5/ It’s clear this is a group of larps that made their money from posing as a research group when in reality they made money from IDO shilling and wrecking anyone who followed them.
6/ It’s frustrating to see all of them get such engagement and make so much money while the newbies blindly follow.
We see this reoccur time after time again. Adouble212 DM’d me saying they want to change but they’ve already caused so much damage at the expense of others.
7/ Why would you trust them now? The least they could have tried to do is reimburse the victims if they’re “truly sorry”.
1/ Meet Haby (Havard), a Canadian threat actor who has stolen $2M+ via Coinbase support impersonation social engineering scams in the past year blowing the funds on rare social media usernames, bottle service, & gambling.
2/ On Dec 30, 2024 Haby posted a screenshot in a group chat showing off a 21K XRP ($44K) theft from a Coinbase user.
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3/ On Jan 3, 2025 Haby posted a screenshot from his Exodus wallet showing his Telegram & IG accounts.
I matched up the historical balances to the screenshot and found the XRP address linked to two other Coinbase user thefts for ~$500K total.
1/ An investigation into how I identified one of suspects tied to the $28M Bittensor hack from 2024 by identifying anime NFT wash trades linked to a former employee and earned a whitehat bounty for my efforts.
2/ 32 $TAO holders experienced unauthorized transfers in excess of $28M from May to July 2024 and the Bittensor network was temporarily halted on July 2, 2024.
A post-mortem published by the team revealed the thefts were the result of a supply chain attack after a malicious PyPi package was uploaded in late May 2024
Victims who downloaded the package and performed specific operations accidentally compromised private keys.
3/ I began tracing the stolen funds from two initial theft addresses, TAO was bridged to Ethereum via Bittensor native bridge, and then transferred to instant exchanges where the attackers swapped to XMR.
1/ An unnamed source recently compromised a DPRK IT worker device which provided insights into how a small team of five ITWs operated 30+ fake identities with government IDs and purchased Upwork/LinkedIn accounts to obtain developer jobs at projects.
2/ An export of their Google Drive, Chrome profiles, and screenshots from their devices was obtained.
Google products were extensively used by them to organize their team’s schedules, tasks, and budgets with communications primarily in English.
3/ Another spreadsheet shows weekly reports for team members from 2025 which provides insight into how they operate and what they think about.
“I can't understand job requirement, and don't know what I need to do”
1/ An investigation into how @cryptobeastreal scammed followers by lying they were not behind the $190M -> $3M $ALT market cap crash where 45+ connected insider wallets sold $11M+ on July 14, 2025.
2/ Earlier this month Crypto Beast began aggressively promoting $ALT on X and TG.
On July 14, 2025 ALT crashed from 0.19 to 0.003 after insiders sold a large percent of the total supply.
All of these posts promoting the token. have since been deleted.
3/ Crypto Beast previously shared a public wallet on X & TG in now deleted posts.
1/ My recent investigation uncovered more than $16.58M in payments since January 1, 2025 or $2.76M per month has been sent to North Korean IT workers hired as developers at various projects & companies.
To put this in perspective payments range from $3K-8K per month meaning they have infiltrated 345 jobs on the low end or 920 jobs on the high end.
2/ Here’s a look into one of the six clusters I have been monitoring and was able to attribute 8 different DPRK ITWs that obtained roles at 12+ projects.
I traced out the payment addresses from the table to two consolidation addresses.