FSB illegally leaked video of the raid on @Dobrokhotov home. In what definitely backfire, a policeman is heard reading to Roman the criminal charge of "tweeting about @MaxvanderWerff. Roman asks sarcastically:
-Seriously, guys? Over a tweet about a Dutch blogger?
-Yes, seriously
What were these idiots thinking when leaking this? Makes them look like morons, and makes @Dobrokhotov look like the coolest guy on earth.
Which he probably is.
..and let's not forget the manila folder from the US embassy, "the contents of which police are investigating"
I asked @Dobrokhotov what the contents were.
"It was empty. It had some conference materials but has been lying around empty for many years"
To complete the burlesque, FSB leaked the footage to Ren TV, whose parent company is chaired by Putin's reported secret common-law wife, Alina Kabaeva.
Just realized there are many (Russian included) who didn't realize @Dobrokhotov is that same "heckler" who, 13 years ago, dared shout "Disgrace" at the Russian president when he announced the change of the constitution enabling Putin-forever. mobile.reuters.com/article/amp/id…
"we have a clip"
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"Spanish shame" is the first thing that comes to mind while watching the chief of SVR's 80-minute interview with Kremlin's wannabe Rush Limbaugh. For starters, intelligence chiefs *don't* do 80-minute interviews, period.
There's literally nothing that an intelligence chief knows that s/he can say publicly. That's why they never do it. That means literally everything that Naryshkin rambled on was pure propaganda, with zero truth or news value.
I take that back - there is news value in his appearance. That the Kremlin patient would ask his intel chief to make a fool of himself says a lot about his degree of insecurity before next month's elections.
Interesting detail from an interview with @MaxvanderWerff:
Q: "But why would @bellingcat & @the_ins_ru accuse you of cooperating with GRU? Maybe you had some contacts with them?
A: "I don't disclose my sources and contacts..."
And It would have been so easy to say "no".
A great scoop by @arawnsley & @thedailybeast: FBI are investigating a US company that supplied equipment to the same FSB's "forensic institute" that - we discovered - poisoned @navalny, @vkaramurza and other opposition activists.
Indeed, open source registries show that Intertech Instruments for years supplied chemical analysis/chromatography equipment to Military Unit 34435. This is exactly the FSB unit where the whole poisoning squad is employed.
The US company tried to disguise its sales to FSB - which they knew to be against the law - by forging purchase orders and creating an optically unrelated Russian company. By that time the @FBI were already tapping their conversations.
A briefing by Bulgarian prosecutors today is expected to shed light on investigative proceedings into the explosions of several Bulgarian ammo depots in 2015. These investigations were started after @bellingcat's 2019 investigations into GRU trips to Bulgaria @ time of explosions
As we reported earlier, a total of 8 GRU undercover operatives visited Bulgaria in early 2015. 5 of these spies could be directly tied to the poisoning of three Bulgarians. However, at least 3 - and may be more - worked on other "projects". bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-eu…
Several of the assassins/saboteurs from Unit 29155 visited Bulgaria as "tourists" just days before explosions at three state-owned ammo depots. Interesting if BG investigators have discovered data they traveled to the locations of the depots.
Dear GRU, a bit dumb to try to phish-hack exactly the journos who just outed your largest black-op ever. You might have waited a day or two. And generally you might improve your phishing tradecraft. A .ru hop-over server? Bumbling idiots.
Yeah, keep them coming :)
Am I officially allowed now to hack back into GRU accounts?
Unit 29155's commander, Generlal Andrey Averyanov personally supervised the Czech ammo terror mission. Read our latest: bellingcat.com/news/2021/04/2…
The unprecedented scale of the operation (8+ people) including the fact that a top GRU General would take the risk to fly undercover, shows how important this mission must have been for the Kremlin. Several military awards were given to unit members in the wake of the operation.
Gen. Averyanov is not your run-of-the-mill spetsnaz guy. He reports directly to the GRU chief, and we found he communicated directly with Lavrov around the time his unit poisoned the Skripals, and killed Dawn Sturgess. This means the Kremlin was aware, and likely requested the op