With their cynical approach to the People's Republic of China 🇨🇳 the four chancellors Schmidt (1974-82), Kohl (1982-98), Schröder (1998-2005) and Merkel (2005-21) have done Germany 🇩🇪 a disservice. There is much to be learned from their leadership failures. A short thread 🧵 /1
Chancellor Helmut Kohl is best known for his role in Germany's re-unification. Yet he also helped normalising the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) after the 1989 Tiananmen massacre. In 1995 he was the "first Western leader to visit a Chinese military base" /2 nytimes.com/1995/11/09/wor…
Kohl's visit to the People's Liberation Army 196 Infantry Division outside Tianjin was highly symbolic. It was a clear signal to the Chinese Communist Party that the atrocities of 1989 were no longer an obstacle to western business engagement with China /3 scmp.com/article/138269…
Under Kohl German China policy was increasingly driven by mercantilist considerations. Kohl helped to "[convince] a generation of German political and business elites that China held the key to Germany’s long-term prosperity." /4 politico.eu/article/german…
Kohl's successor Chancellor Gerhard Schröder went further. He relegated human rights concerns to a toothless 'dialogue'. In 2005 he lobbied to lift the European arms embargo, which he saw as an obstacle to deepening Germany's commercial ties with China /5 dw.com/en/schr%C3%B6d…
Schröder admired former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. Despite retiring from front-line politics in the early 1980s, Schmidt exercised very problematic intellectual leadership in the early 2000s. Time and again Schmidt argued against China's democratisation /6 spiegel.de/politik/deutsc…
Schmidt argued that "in China all the prerequisites for a democracy were missing, there were no democratic traditions in Chinese history (author's translation)". He exaggerated the importance of Confucianism in Chinese political thought and practice /7 handelsblatt.com/meinung/kommen…
The German journalist Erling has portrayed Helmut Schmidt as part of the 'sceptic generation': Schmidt had grown up in the Third Reich; he was disillusioned, displayed a cynical attitude; rejected political visions and advocated pragmatism /8 welt.de/politik/auslan…
Erling critiqued Schmidt as an "authoritarian character dressed in the cloak of the sceptic. And therefore an admirer of all authoritarians in this world as long as they have power; and a despiser of anti-authoritarian democracy (author's translation)" /9
During a talk in 2012 "the former chancellor expressed his doubts about the export of Western democracy to the People's Republic". Gu Xuewu disagreed and told Schmidt that "a free system was always a better option than the naked exercise of power" /10 dw.com/en/magnet-chin…
Sieren has argued that "Germans should think hard about how to address [Schmidt's] legacy". Yet Schmidt's view of China was very problematic. He portrayed it in culturally essentialist terms. He also frequently gave the CCP the benefit of the doubt /11 dw.com/en/sierens-chi…
Following Schröder's election defeat in 2005 Angela Merkel began her long reign as chancellor. U-turn after u-turn revealed her lack of leadership. First she was in favour of nuclear energy, only to change her mind after Fukushima /12 dw.com/en/opinion-ang…
Merkel initially was critical of China and even met the Dalai Lama in 2007. Yet her biggest legacy will be the ill-considered Comprehensive Agreement on Investment #CAI. Merkel prioritised the bottom line of German conglomerates over any other concerns /13 spiegel.de/international/…
Under Merkel German China policy was effectively outsourced to the private sector. This opened the flood gates to corporate propaganda. In their blind pursuit of short-term profits economic elites distorted the German public discourse about China /14
Let me conclude with a brief summary. When the four chancellors exercised leadership they either normalised the CCP (Kohl), made the case against China's democratisation (Schmidt), or prioritised commerce over other enlightened values and interests (Schröder and Merkel) /15
There is now a lot to unlearn. Myths about the importance of China's market and misunderstandings about China's political system need to be busted. Academics and think tankers should help to inform a more critical public debate about China. Germany needs a reality check /16
The SPD foreign affairs spokesperson Schmid is right when arguing that “[we] need a real foreign policy for China — not just a business-oriented policy (...) We need to decouple our foreign policy from the commercial interests of big business” /End ft.com/content/0de447…
