt's view of China was very problematic. He portrayed it in culturally essentialist terms. He also frequently gave the CCP the benefit of the doubt /11 dw.com/en/sierens-chi…
Following Schröder's election defeat in 2005 Angela Merkel began her long reign as chancellor. U-turn after u-turn revealed her lack of leadership. First she was in favour of nuclear energy, only to change her mind after Fukushima /12 dw.com/en/opinion-ang…
Merkel initially was critical of China and even met the Dalai Lama in 2007. Yet her biggest legacy will be the ill-considered Comprehensive Agreement on Investment #CAI. Merkel prioritised the bottom line of German conglomerates over any other concerns /13 spiegel.de/international/…
Under Merkel German China policy was effectively outsourced to the private sector. This opened the flood gates to corporate propaganda. In their blind pursuit of short-term profits economic elites distorted the German public discourse about China /14
Let me conclude with a brief summary. When the four chancellors exercised leadership they either normalised the CCP (Kohl), made the case against China's democratisation (Schmidt), or prioritised commerce over other enlightened values and interests (Schröder and Merkel) /15
There is now a lot to unlearn. Myths about the importance of China's market and misunderstandings about China's political system need to be busted. Academics and think tankers should help to inform a more critical public debate about China. Germany needs a reality check /16
The SPD foreign affairs spokesperson Schmid is right when arguing that “[we] need a real foreign policy for China — not just a business-oriented policy (...) We need to decouple our foreign policy from the commercial interests of big business” /End ft.com/content/0de447…
If you found the thread 🧵 about the four German chancellors’ cynical approach to China thought provoking please consider this thread from September 14, 2020. Here I write about the pitfalls of Germany’s single-minded pursuit of foreign trade promotion (Außenwirtschaftsförderung)
I am not convinced that institutional funding by @AuswaertigesAmt for @merics_eu is such a good thing. China competence sounds great, but we need to understand the multitude of our relationships with China better. This will require a (self-)critical introspection. A short 🧵/1
I am mindful that think tanks need to diversify their funding streams. So I can understand why @merics_eu is happy to accept support also from @AuswaertigesAmt. But there is a catch: when it comes to China policy, the AA has struggled to assert itself vis-à-vis the Chancellery /2
@merics_eu @AuswaertigesAmt Of course @merics_eu could use AA funding to publish more insightful reports about China. But in my view we do not simply need more knowledge about China. In addition, think tanks should regularly assess the state of our relationships with China. But that is quite challenging /3
In #ChinaLeaks (C.H. Beck, 2024) investigative journalist Markus Frenzel uncovers Beijing's secret influence network in Germany. A must-read for those concerned about Western elites' complacency towards the Chinese Communist Party's illegal interference in liberal democracies /1
Frenzel’s book is the result of a two-year investigation with twenty-one journalists across ten countries. It explains the 'friend-enemy' mentality underpinning the CCP's United Front work at home and abroad. It draws on specific examples of elite capture in Germany /2
While making an uncomfortable reading for Chinese citizens on the leaked #UnitedFront list, it is important to recognise the book's focus on political critique rather than racial bias. Frenzel emphasises the need for critical awareness over discrimination /3
Strategic blindness in Germany’s approach to China has led to mounting costs in terms of national sovereignty, economic independence and civil liberties. Learn how entanglement with China erodes Germany's strategic autonomy. A short 🧵/1 rusi.org/explore-our-re…
Beyond the partner, competitor, and systemic rival trifecta. A neo-totalitarian Chinese Communist Party (CCP) threatens freedom, prosperity, and security, at home and abroad /2
Why the CCP struggles against its opponents. A key feature of both Maoism and Stalinism, 'perpetual struggle', informs Xi Jinping's thinking and fuels the party's friend-enemy mentality /3
German China policy remains highly contested 🇩🇪🇨🇳. On the one hand there are the German industrialists representing the interests of the #4BigCorps VW, BMW, Daimler, BASF etc and their defenders of the status quo in politics and academia /1
On the other hand we have a motley crew of independent-minded parliamentarians, journalists & analysts, who would like to see a more principled and assertive German China policy. Thus far the silverbacks are winning. How can we bring about policy change under such conditions? /2
In my newest book "Germany and China: How Entanglement Undermines Freedom, Prosperity and Security" (Bloomsbury, 2024) 📖🇩🇪🇨🇳 I have outlined my theory of change (TOC) /3
On 14 March 2024 the Centre for Finance and Security at @RUSI_org, in partnership with SOC ACE, organised a workshop on the threats faced by 🇩🇪 and 🇬🇧 from hostile state actors. What follows is a short 🧵 with key takeaways from the conference report /1 rusi.org/explore-our-re…
The workshop brought together experts, academics, policymakers from Germany and the UK, private sector representatives, and civil society members /2
State threats are defined as hostile acts orchestrated by foreign governments and proxies that fall short of war but include threats to people, assets, services, information acquisition, interference with democracy, and shaping the international environment /3
Der Einfluss der Kommunistischen Partei Chinas in 🇩🇪 beschränkt sich nicht nur auf die extremen politischen Ränder links und rechts, sondern reicht tief in unser politisches und wirtschaftliches Establishment hinein. Wann wird diese #Elitenkooptierung aufgedeckt? Ein kurzer 🧵 /1
🇨🇳 Einmischung in 🇩🇪 ist schon länger auf der Agenda. Der Fokus liegt aber meist auf bestechliche Politiker. Journalisten haben mir erklärt, dass sich Leser nicht für von Peking kultivierte 🇩🇪 Eliten in Wirtschaft und Wissenschaft interessieren, da sie nicht sehr bekannt seien /2
Die China-Debatte ist stark durch Personen mit Agenda geprägt, wobei nicht immer klar ist, ob aufgeklärte 🇩🇪 Interessen oder die der 🇨🇳 Partei vertreten werden. Es darf uns aber nicht egal sein, wenn von Peking kultivierte 🇩🇪 Eliten unseren Chinadiskurs so stark prägen /3