1. Our forthcoming work for @L4P_Afghanistan shows that the loss of Kang in Nimroz would deny government affiliated actors just short of $7 million per annum in informal taxes levied on the smuggling of fuel and drugs ariananews.af/kang-district-…
2. There is approx 37 MT of fuel worth $19.2 million p.a. smuggled across the border from Iran at Kang. Transported by tractors, with payments made to private actors & ABP both at the border & as it’s moved by pickups en route to the city of Ziranj, it raises $826,000 in bribes.
3. By far the bigger source of revenue to govt affiliated actors in Kang is the drugs trade. An important entrepôt for smuggling opiates, methamphetamine & cannabis into Iran we estimate govt affiliated actors earn as much as $6.1 million p.a. from the various taxes levied.
4. As with Taliban in Khashrud & Bakwa the taxes levied on drugs are on weight not on price, although there are monthly taxes on catapults ($ 120/month). We estimate the money earned from drugs by govt affiliates at Kang is greater than that earned by Taliban from Nimroz as whole
5. The real prize is the Customs House in Ziranj. Officially earning the govt $43.2 mill p.a. in customs duties & a further $50 mill p.a. in direct taxes in 2020, we estimate a significant amount of trade enters undeclared, particularly fuel. Revenues could be $176 mill p.a.
6. As highlighted in previous threads the danger is such a move undercuts the Talibans own finances & could upset Iran. Taliban has been successfully collecting taxes on legal goods from Iran transiting Ziranj in the area north of Ghorghory, earning an estimated $54.3 mill p.a.
7. There is little doubt seizing Ziranj would hurt the govt & it’s affiliates financially but it would lead to further disruptions to a trade with Iran already feeling the fallout from the Taliban’s seizures of Islam Qala & Mile 78 in early July.
8. This puts at risk a trade in diesel alone worth $1 billion p.a. & a trade in transit goods through Ziranj worth an estimated $780 million a year. With sanctions & Covid impacting the Iranian economy trade with Afghanistan is increasingly important.
9. It remains to be seen if pushing into Ziranj is a step too far for Tehran who would be totally dependent on Taliban held crossings for trade with Afghanistan & no doubt have fears for the water supply now that Kamal Khan dam is complete.
10. The financial cost to the Taliban could also be high significantly disrupting trade at the border. But as we have seen in Kandahar & LKG the real cost of a fight for Ziranj will be borne by the population of what had become a relatively peaceful and prosperous city.
1. I’ve had a lot of emails from governments, institutions and individuals following UNODC’s recent report on methamphetamine in Afghanistan. unodc.org/documents/data…
2. Most are sceptical of the findings & UNODC’s claim that OTC & bulk pharmaceuticals are the primary precursors for meth in Afghanistan & what they see as a corresponding lack of evidence. Further confusion is expressed over the press coverage that has accompanied the report.
3. Particularly the claim that methamphetamine trafficking is rising in response to the Taliban ban. reuters.com/world/asia-pac…
1. Warning - “anorak” thread: Having read the Taliban finance section of the latest UNSMT report it would seem to contain a lot of confusing lines, many because there isn’t a clear indication of time, others because the team have been drawing on dated data or ideas.
2. The most obvious errors relate to the failure to engage with a timeline on agricultural seasons for drug crops & therefore address what can realistically be done by the Taliban authorities re drug control. A common error that has become a bit of an issue in wider reporting.
3. The current 2022/23 poppy season began in Nov/Dec 2022 when the primary crop was planted in the fall. The harvest of that crop is largely in April/May 2023. This fall planted crop typically constitutes about 90% of the annual poppy crop in Afghanistan
1. Ok, so here is an interesting story in the Times about opium production in Afghanistan. It centres around an anonymised opium trader “Habibullah”, & a farmer “Ahmadullah” both of whom reside in the province of Uruzgan in SW Afghanistan. thetimes.co.uk/article/cash-s…
2. Ahmadullah is a bit of a sideshow to the story but he owns 4.5 acres of land which he typically dedicates to wheat & poppy, but in the 2022/23 growing season has planted a much smaller amount of poppy within his compound walls.
3. The reader is left with the impression that Ahmadullah & other farmers in SW Afghanistan will persist with poppy in the current season, on the basis that they’re poor & the Taliban will not impose a ban for fear of a backlash from its supporters in the rural heartlands.
1. A thread: Now the planting season has begun there is a lot of debate about what the next poppy season brings. A reference point for many commentators is how little was done about the 2022 crop, which @UNODC reports covered 32% more land than the previous year.
2. What is not considered is the action taken against ephedra based methamphetamine over the course of the summer where the Taliban closed the primary market hub & surrounding labs in the SW.
3. Further ephedrine labs were closed in a variety of districts across the country revealing just how extensive production has become. Meth prices rose by more than three-fold following these closures but there were also significant reverberations across the opium economy.
1. You ever feel your life is a little too much rinse repeat? Crop substitution with an emphasis on replacing poppy with wheat? Now I am sure we’ve been here before? Oh yeah, there was HFZ 2008-2011) and before that again (2004-2005) but hey why not go round the buoy again?
3. “From a drug control point of view, the Helmand Food Zone took the form of a crop substitution programme-the kind abandoned in the 80s due to a systemic failure to address the wider market, infrastructural & social factors that led to widespread drug crop cultivation”
1. There are growing reports of eradication in SW Afghanistan. It has caused some confusion, particularly the sight of tractors ploughing fields of emergent poppy, next to a neighbouring field of undamaged poppy ready to harvest.
2. Such scenes have been met with understandable scepticism: accusations that “this is all for the cameras”, “surely if it were otherwise the entire crop would have been destroyed regardless of its size or maturity?”This is not an unreasonable response.
3. There is a long history of exaggerated reports of eradication in Afghanistan & not just by those in the Afghan govt also by USG. With eradication used as a measure of CN commitment there are often theatrics that accompany crop destruction that need to be charted & understood.