Raisi took office as Iran's 8th president.
Marked by a reputation for repression, bereft of experience in governance, facing growing internal & external challenges, there will no honeymoon for the deep state's groomed choice.
Our new report explains 🧵: crisisgroup.org/middle-east-no…
2| With Raisi's installation, hardliners control all IRI's elected & unelected institutions. His path was paved by an election that was unfree, unfair and - even by Iranian standards - uncompetitive.
How uncompetitive? If spoiled ballots were a candidate, they'd have come 2nd.
3| Why was the system willing to sacrifice elections, which it claims as pillar of its popular legitimacy, for a non-race? Because it's wagered that closing ranks at time of uncertainty is a price worth paying - especially if it shores up 30% of Iranians backing conservatives.
4| It's a massive gamble, and Raisi's to-do list is monumental: Jobs, inflation, COVID-19, water/electricity shortages, ongoing protests & labor strikes just some of the key challenges his admin faces. And even as the economy goes from red to black, it's badly in need of surgery.
5| Glass-half full view is that Raisi & Co realize scale of the task, and that having all responsibility on their shoulders, hardliners are better placed to implement difficult choices.
Perhaps.
But even that is a notch up from the prospects over socio-political reform:
6| System's default response to protests over econ/pol grievances is iron first; A sociologist said the system faces "silent tsunami" of resentment particularly acute in impoverished/underdeveloped border provinces.
Unaddressed, standoff b/w state & citizen looms.
7| When it comes to foreign policy, Raisi is untried & vague on actual policy. Iran's strategic decisions aren't set by the president, but tone and tactics of he and his team are key in how Iran is perceived by the world.
JCPOA's fate stands central to how this unfolds.
8| We trace talks that got underway in April, addressing 2+2 issues:
Core discussions on sanx/nukes for mutual compliance
Iran's ask for a guarantee US won't leave again
US wanting commitment for Iran to talk abt missiles/sunsets/regional
But since 20 June, all talks on hold.
9| How Raisi/Tehran approach JCPOA talks now the key variable: They could return to Vienna, pick up where Round 6 left off and seal a deal - or move to a brinksmanship gambit on the notion that it'll yield bigger returns.
US/E3 saying: Think very, very carefully.
10| Clock will be running as Iran's nuclear breaches approach the point of no return: Advances too substantial for JCPOA to fix.
With September IAEA BoG meeting on the horizon, Tehran could end up facing a censure resolution - and perhaps referral to the UNSC if it dithers.
11| As we argue in the report, mutual return to full compliance with existing deal is still the best path forward. Divide b/w the two sides is real but still bridgeable and better than reverting to race of sanctions vs. centrifuges that is in neither's interest. Failing that...
12| An alternative would be to shift toward a JCPOA-minus deal capping escalation process: Iran freezing key breaches of its nuclear obligations in return for partial sanctions relief. This is a way station toward a JCPOA+ or a more-for-more deal that both sides say they want.
13| Even then, some of the regional concerns around ballistic missiles & Iran's power projection don't have to wait for the JCPOA. Discussions with GCC rivals have been quietly taking place, offering real opportunity for defusing long-standing tensions. worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/29731…
14|14 Iran's new govt takes over at a moment of major challenges & slender opportunities, & on the hardliners now falls the full burden of addressing myriad/intersecting political, economic & diplomatic crises.
Time will tell if they sink or swim together. crisisgroup.org/middle-east-no…
When President @realDonaldTrump takes office in January 2025, the #Iran his administration will face will be, relative to four years earlier, weaker on several fronts, and changed on several others. 🧵
2/ Domestically, absence of major protests for ~2 years cannot obscure deep gap between state and society.
Social, cultural, political and economic discontent persist, while government's default remains repression over any meaningful reform to address them.
3/ Regionally, setbacks to Hamas & Hezbollah have weakened parts of IRI "Axis of Resistance", though others continue to pose a threat to Israel/U.S. interests. Meanwhile, prospect of retaliation for Israel's 26 Oct attacks - and counter-strikes in response - remain significant.
