For those who think that NSO is the problem - you're missing out the bigger picture:
1. There are many vendors like NSO, not just in Israel. Also in EU, APAC, N. America, and others.
2. Even if NSO shuts down tomorrow: we still have a problem: mobile attacks are scalable.
2. (cont) Once you have created a generic attack-chain, you can infect 1B+ devices. This is too powerful to keep a single barrier for attackers which already block telemetry sharing with the vendors.
3. NSO is *EASY* to find *if* a deeper access is provided to the phones.
Which leads to the bigger problem:
Why we can opt-in to be tracked by ads but can't opt-in to choose our own security apps to run with full privileges on our own phones?
If 3 would have been solved - NSO and other companies like NSO, regardless of where they operate, would have needed to work really hard to remain invisible.
Right now, it's just too easy for them - Disable telemetry to Apple/Google and that's it.
Simple solution: allow users to choose what software they run and in what permissions. The local-admin concept worked perfectly in MacOS, Windows, and Linux. It should work perfectly in mobile too.
[2/N] If we needed another proof that we have to fix the broken mobile security permission model, here it is.
NSO's software is actually super easy to catch, but due to the lack of permissions it becomes almost impossible at scale, and NSO only has a single vendor to avoid.
[3/N] This was easy to do for NSO: they simply blocked telemetry, communications, and updates to Apple/Google: and viola! They were set. The vendors had no visibility.