1.  I’ve had a lot of emails from governments, institutions and individuals following UNODC’s recent report on methamphetamine in Afghanistan. unodc.org/documents/data… 2. Most are sceptical of the findings & UNODC’s claim that OTC & bulk pharmaceuticals are the primary precursors for meth in Afghanistan & what they see as a corresponding lack of evidence. Further confusion is expressed over the press coverage that has accompanied the report.

1. Warning - “anorak” thread: Having read the Taliban finance section of the latest UNSMT report it would seem to contain a lot of confusing lines, many because there isn’t a clear indication of time, others because the team have been drawing on dated data or ideas. 2. The most obvious errors relate to the failure to engage with a timeline on agricultural seasons for drug crops & therefore address what can realistically be done by the Taliban authorities re drug control. A common error that has become a bit of an issue in wider reporting.

1. Ok, so here is an interesting story in the Times about opium production in Afghanistan. It centres around an anonymised opium trader “Habibullah”, & a farmer “Ahmadullah” both of whom reside in the province of Uruzgan in SW Afghanistan.
thetimes.co.uk/article/cash-s… 2. Ahmadullah is a bit of a sideshow to the story but he owns 4.5 acres of land which he typically dedicates to wheat & poppy, but in the 2022/23 growing season has planted a much smaller amount of poppy within his compound walls.

1. A thread: Now the planting season has begun there is a lot of debate about what the next poppy season brings. A reference point for many commentators is how little was done about the 2022 crop, which @UNODC reports covered 32% more land than the previous year. 2. What is not considered is the action taken against ephedra based methamphetamine over the course of the summer where the Taliban closed the primary market hub & surrounding labs in the SW.

1. You ever feel your life is a little too much rinse repeat? Crop substitution with an emphasis on replacing poppy with wheat? Now I am sure we’ve been here before? Oh yeah, there was HFZ 2008-2011) and before that again (2004-2005) but hey why not go round the buoy again?

https://twitter.com/unodc_ad/status/1578041506648059904

2. Perhaps cos long term detailed empirical research says it don’t work? areu.org.af/wp-content/upl…

1. There are growing reports of eradication in SW Afghanistan. It has caused some confusion, particularly the sight of tractors ploughing fields of emergent poppy, next to a neighbouring field of undamaged poppy ready to harvest.

https://twitter.com/moiafghanistan/status/1525728538992574465

2. Such scenes have been met with understandable scepticism: accusations that “this is all for the cameras”, “surely if it were otherwise the entire crop would have been destroyed regardless of its size or maturity?”This is not an unreasonable response.

1. The recent @WaPo article has brought renewed attention to the burgeoning meth industry in Afghanistan. Over 4 yrs our research has shown how the industry expanded with the discovery that production costs could be halved using ephedra rather than OTC. washingtonpost.com/world/interact… 2. However nothing stays still for long in Afghanistan. Since late Nov 21 meth prices have doubled, halved & then doubled again following an initial Taliban announcement of a ban on the ephedra harvest in 12/21 then a ban on all drugs (including meth) announced last month.

https://twitter.com/mansfieldintinc/status/1481351897885904902

1. It’s worth considering where things stand one week on since the Taliban announced their latest ban on drug production & trade. While some have viewed Afghan drugs solely through the prisms of law enforcement & rural development there is so much more at play. 2. In reality the timing, implementation & response to a ban tell us much about the evolving economic & political situation: the coercive power of the state & how it varies by geography, resource endowments & time; the bargaining power of communities & their elites;….

1. “we inform all farmers…that, poppy cultivation isn’t allowed after today. If anyone cultivates poppy, their land will be eradicated & the person arrested by the government. In addition: use, trade, transport, production, import and export of all types of drugs…isn’t allowed”

https://twitter.com/BakhtarNA/status/1510490244038156289

2. This is like travelling back more than 20 years without any of the benefits of youth. As with the Taliban ban before, it seems to be more about geopolitics and leveraging development assistance -perhaps more so now given that the poppy harvest is in full swing.

1. The economic crisis is reeking havoc on the Afghan population. Since the Taliban takeover the Afghani has depreciated by a third, the price of basic food items has more than doubled & large numbers of public sector employees have found themselves without pay. 2. However, there is a part of the economy that is prospering, bolstered by the Taliban’s intervention. In the 1st week of December 2021 the Taliban banned the harvesting of ephedra in the provinces of Ghor, Farah, Nimroz & Bamian.

