okay, so I went through @DonBeyerVA 's proposed 'Digital Asset Market Structure and Investor Protection Act' more carefully, and here is the obligatory thread

beyer.house.gov/news/documents…
the good:
*this should be a low bar, but the definitions/drafting are non-circular and reasonably technologically accurate--more than I can say for other blockchain legislation
the good (cont'd):
*reasonable approach to securities laws:

-->token is security if it carries equity-ish rights in the issuer or was sold for risk capital (sorry @NYcryptolawyer)

-->can 'de-securitize' Howey tokens

-->3-year grace period prior to desecuritization
the good (cont'd):
-->bill codifies what 'actual delivery' means under the Commodities Ex. Act (as exception to retail commodities tx regs) & includes delivery through private keys
the good (cont'd):
-->the bill tries to encourage market transparency by requiring 'digital asset repositories' that aggregate off-chain transactions to be registered w/ CFTC and publicly file off-chain transaction data
the good (cont'd):
-->the bill authorizes the creation of 'digital versions of Federal reserve notes' on a distributed ledger and gives them legal tender status without any weird surveillance requirements
the good (cont'd)
-->assuming the 'and' here is intentional, the bill creates a fairly narrow definition of 'virtual asset service provider' for BSA purposes & also has nice broad carve-outs for software and network service providers
the good (cont'd):
-->the bill mostly lays off of DeFi, instead asking all the major agencies to submit a joint report of recommendations and analysis on DeFI
Now the bad:
-->the bill empowers the SEC and CFTC to classify the *top 25 currently trading* tokens as either securities or commodities, essentially in their sole discretion with no prescribed due process in case they get the legal analysis wrong
the bad (cont'd):
-->although providing a 3-year grace period for Howey tokens (like @HesterPeirce 's safe harbor proposal does), it does not solve the 'chicken/egg' problem re: sufficient decentralization because it only suspends registration reqs, not trading reqs*
the bad (cont'd):
*(however, this would still probably be achievable for most projects, because under this bill descuritization is possible as long as the platform is "fully operational")
the bad (cont'd):
an additional problem with the descuritization process is that descuritization only happens once the SEC determines not to deny the descuritization certificate, and there is no time limit within which the SEC is required to make that determination
the bad (cont'd):
the bill shortens the 'actual delivery' requirement for tokens not to be retail commodities transactions from 28 days (current rule & CFTC guidance) to *24 hours*--good for 'not your keys, not your coins' mentality but bad for exchanges & maybe DeFi
the ugly #1:
has blanket, probably totally unenforceable and possibly unconstitutional rule that "no PERSON may issue, USE or PERMIT TO BE USED a digital asset fiat-based stablecoin that is not approved by the Secretary of the Treasury"
the ugly #1 (cont'd):
this one is a real head-scratcher given the breadth of the 'fiat-based stablecoin' definition...I get making *issuance* of an unregistered stablecoin illegal in commerce, but *use*? this is treating stablecoins like Schedule I drugs or fissile material
the ugly #1 (cont'd):
EVERY token that is "tied, pegged to, or collateralized substantially with" *ANY* 'fiat currency(ies)' would be illegal unless approved by Dept of Treasury

basically, only (arguably) RAI would be legal, and probably, eventually, USDC
the ugly #1 (cont'd):
while I do think it is surprising stablecoins have gotten this far (they are basically digital dollar counterfeiting, if you think about it) & am not surprised state wants to keep its monopoly on this--wow, the breadth of this is huge & problematic
the ugly #1 (cont'd):
there are many potential objections, but for starters--why does the U.S. care if we make tokens pegged to *other* nations' currencies?
the ugly #2:
the bill basically requires FinCEN to try to ban anonymizing services & anonymity-enhanced tokens; possibly, this part just applies to transactions by/with institutions, in which case I get it, but in parts it seems like the institutions may be required...
the ugly #2 (cont'd)
...to police extrinsic anonymizing transactions somehow; that seems basically impossible, & so at minimum this section needs some clarification--is it just a rule about how institutions interact with anonymizing tech, or is it a broad use prohibition?
All in all, although this bill would take a big bite out of the value and confidence in our industry, in spirit it is unsurprising and fairly measured. But, in a few key places, its overbreadth or ambiguities raise civil rights and other issues that need to be addressed.
Private txs cannot be per se illegal (maybe that is not the intent), the SEC and CFTC cannot have carte blanche to classify the top 25 tokens today however they want, and there needs to be some room for true p2p decentralized algorithmic stables not collateralized by securities.
PS #1: the more I think about it, the more I realize the U.S. probably does not need stablecoin-specific regs
PS #1 (cont'd): many stablecoins are probably securities or swaps--I doubt all the "commercial paper" backing USDT is true 4(2) "commercial paper"; DAI is partly collateralized by securities
PS #1 (cont'd): the stablecoins backed by securities are the really 'dangerous' ones--they pose counterparty risk & are potentially highly highly scalable
PS #1 (cont'd): by contrast, algorithmic stablecoins are of uncertain scalability, and in any event while they might be risky and unstable, their risks are quite transparent and of the algorithmic, not counterparty, variety
PS #1 (cont'd): moreover, algorithmic stablecoins are essentially peer-to-peer make-believe transactions--can you make it illegal for me and my neighbor to decide that acorn caps are worth $1 each? this raises constitutional issues, I suspect
PS #1 (cont'd): so, my humble proposal would be to ditch the stablecoin part of the bill and focus on regulating stablecoins that are backed by securities (which is likely nearly all of them, anyway)
PS #1 (cont'd): a securities law focus to stablecoin regulation would be more consistent with legacy law and would avoid empowering Treasury to draw arbitrary lines in an essentially unappealable discretionary process, while giving breathing room to algorithmic stability

