Thanks to @DavidKleimann for responding. His response raises 2 questions. 1) The EU is "unilaterally" imposing a CBM that does not give credit to US producers for the implied price of carbon from complying with regulations. Why does the US then bear the blame if it responds?
This seems to confuse the Trump 232s, where the US acted on its own, w/ the CBM situation, where the EU is the first mover. Moreover, I imagine one reason the EU has not recognized the implied price of carbon in its CBAM is to give it something to negotiate with.
2) Why would we assume that assessing duties on imports from countries w/ high domestic carbon costs would exacerbate substitution effects in a magnitude sufficient to overcome the effect of imposing a CBM on all carbon-intensive imports?
The status quo already bakes in this substitution, since in a world w/o CBMs imports from countries w/ high carbon costs are more expensive, all else equal, than imports from countries w/o high carbon costs.
I agree w/ Kleimann that CBMs like the Coons/Peters bill and the EU CBAM that do not grant credit for the costs of carbon at home (explicit or implicit) will not remedy this disparity among imports, but I doubt it will make it worse.
Moreover, the CBMs will cause substitution to cleaner domestic products, so it should overall promote substitution into cleaner products. That is enough for the measure to be "related" to conservation under XX(g).
Even if Kleimann is right that not giving full credit for domestic CBMs will increase substitution among imports, relative to the status quo, he is still assuming that a) substitution among imports will swamp b) substitution into cleaner domestic products relative to all imports.
That is ultimately a post-implementation empirical question, but given the status quo, it seems unlikely. As long as the marginal increase in (b) from the CBM is greater than the marginal increase in (a), the measure is "related" to conservation.
Finally, I'm not sure what the basis is for being certain how the petition process would relate to the exemption. The bill would likely change before enactment & the actual process would then be crafted by the admin via rule making. Thus, it could be a problem, but need not be.
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His main beef seems to be that the bill will mean no explicit carbon price in the US. But as @toddtucker and I argue in @trade_review, achieving our climate goals on the necessary timetable means accepting a diversity of approaches to decarbonization. cambridge.org/core/journals/…
Indeed, the Paris Agreement nations agreed to accept a diversity of domestic approaches to decarbonization. The EU CBAM abandons this promise by not giving importers credit for the implicit price of carbon resulting from regulations, the approach on which the US has relied.
An important thread. As @JGodiasMurphy explains, for technical reasons CBP is not likely able to collect tariffs on Mex imports next week, or possibly even this month. This fact underscores the constitutional problems with these tariffs. 1/
@JGodiasMurphy S. 1704 of IEEPA makes it a crime to willfully violate, attempt to violate, or aid & abet a violation of any presidential order, reg, etc. made under IEEPA. In other words, when POTUS declares an emergency and then acts under IEEPA, he creates crimes. 2/
@JGodiasMurphy That itself may be unconstitutional under either the non delegation doctrine (we'll find out in Gundy) or the due process clause. The basic problem is the same: the executive branch is defining a crime w/ no guidance, limits, or notice to citizens from Congress. 3/