If you found the thread 🧵 about the four German chancellors’ cynical approach to China thought provoking please consider this thread from September 14, 2020. Here I write about the pitfalls of Germany’s single-minded pursuit of foreign trade promotion (Außenwirtschaftsförderung)
Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine has upended Europe's security architecture, yet Germany’s moralised, dysfunctional foreign policy discourse traps us in a Groundhog Day loop. Trump II’s alignment with Putin makes it even worse. A short🧵/1
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For decades🇩🇪was a ‘civilian power’ (Hanns W. Maull): rejecting militarism, ‘Never again,’ Ostpolitik etc. In 2025, that is not enough to counter mounting threats to our sovereignty and national security /3
Im Herbst 2024 erschienen in der Zeitschrift SIRIUS Rezensionen zu China-Büchern, darunter Oertels neuestes Werk und mein Buch 'Germany and China'. Auffällig war ein Verriss von Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrziks 'China und die Neuordnung der Welt' (Brandstätter Verlag, 2023) /1
Trotz detaillierter Kenntnisse zu Chinas Außen- und Innenpolitik gelänge es der Autorin nicht ein "differenziertes, kohärentes und realistisches Bild von der derzeitigen internationalen Krisensituation und der Rolle Chinas darin zu vermitteln" /2 degruyter.com/document/doi/1…
Konkret bemängelt der Rezensent Krause, dass Weigelin-Schwiedrzik Chinas Position im Ukraine-Krieg als neutral darstelle, obwohl Peking "ein möglichst schnelles Ende des Ukraine-Kriegs will – aber zugunsten Russlands und am besten mit der völligen Unterwerfung der Ukraine" /3
Tomorrow’s German election could be Europe’s most pivotal since Brexit 2016. Can a functioning coalition emerge? Or will Germany turn ungovernable? What’s at stake for Europe’s future? A short 🧵/1
Polls favour @_FriedrichMerz (CDU/CSU) to lead Germany’s next government. Yet preference falsification and @dieLinke's rise in the polls signal a wild card. Tomorrow evening we could be in for a surprising election result /2
@_FriedrichMerz @dieLinke And have a look at this electoral map. The far-right @AfD is set to surge in the East. The centre-right @CDUCSUbt is poised to win big in the West. What does that tell us about the state of German unification thirty-five years after the fall of the Berlin Wall? /3
Folks need to understand that elite capture / strategic corruption is real: in the 🇺🇸, in 🇪🇺 , wherever you look. For too long we assumed that our democratic institutions could withstand the onslaught of corporate and foreign government lobbying / influence / interference /1
What started with the Schroederisation of politics has now morphed into institutional corruption. This is the inconvenient truth, the 🐘 in the room. We now not only need strengthened 🇪🇺 military capabilities but also national and transnational movements against corruption /2
Self-serving European elites contributed to today’s mess just as much as the true believers of the MAGA movement. Both have major blind spots, just different ones. The resulting #hypernormalisation prevents necessary reforms aimed at enhancing transparency and accountability /3
German strategic culture remains stuck in the outdated paradigm of economic interdependence. Although 'change through trade' has been discredited, no new strategic framework has emerged to take its place. This shift would require not only new ideas but also fresh leadership /1
I was intrigued by Johannes Volkmann @jbvolkmann, a 27-year-old candidate for the German Bundestag. As the grandson of the former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, he may come to represent a new generation of German politicians /2 hessenschau.de/politik/johann…
I noted with great interest that he has an academic background in Contemporary Chinese Studies from Oxford, complemented by his year spent in 🇨🇳 at both Tongji University and Peking University. He appears to possess the much-needed 'China competence.' /3 johannes-volkmann.de/uebermich/
Warum strebt der "treueste Verbündete des Kanzlers" (Mona Jaeger in der FAZ, 5.2.2025, ) Wolfgang Schmidt @W_Schmidt_ ein Bundestagsmandat an? Kann er sich wirklich von @Bundeskanzler Scholz emanzipieren? Ich habe da so meine Zweifel. Ein kurzer 🧵/1 archive.is/G4Xk5
"Seit 2002 arbeitet Schmidt für Scholz," schreibt Mona Jaeger, "er war sein Büroleiter zu Generalsekretärszeiten, sein Stabschef als Arbeitsminister, Staatssekretär im Finanzministerium, dann als Kanzleramtsminister Organisator der Ampelkoalition" /2 faz.net/aktuell/politi…
In der NZZ wurde ein Oppositionspolitiker zitiert, der Schmidt als «Machtabsicherungsapologet» bezeichnete. Es gehe darum, Scholz gegen Kritik in Schutz zu nehmen. Er ziehe ausserdem "einen Schutzwall um Scholz, intransparent und unkontrollierbar." /3 archive.is/Kh1fH#selectio…