For a break from Afghanistan news, my latest in @WarOnTheRocks on the PLA's apparent use of civilian RoRo ferries & vehicle carriers to augment its amphibious assault capacity - a lack thereof having been an area of comfort re the PRC threat to Taiwan.
In summary:
For years now China appears to have been building its "civilian" shipping, and especially its RoRo ferries to dual-use civilian-military standards...
Significant portions (I'm guessing most) of China's RoRo ferry and vehicle carrier fleets are already formally organized into auxiliary units of the Chinese military...
...and the PLA has been regularly practicing using RoRo ferries in its amphibious assault exercises, including using them to discharge first-echelon assault forces directly toward the beach, rather than to captured port facilities as was usually assumed in the past.
In terms of scale, China's large ferries are ocean-going vessels, and much larger than the ferries that most readers may have encountered...
...in aggregate, by my calculations China's RoRo shipping fleets are roughly three times the size of China's traditional amphibious assault ship fleet.
Does this mean that China has enough combined civil-military amphibious assault capacity to successfully invade Taiwan. It's hard to say for sure.
But what is clear is that China very likely has far more of it available than has generally been thought to be the case.
A bit of back-story: what got me interested in this topic was stumbling onto these new ferry terminals while scrolling around looking at imagery of Hainan Island. They struck me as being quite large, as well as having a fair number of idling ferries and pretty empty parking lots.
In my experience, ferry landing parking areas are pretty small and usually full, with traffic often backed up well into nearby communities.
For comparison, here are two of the busiest ferry terminals in the U.S., for the Staten Island and WA State Ferry systems.
I was also inspired by @KennedyMaritime's superb OSINT on this topic:
Would you like to know more about the broader cross-Strait military balance? Then check out my testimony (as well as that of my superb fellow witnesses) earlier this year on this topic to @USCC_GOV.
"Rattner [sic] said Xi Jinping’s goal of having his military ready to carry out a “short, sharp invasion” of Taiwan by 2027 “is not possible right now.”"
I was at this event, and that is not what I recall them saying. What I recall is them saying is... news.usni.org/2024/12/19/chi…
...that invasion was "neither imminent nor inevitable", that the PLA faced obstacles in reaching Xi's 2027 goal, and in terms of a short sharp invasion at acceptable cost, "they're not there today".
But judge for yourself, that portion is around 12:00:
IMO my recollection is consistent with this statement, provided at a separate brief to reporters—and released by DoD.
Again: not imminent or inevitable, Xi remains committed to 2027 goals but corruption could slow them down (i.e., not "not possible" to meet 2027 goals). 🤷♂️
Moving on, here's part 3 of my thoughts on the 2024 China Military Power report. We'll start with the PRC's nuclear forces.
Overall, DoD estimates the PRC has 600+ warheads. Last year's report said 500, with 1000 expected by 2030, so this 20% increase isn't really a surprise. 🤷♂️
We also get news the PLARF is doubling the size of the DF-5 liquid-fueled ICBM silo force.
We also get a new discussion of possible reasons for the massive nuclear expansion: in part due to concerns about US BMD (note: not US nuclear modernization).
While US BMD could have something to do with it, I think there's more to it: Xi has said China will have a "world-class" military, and this is probably part of that.
Also, a robust nuclear force is insurance against a US nuclear response to large-scale PRC conventional strikes.
First, the report provides a section on PLARF force structure, with an estimate ICBM brigades have 6-12 launchers, other brigades 24-48—a detail I don't recall from previous reports.
Also, it details there's probably different C2 for nuclear vs. conventional ops, also new AFAIK.
The report also reveals the DF-21C MRBM is on its way out, with no more dedicated brigades operating it (I assume there are still DF-21D anti-ship brigades?).
Ok, here we go: some thoughts on the 2024 DoD China Military Power report, or CMPR, which was released yesterday (finally!).
I'll focus on updates I thought were interesting/consequential - areas new or different from last year's report.
(part 1)
In general, I'd say the report has few surprises this year (but one significant one, detailed in the next installment).
The PLA continues on its trajectory of significant improvements in reach and capability, with no signs of slowing down.
For comparisons between the 2024 and 2023 reports, this year's report will be on the left, last year's on the right.
First up: total numbers. The PLA remains the largest active-duty military in the world, though some numbers dropped a bit due to a change in counting methods.
1. Everyone involved in reporting this clearly understands that nuclear submarines had not—yet—been built in Wuhan, and that this was a new development: a significant expansion of nuclear submarine production outside of Huludao.
1. cont'd: rumors of a new "auxiliary nuclear powerplant for electricity generation for fitting into conventional submarine designs" (like the subs they've been building at Wuhan) have been circulating for years, so not that surprising of a development.cimsec.org/pla-navys-plan…
2. Everyone also understands the Yangtze is shallow, which is why for years the subs being built there have been taken downriver on barges. The new boat is only ~10% longer than previous classes, nothing like the size of PRC SSNs, so no reason to think it couldn't be so also.