Italian police arrested 6 this week over an allegedly surreptitious drone company acquisition by PRC state-owned enterprises (SOE) via a Hong Kong shell. They released a redacted ownership chart - I’ve filled it in using corporate records 👇
Let’s walk thru this case, but 1st...
CRRC may stand out to folks familiar with my past work. My Open Arms report w/ @C4ADS documented CRRC’s role in acquiring UK-based Dynex Semiconductor, moving production to China (*remember this part*), and likely aiding military technology breakthroughs tinyurl.com/43atvbr8
To begin, Italian police allege that PRC SOEs and gov entities conspired to buy Alpi Aviation, which agreed, in violation of export controls and investment review regs. Alpi makes the Strix-DF unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) for military use and participates in Italy’s defense R&D
The police charge that SOEs China Corporate United Investment (CCUI) and CRRC Capital Holdings, and the Wuxi government in Jiangsu used a web of shells to control Alpi and move Alpi’s production and know-how to China. This story goes back to 2017…
2017: The Shanghai gov and Italian Ministry of Economic Development host a China-Italy Economic Cooperation Forum in Jun. CCUI signs an equity acquisition framework with Alpi. CCUI’s chairperson creates the alleged shell co. Mars (Shanghai) in Oct.
2018: Mars (HK) is created in Feb. CCUI states publicly it acquired Alpi in Jul. In Dec., Demos (Shanghai) and the Wuxi CRRC CCUI Intelligent Equipment Fund are established, the latter “to push forward the transformation and upgrading of the national industry” (CCUI’s mission)
As far as I can tell, at the time of acquisition the ownership chain was CCUI (a gov-sponsored fund) + CRRC ➡️ Mars (Shanghai) ➡️ Mars (HK) ➡️ Alpi Aviation. Basically the right half of the ownership chart
The other entities were probably set up to manage and fund Alpi’s development + relocation to China. By Oct. 2018, news reports already indicated that Alpi was participating in a joint venture to move production to China
Alpi’s China facilities are intended, according to CCUI press, to be the 1st project within a new Wuxi CRRC S&T Innovation Park. I’m guessing this falls within the Wuxi Liyuan Economic Development Zone, but am not sure. By 2019, facility planning/development is underway…
2019: CCUI’s assistant president (助理总裁) says Alpi production will move to China, creating local engineering teams + new domestic supply chains. In the meantime, Alpi shows off the Strix UAV at the China Int’l Import Expo — Strix is Italian mil. equipment & export controlled
Police allege that Alpi failed to notify the Italian Ministry of Defense about their sale for 2 years and reportedly misrepresented the Strix-DF UAV when exporting it to China for the Expo. I believe this is the core of the legal case against Alpi
Other notable points in the case: CCUI and CRRC may have paid as much as 90 times Alpi’s actual value (reported numbers vary). Alpi is also reportedly under investigation for violating export controls related to Iran, which might be a longstanding issue per this 2009 US cable
3 things abt this case stand out: 1st, CRRC + relocation to China. It's just like Dynex. CRRC also owns British subsea equipment & submersibles manufacturers Specialist Machine Developments and Soil Machine Dynamics that at 1 time said they would move to China too
2nd is overpayment. This is the so-called “China Premium” that sellers want, and PRC companies are willing to offer, due to the regulatory risks and opacity of PRC corporate structures
3rd, the targeting of foreign military suppliers for acquisition or R&D partnership. People's Liberation Army Navy supplier Beijing Highlander Digital Technology has done this multiple times. And btw they partner with radar developer AIDOS Systems Srl in Italy
Now some ppl are pushing back on the legitimacy of this case, so let’s unpack a little:
1. Is this tech transfer? Yes — CCUI said it 2. Is it covert? Not really, but proper disclosure apparently didn’t happen 3. Is it illegal? This is for Italian courts to decide
Anyway, read my past report with @BenSpevack and Marcel Angliviel if you’re a company that actually cares about wanting to avoid this kind of situation
1/ NEW INVESTIGATION: Remember hearing that a People’s Liberation Army (PLA)-linked cyber group hacked 200 Japanese businesses in 2016? While looking into that allegation, we at Recorded Future found something else you should know: a PLA unit is buying popular antivirus in bulk
2/ So the allegation is PLA Unit 61419 is linked to the advanced persistent threat (APT) actor Tick Group. We need more information to make a firm conclusion there, but circumstantially it makes sense. Both groups have a cyber operations focus on Japan yomiuri.co.jp/national/20210…
3/ While investigating Unit 61419’s recent activities for additional clues, we found multiple military procurement documents showing their inquiries about buying 14 (!) English-language antivirus products throughout 2019
Remember hearing that @exceptionpcb makes printed circuit boards (PCBs) for the F-35 & is owned by Shenzhen Fastprint? Let’s take a look into who Fastprint is & how we can investigate them. Spoiler alert: they supply electronics to the PLA!
First, the website. Shenzhen Fastprint manufactures integrated circuits (ICs), PCBs & other things in SZ, Guangzhou & Yixing, with subsidiaries in HK, UK & the US. They also admit to producing products for the Chinese military since 2010, though that’s not on the English site…
Their Guangzhou & Hunan subsidiaries make “military products,” incl PCBs & secure solid-state HDs for the PLA. Fastprint reported an income of >500 mil USD in 2017. The 2nd largest source was military products (7%) & national defense tech is central to their development plan!