1/ Welcome to the next episode of marketers shilling IDOs that you should avoid.
This time featuring the team at Yellowblock:
TeddyCleps
The Crypto Monk
Crypto Birb
CryptoRangutang
2/ Want to live a extravagant lifestyle and flex on your audience?
See how you can as well below!
*perfectly sells the top*
3/ Case 1: $POLK In my other threads we already know Moonrock & friends sell instantly.
Let’s see who actually pushes this out on Twitter.
4/ Case 2: $PMON This was also pushed out by Moonrock and shilled hard to trick newbies.
5/ Case 3: $ROOM
Another widely shilled IDO by CT influencers that dumped 96.7%.
6/ Case 4: $MATTER
This project suddenly changed it’s vesting schedule because of private sale investors repeatedly dumping . Guess who was quick to claim their tokens after the change?
7/ No tweets from them about $MATTER or any other of these projects in months even though they were so “bullish” on them.
You’d think as private sale investors they’d aim to support the project longterm.
8/ Case 5: Might I add $ERN to the mix. Down 90% since ATH shortly after the IDO.
9/ Case 6: Last but not least $XED, another Moonrock project that dumped very early on.
10/ This is another classic example of marketers pretending to trade who will shill anything available to them.
We all remember the engagement on Twitter during the first couple months of 2021. Imagine being a newbie seeing the tweets.
None of these tweets gave any disclosure.
Follow for more threads in the future!
If you’re new and unfamiliar with Moonrock make sure to read this.
1/ An investigation into how I identified one of suspects tied to the $28M Bittensor hack from 2024 by identifying anime NFT wash trades linked to a former employee and earned a whitehat bounty for my efforts.
2/ 32 $TAO holders experienced unauthorized transfers in excess of $28M from May to July 2024 and the Bittensor network was temporarily halted on July 2, 2024.
A post-mortem published by the team revealed the thefts were the result of a supply chain attack after a malicious PyPi package was uploaded in late May 2024
Victims who downloaded the package and performed specific operations accidentally compromised private keys.
3/ I began tracing the stolen funds from two initial theft addresses, TAO was bridged to Ethereum via Bittensor native bridge, and then transferred to instant exchanges where the attackers swapped to XMR.
1/ An unnamed source recently compromised a DPRK IT worker device which provided insights into how a small team of five ITWs operated 30+ fake identities with government IDs and purchased Upwork/LinkedIn accounts to obtain developer jobs at projects.
2/ An export of their Google Drive, Chrome profiles, and screenshots from their devices was obtained.
Google products were extensively used by them to organize their team’s schedules, tasks, and budgets with communications primarily in English.
3/ Another spreadsheet shows weekly reports for team members from 2025 which provides insight into how they operate and what they think about.
“I can't understand job requirement, and don't know what I need to do”
1/ An investigation into how @cryptobeastreal scammed followers by lying they were not behind the $190M -> $3M $ALT market cap crash where 45+ connected insider wallets sold $11M+ on July 14, 2025.
2/ Earlier this month Crypto Beast began aggressively promoting $ALT on X and TG.
On July 14, 2025 ALT crashed from 0.19 to 0.003 after insiders sold a large percent of the total supply.
All of these posts promoting the token. have since been deleted.
3/ Crypto Beast previously shared a public wallet on X & TG in now deleted posts.
1/ My recent investigation uncovered more than $16.58M in payments since January 1, 2025 or $2.76M per month has been sent to North Korean IT workers hired as developers at various projects & companies.
To put this in perspective payments range from $3K-8K per month meaning they have infiltrated 345 jobs on the low end or 920 jobs on the high end.
2/ Here’s a look into one of the six clusters I have been monitoring and was able to attribute 8 different DPRK ITWs that obtained roles at 12+ projects.
I traced out the payment addresses from the table to two consolidation addresses.
1/ Multiple projects tied to Pepe creator Matt Furie & ChainSaw as well as another project Favrr were exploited in the past week which resulted in ~$1M stolen
My analysis links both attacks to the same cluster of DPRK IT workers who were likely accidentally hired as developers.
2/ On Jun 18, 2025 at 4:25 am UTC ownership for ‘Replicandy’ from Matt Furie & ChainSaw was transferred to a new EOA 0x9Fca.
Jun 18, 2025
6:20 pm UTC: 0x9Fca withdrew mint proceeds from the contract
Jun 19, 2025
5:11 am UTC: 0x9Fca unpauses the mint
The attacker then minted NFTs and sold into bids causing the floor price to fall to zero.
3/ On Jun 23, 2025 the attacker transferred ownership from the ChainSaw deployer to 0x9Fca for Peplicator, Hedz, Zogz.
Similarly the attacker minted NFTs and sold them into bids causing the floor price to fall to zero.
1/ An investigation into how the New York based social engineering scammer Daytwo/PawsOnHips (Christian Nieves) stole $4M+ from Coinbase users by impersonating customer support, bought luxury goods, and lost most of the funds gambling at casinos.
2/ Daytwo operates a small call centre group and also works as a caller.
His group primarily coerced targets into setting up Coinbase wallet with a compromised seed on phishing sites.
Below is a video of his panel used and a sample of his voice when calling.