1. There seems to have been a rash of rather performative video pieces on the Pakistani fence of recent but this one really counts

https://twitter.com/sadiqullahafgha/status/1476568625645604867

2. It’s the last major gap in the fence - the 167.5 km stretch in Balochistan - that allows those migrants departing Zaranj in Nimroz to pass through into Pakistan

4. The next leg of research focused on the rapidly developing cottage industry in ephedrine production drawing on indepth interviews with cooks & high resolution imagery analysis used to identify & count labs, & monitor developments in key market hubs. emcdda.europa.eu/system/files/p… 5. We then expanded the lab count over a wider area in the SW to include parts of Nimroz & Farah. We found 348 ephedrine labs alone - enough to produce the equivalent of 1,000 MT of meth per year - & calculated the income earned by those involved. l4p.odi.org/resources/war-…

1. The Afghan population is suffering from economic crisis & drought. Rural people are especially vulnerable: they lack functioning markets for legal cash crops, public sector employment has collapsed, & the private sector-once buoyed by international spending- is imploding. 2. Many are trying to escape, leaving the country in large numbers via Zaranj in the SW. The exodus began as early as May 2021 when Biden announced the US withdrawal, & increased exponentially with the Taliban takeover. In October, as many as 12K people left the country each day.

1. I dont think I have seen a report this confused for some time. Well possibly not since UNODC’s “is poverty driving the opium boom in Afghanistan” in 2008 (a report that argues the polar opposite of what @UNODC is claiming here).

https://twitter.com/unodc/status/1460654033891377164

2. It is not just the word soup (p7) “In view of the volatile security situation, protracted economic crisis & health emergency, the international community must urgently provide basic needs & services to the people of Afghanistan” (breath)…

1. The latest report exposes a number of myths about Afghanistan, drugs, taxes & the Taliban based on indepth fieldwork over the last 25 years and high resolution imagery analysis @AlcisGeo areu.org.af/wp-content/upl… 2. It suggests we all need to be more discerning consumers of data: media, scholars, officials. It’s a prerequisite that we look at method, even if it’s in an esteemed journal, from a celebrated journalist or scholar, or an official UN report. For example (in no particular order)

1. The numbers of migrants departing Zaranj in Nimroz for Pakistan en route to Iran has increased exponentially. Reports indicate most are ex employees of the former Republic, some leaving along with their families, highlighting the desperate situation for many in Afghanistan. 2. We have been documenting these departures for some time. As early as June 2021 -some 2 months before the govt collapsed- we pointed to the dramatic rise in the number of migrants & the growing proportion of ANA/ANP amongst them.

https://twitter.com/mansfieldintinc/status/1405506144714596352

1. I was trying to avoid any more threads for a while but this story needs much more context and a look beyond the headlines. It represents only a snapshot in time and perhaps a local event: it certainly not the whole picture.
wsj.com/articles/talib… 2. 12 days ago the price of fresh opium increased to around $135 per kilogram in the south, a function of market uncertainty due to the Taliban announcement of the intention to ban opium poppy cultivation, but also border closures following their capture of Kabul.

1. During this really difficult time for Afghanistan & its population, while the west decides how it will engage, it would be helpful if people would be more discerning about what they write, it could draw on misinformation & result in illconceived & counterproductive policies 2. Just cos something has been written don’t make it true. And if it has been written check out what the actual sources say and whether they are credible - just cos it’s a “reputable” org it may have just lifted the figures from somewhere else without checking the veracity.

1. The fall of Ziranj is significant, perhaps less because it is a provincial centre & more it marks the final official border crossing with Iran to fall to Taliban & a major source of revenue to the govt & it’s allies.
washingtonpost.com/world/2021/08/… 2. Official revenue from Ziranj $43.2 million p.a. in duties plus another $50 million in direct taxes. We estimate $176 million p.a. when undeclared goods included. That is as much as $83 mill p.a to share amongst “friends” - part of the glue that held the Republic together?

1. Our forthcoming work for @L4P_Afghanistan shows that the loss of Kang in Nimroz would deny government affiliated actors just short of $7 million per annum in informal taxes levied on the smuggling of fuel and drugs ariananews.af/kang-district-… 2. There is approx 37 MT of fuel worth $19.2 million p.a. smuggled across the border from Iran at Kang. Transported by tractors, with payments made to private actors & ABP both at the border & as it’s moved by pickups en route to the city of Ziranj, it raises $826,000 in bribes.

1. Following the last thread I’ve been asked a few times how much
money the Taliban is making from the official border crossings it seized over the last month?

https://twitter.com/mansfieldintinc/status/1415335107238445059

2. Based on our work for @L4P_Afghanistan it is clear that it is less a case of how much money the Taliban has earned & more an issue of how much they have denied the govt & it’s allies?