Here is your inflation scorecard. For context, as recently as two months ago people were speculating that we "might" get 3% inflation this year.
We've already had 4.1% CPI this year, if prices are flat for the rest of the year that's the annual inflation we'll have.
As recently as two months ago forecasters saw essentially no chance that core CPI would be 4% this year. Now it would take monthly prints slowing down from 0.48% to 0.13% (or a 1.6% annual rate) to keep inflation down this low.
Inflation moderated in July because the unusually large vehicles category moderated (as widely expected). The underlying inflation rate remained relatively strong. If core inflation continued at this month's rate for a year that would be 4.1% annual inflation.
(As an aside, the idea that vehicle price increases are just supply is implausible. They are partly supply but also a huge increase in demand due to stimulus checks, new car prices especially appear to reflect higher willingness to pay more than shortages.)
This is not base effects or transitory categories. The price increases we've seen have been widespread & not just a few freakish categories. Taking out food, shelter, energy and used cars/trucks (a standard BLS series), prices are above trend and rising faster than trend.
One way to see this is the comparison between the US and Europe. Using the comparable European methodology, the US has had annual inflation at a 3.3% over the last two years, Euro Area has been just 1.3%.
(My view: US too high and Europe too low.)
Finally, some shoes have yet to drop. Rent was really low again this month (+0.2%) and owner's equivalent rent also low (+0.3%). Overall shelter is below trend and likely to rise faster. This would be huge for the CPI and large for the PCE.
Using month-old data, a number of other rent measures are tracking much faster than the CPI. Some of this is conceptual differences (not all apples-to-apples) but some is that the CPI lags based on infrequent interviews to update.
And a policy-related addendum: I view inflation as primarily an issue for monetary policy (plus some supply chain untangling), not fiscal policy. I don't think the infrastructure bill or reconciliation plan would materially impact inflation over the next decade.
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Jobs report uniformly weak: 92K jobs lost (with job losses in almost every industry), household survey employment down too, unemployment rate up to 4.4%, participation down, avg weekly hours flat.
Main sign in the other direction was strong wage growth.
The dynamics for private employment look just like overall (86K lost in private with govt basically flat.
Unemployment rate still stable or slightly rising. Breakeven job growth is in the 25-50K range so negative jobs months will be more common and normal going forward. Note 3-month moving average of jobs is 6K so a bit below this range.
More than *all* of the jobs added over the last year have been in private education & health services.
Total jobs: 359K
Private education & health services: 773K
All other sectors: -414K
This might look surprisingly unbalanced. It's actually the opposite.
A 🧵
Here is percentage job growth across sectors over the last year. Dropping the two most extreme they range from 0.8% for leisure & hospitality to -1.5% for information, a 2.2pp difference.
(Note this post generally uses 3 month moving averages to smooth otherwise volatile data.)
This is job growth in 1996. It looks more balanced than 2025 because every industry added jobs. But actually the gap between the second highest (professional services at 5.1%) and second lowest (mining at 0.4%) is 4.7pp. Much more dispersed than this year.
Core CPI inflation rose during the month of January. But it fell and was relatively muted over longer periods of time--although still some concern the numbers a bit lower due to shutdown-related quirks.
On the surface a strong jobs report (130K jobs & unemployment falls to 4.3%).
And just about every detail makes it even stronger: participation up, involuntary part-time down, hours up, wages up.
The mystery of strong GDP and weak jobs is being resolved in the direction of GDP.
The job growth happened despite further cuts in federal jobs. Private employment was up an impressive 172K.
Note, breakeven job growth is currently about 25-50K because of reduced net immigration & also more fully recovered participation. So job growth has slowed but the unemployment rate now seems to have stabilized after slowly and steadily increasing since mid-2023.
I will be enthusiastically supporting faculty legislation to cap the number of A's at Harvard at 20% (plus a bit). The collective action problem that has driven grades higher & higher over time is increasingly problematic. I hope other institutions consider similar steps.
I've talked to numerous colleagues & students about grade inflation. Almost all of them see it as a a problem. I've also heard about as many different ideas for solutions as I've had conversations. I would tweak this proposal in various ways. But would support it over nothing.
One place the current system fails--and it's not the only place--is honors. I'm on the Committee to recommend honors in the economics department. It's increasingly hard to distinguish excellence with so many A's. I believe that now even two A-'s makes you ineligible for Summa.