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More from @lex_node

29 Jul
Damn, pretty comprehensive.

beyer.house.gov/news/documents…
there's going to be a lot of controversy here but I just want to say that while this bill could be evil af it at least is drafted coherently--for example, it doesn't call tokens "representations of value"
it also enshrines logic similar to @HesterPeirce 's proposal by introducing the notion of a 'desecuritization certificate' for tokens that begin as securities (in this case likely meant for tokens which are tied up in Howey transactions rather than being 'inherent' securities)
Read 6 tweets
29 Jul
good thread from @adamscochran rebutting points from @angela_walch

that miners & other ecosystem players have *some* discretion does not make them TradFi-like intermediaries/fiduciaries

miners compete; one miner will gladly get paid to mine a tx censored by another miner
@adamscochran @angela_walch much of political FUD around blockchain also ignores the natural checks/balances that have arisen in the blockchain ecosystem

sure, core devs have power, but that power is checked by miners, investors, non-mining node runners, app (wallet) providers, DApp teams, etc.
likewise, miner power is checked by the power of core devs + those other constituencies

the resulting system is more robust & trust-minimized than any set of TradFi laws / contracts / regulatory watchdogs could have made it
Read 6 tweets
3 Jun
Cryptolaw should be done in the crypto spirit. The 6 lawyers involved here are great but already lobby through other closed opaque orgs, and no 6 people can 'represent DeFi'. DAOs paying millions to non-incentive-aligned biglaw lobbyists is not the cypherpunk way.
to be clear, I am not calling the 6 lawyers who would be in the nonprofit 'non-incentive-aligned biglaw lobbyists', but it certainly sounds like they would be using a chunk of the funds to pay other lawyers, and likely those lawyers would be non-incentive-aligned biglaw lobbyists
Whatever permission you gain by playing legacy games with legacy people is fragile, corruptible & easily lost through regime change. Funding an opaque, closed lobbying org staffed by members and alums of other lobbying orgs--this is not crypto! We need a better way.
Read 18 tweets
28 May
no time to write something long, but don't be fooled by the fact that Bitconnect was a fraud--this case could become a blueprint for action against non-fraudulent DAOs

N.B.--Bitconnect was an "unincorporated association"
in this thread @collins_belton echoes conversations we have been having with DAOs for a while--they need to start thinking about indemnification structures to protect the core devs & others involved with the project

the SEC is smart. . .their theory on this case seems novel & susceptible of being challenged in several ways, but these particular defendants are un-sympathetic & will probably not have top-notch defense counsel; SEC will get a precedent it can then use against DeFi teams...
Read 6 tweets
28 May
How govt should do cryptolaw:

1. autonomous software systems = legal persons

2. tokenholders & miners get qualified limited liability

3. to qualify for #1 and #2, must have insurance pool (token premine or inflation), gov holds keys & can only tap pool with final court order
The insurance pool is sole source of legal remedies for most negative externalities associated with the autonomous software system.

As a legal person, the autonomous software system has rights and is deemed to own this pool--thus entitled to due process before assets seized.
Outright granting legal personhood to autonomous software is better than 'wrapping' it in traditional corporate personhood through e.g. an LLC. Business entities are nexuses of rights & obligations. Autonomous software systems are nexuses of powers & incentives.
Read 8 tweets
21 May
Governance tokens, done right, have a lot of intrinsic value and are a game-changer.

I do worry that 'done right' & intrinsic value also makes them more securities-like utility and MoE tokens but I am also optimistic. Here's why.
People are too quick to apply SEC's utility token guidance to governance tokens and I think this has spawned many misguided regulatory strategies. People need to think more about them in the context of the SEC's DAO Report.
The analogy between network miners or validators and DAO voters to achieve "sufficient decentralization" for regulatory purposes is way too facile.
Read 30 tweets

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