Tråd: Mohamed Daramys transfer og bud fra Club Brugge og Ajax afstedkom en del diskussion om at de to klubber havde meget større økonomi end FCK. Derfor har jeg kigget lidt på de tre selskabers regnskab fra 2020, da halvårsregnskaberne ikke er til rådighed endnu 1/12 👇🏻 #fcklive
Omsætning: Hvis man kun ser på omsætningen på de tre selskaber PSE A/S, Club Brugge N.V. og AFC Ajax N.V. så ligger den på samme niveau for de første to men væsentligt over i Ajax. FCK har også i 2019 væsentligt over. Nedgangen fra 2019 var 35% for PSE/FCK og 19% for Ajax. 2/12👇🏻
Resultat: Alle tre klubber havde et negativt driftsresultat i 2020, men hvor FCK havde et underskud på transferaktiviteterne på -118m og særlige indtægter på +86m, så havde begge de andre klubber et stort plus samt en del andre indtægter, der ikke kom fra driften. 3/12 👇🏻
Cash-flow: Analysen fortæller hvor meget likviditet selskabet har sammenlignet med udgangen af 2019. Den er opdelt på driften, investeringer og finansiering. FCK havde et positivt cash-flow som følge af finansiering, CB et lille negativt og Ajax et større 4/12 👇🏻
Aktiver: Det vil sige rede penge og værdien af de elementer som udgør selskabet. Her begynder det at blive interessant når vi taler om hvad der opgjort af kontraktrettigheder, men også hvor mange kontanter man har stående og dermed meget hurtigt kan handle i markedet. 5/12 👇🏻
Aktiver 2: En hel del spillerhandler har en betalingsprofil som betyder at hele købssummen oftest ikke betales på en gang. FCK har 23m mere stående kontant end CB, men Ajax har dobbelt så meget som FCK, hvilket afspejler størrelsesforholdet. 6/12 👇🏻
Aktiver 3: Her fremgår det at FCK har størst kortsigtede aktiver. FCK har 268,5m i immaterielle aktiver (heraf 184m i kontraktrettigheder), hvor CB har 373m og Ajax 1.206,9m. Det vil sige at FCKs trup var opgjort til 184m per 31.12.2020. 7/12 👇🏻
Passiver: Lang- eller kortsigtet. Det første betyder stabilitet, lav rente og er typisk lån i fast ejendom. Kortsigtet gæld kan være helt uproblematisk som næste løn, leverandører etc, men det kan også være problematisk hvis man ikke har likviditeten til at betale dem. 8/12 👇🏻
Passiver 2: Interessant nok så hører FCK meget for sin gæld, men den kortsigtede gæld udgør 88% af de kortsigtede aktiver hvor de i CB og Ajax overstiger dem med 92% hhv 40%. Tallet for forholdet mellem kortsigtet gæld og omsætning er hhv 83, 74 og 53% med Ajax som bedst. 9/12 👇🏻
Passiver 3: FCKs langsigtede gæld er bundet op på de faste langsigtede aktiver (Parken og Lallandia) og udgør 85% af disses værdi. De to andre klubbers langsigtede gæld overstiger derimod deres faste aktiver m 25% og 13%. Samlet gæld i forhold til aktiver er 77, 56 & 49% 10/12 👇🏻
Passiver 4: Ud over gæld består passiverne af egenkapital, der er forskellen på aktiver og passiver. På grund af det store negative resultat så blev egenkapitalen i FCK reduceret fra 845m til 653m, men det er næsten dobbelt så højt som CB, men næsten en tredjedel af Ajax 11/12 👇🏻
Konklusion: 2020 er et svært år at bedømme ud fra, men Club Brugge har ikke en stærkere økonomi på de fleste parametre end FCK. Det har Ajax derimod med et meget stærkere grundlag med en meget større egenkapital og indtægter ud over driften. 12/12 Se også:
#OTD 9 April 1940
Colonel Bennike, commander of the 🇩🇰Danish 4th Regiment refused to follow the order to surrender. To him the only correct decision was to go to Elsinore and board ships to transport his men to Helsingborg, 🇸🇪Sweden to continue the fight against the Germans 1/5
He had issued orders to march to Elsinore, but both due to some officers questioning his orders and other delays, only half of the 11th Battalion made it to the ships and was transported to Helsingborg
(Photo from Elsinore 9 April 1940) 2/5
At Helsingborg the much baffled Swedes was “invaded” by a colonel who was not to give up the fight against Germans. As it happened Sweden had not mobilised and large parts of Southern Sweden was largely undefended, which meant the Danes was a surprising but welcome addition 3/5