With the killing of Hizbollah's leader, Iran & its "Axis of Resistance" have suffered the biggest in a series of setbacks that began mounting late last year. And for the third time since April, what was seen as IRI's regional strengths underscore its strategic vulnerabilities. 🧵
2/ After Hamas's attack on 7 October and the start of Israel's military campaign in Gaza, the "Ring of Fire" approach of mobilizing against Israel on multiple fronts - notably from the north - we started to see a more concerted counter-Axis campaign that had three main elements.
3/ The first was an uptick in operations against IRGC personnel, especially in Syria. That culminated in April with the killing of several senior IRGC commanders, to which Iran responded with an overt and direct military attack against Israel.
For 10 months, the specter of a regional conflict has loomed over the Middle East. Haniyeh's killing in Tehran now threatens to realize a scenario all sides have worked assiduously to avoid: A major multifront showdown b/w the Axis of Resistance and Israel/U.S. 🧵👇
2| Iran likely sees Haniyeh's killing a worse affront than the April strike in Damascus that prompted it to launch a direct aerial assault on Israel. It once again exposed intel lapses, took place on home soil, and targeted a high-level visitor on @drpezeshkian's inauguration.
3| Moreover, it upended any notion of the April exchange having deterred Israel from targeting Iran directly (at the time, Israel responded with a pinpoint strike near a nuclear facility, more to signal vulnerability than inflict damage).
The first round of #Iran's presidential elections created a lose-lose-lose dynamic.
Here is how: 🧵👇🏼
1. The establishment was hoping that by allowing a slightly more competitive election, it could boost turnout and claim that its wounded legitimacy has recovered. The participation rate fell by 8% compared to 2021, marking a real embarrassment for the leadership.
2. The reformists brought out the big guns and tried their best to mobilize their base. Pezeshkian adopted a non-confrontational and traditionalist approach to grab votes from the conservatives. Yes, he ended up leading, but it simply was insufficient.
در دهه گذشته من با اتهامات متعدد و متناقضی روبرو شدهام. از دست نشانده آمریکا تا حامی جمهوری اسلامی تا آلت دست انگلیس. من عموماً به تهمتهای بیاساس که هدفی جز تخریب شخصیت ندارند واکنش نشان نمیدهم.
اما این بار پاسخ میدهم چراکه با سطح سخیفی از روزنامهنگاری مواجه هستیم.
2| من در سال 2012، زمانی که مذاکرات هستهای در حال شکل گیری بود، به گروه بحران پیوستم. آن دوران مصادف شد با فشردهترین و مستمرترین تعاملات دیپلماتیک بین ایران و ایالات متحده در سه دهه گذشته. حضور 5 کشور دیگر و مجموعهای از مسائل بسیار فنی را هم به پیچیدگی قضیه میافزود.
3| در گروه بحران ما همیشه دیدگاههای همه ذینفعان و بازیگران درگیر در یک بحران را - چه آنهایی که با آنها موافقیم و چه آنهایی که با آنها موافق نیستیم - در نظر میگیریم. و این اصل نه تنها در مورد ایران، بلکه در مورد تمام کشورهایی که ما روی آنها کار میکنیم صادق است.
Over the past decade, I've been called an American agent, an Iranian regime sympathizer and a British stooge.
I usually choose to dismiss such defamatory nonsense.
But on this occasion, I'm going to respond, because this is straight up hatchet journalism.
2 | When I joined @CrisisGroup in 2012, it was just as the nuclear negotiations were taking shape - the most sustained, intensive diplomatic engagement between the US & Iran in over three decades. Add to that 5 other nations and a highly technical set of issues.
3| Our analytical work has always been informed by the perspectives of all relevant stakeholders - those with whom we agree, and those with whom we do not. That holds true for each of the conflict situations @CrisisGroup covers, including Iran.