🧵Trump's "NATO death" speech: Even if my conclusion in the below analysis about scenarios for war with Russia in combination of US withdrawal from Europe was ominous, I had not expected it to go potentially straight to the most negative outcome. 1/11 olfi.dk/2024/02/01/dan…
The baseline assumption is a war with Russia 2-5 years following the end of a war in Ukraine or the old assumption of a 10-year warning in combination with a US withdrawal from Europe. It would either be "Trump" swift or gradual due to e.g. a strategic shift to the Pacific. 2/11
The first worst case scenario is a war from 2027 in combination with immediate US withdrawal from 2025 to 2029 following a Trump election. This will leave no time to replace US capabilities and even basic Danish capabilities for Article 5 will not be ready perhaps save F-35. 3/11
The Danish Army has a critical deficit of contract soldiers and cannot sustain combat capability at brigade or battalion-level according to the Deputy Commander of the Danish Army, Brigadier Lyhne. As I see it, besides the critical lack 1/6
of soldiers, the structure of the army after decades of reductions is the main reason. Today, even if there are 2 brigades on paper, only the 1st is supposedly to become a combat ready formation. With only 3 combat battalions, the brigade cannot sustain prolonged periods of 2/6
deployment of a battalion on a 6 month rotation basis. The 2nd Brigade consists of one armoured (providing tanks for the 1st Brigade), one recon and one light infantry battalion, and can only partly support deployments. This is in contrast to the earlier structure of 3/6
🧵 The Leopard 1A5 is - as I have been arguing since April 2022 - a fine addition to the Ukrainian tank fleet and matches older Ts while also being able to act as infantry support. @CorporalFrisk has a fine analysis below + 4 tweets on my idea development from April 22 to now 1/5
The initial idea was generated back in April 2022 when the initial request from Ukraine and discussions with KMW and FFG emerged, but had no political support in Germany stopped the process. 2/5
In September, I launched the idea to have a Danish acquisition of the ex-Danish Leopard 1A5DK, which got wide distribution and support - also outside the twitter world ;-) (even if the numbers were wrong - should have been 99 - we used to have 230) 3/5
The sudden apparent blind selection of replacement capacity for the CAESAR 155mm howitzer in Denmark after the donation to Ukraine does not make sense. Denmark is forming a medium heavy infantry brigade and in NATO planning we are to deliver a heavy infantry brigade by 2032. 1/6
The French CAESAR system, which is an excellent wheel-based long range artillery system as witnessed in Ukraine, was selected due to specifications developed after our mechanized brigade capacity was dropped (2004) and prior to the decision to - partly - re-build the capacity 2/6
The specifications were developed prior to June 2012 when the army operated out-of-area in Iraq/Afghanistan and needed a deployable system. In December 2014 the Israeli system ATMOS from Elbit actually won, but due to political issues ATMOS was dropped in favour of CAESAR. 3/6
19 ex-Danish Piranha IIIH APCs are being delivered to Moldova by Germany as part of a military support package from Germany.
Thread 1/4 army.md/?lng=2&action=…
Denmark announced in April 2022 it would donate between a number of Piranha III to Ukraine (about 20-25 APCs), but this was blocked by Switzerland in June 2022 2/4 srf.ch/news/schweiz/w…
Denmark originally had 92 Piranha IIIC (incl 16 ambulance and 4 signals) and 22 Piranha IIIH (all infantry APC). The Piranha III were extensively used in Iraq and Afghanistan and has now been replaced by Piranha V in the Danish Army. (P: L.Holst and O. Andreasen, DK defence) 3/4