Encrypted Phone Firm Ciphr, Used by Criminals, Moves to Cut-off Australia vice.com/en/article/k78…
It's really interesting that Ciphr is expanding to include a 'Lite' version that may significantly expand their user base. Why might an organization that ostensibly markets its services criminals do this?
1) The more people using the service who are not potential criminals may increase costs to LEAs who want to insert a backdoor into the application somehow. If they can scale then there may be a public interest argument to *not* backdoor this Ciphr, unlike An0n.
2) The more non-criminal users who use the service, the higher the likelihood that criminals can use the application without it standing out as a 100% problematic/criminal application. In other words, to reduce suspicion based on using Ciphr itself.
3) Linked to (2), if Ciphr happens to be noisy or have particular indicators when its on the network, then adding a legitimate user base may confound some surveillance/targeting based on those indicators. This will help criminal actors hide amongst more legitimate users.
I'll be very curious to see how, over time, reporting on this shift takes place and whether adopting a semi-legitimate arm of business is sufficient to stave off the technical capacities warrants that are now possessed by several FVEY countries. I....have some doubts they will.
Phantom Secure tread the line between legitimate service that then significantly supported alleged criminals/their activities. An0m was developed (in part by LEAs) to exclusively support criminals and their activities. Ciphr appears to be moving from criminal >> legitimate.
In doing so, and if targeted with a warrant that'd compel modifications to Ciphr, then a *very* curious and potentially troubling area of case law will quickly get spun up and presumably tested.
It's fascinating to watch, on the one hand, while also deeply concerning for how these kinds of maneuvers could affect legislative reform or be used to expand what is considered 'appropriate' use of technical warrants going forward. Definitely an area to watch closely.
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Earlier this year, Canada's National Security Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) announced it experienced a 'cyber incident. @NSIRACanada is responsible for, amongst other things, reviewing the operations which have been undertaken by Canada's intelligence community. #cndnatsec
At the time there was very little public information, which led me to raise a serious of questions of what unclassified or Protected (as opposed to Secret, Top Secret, or Top Secret SI) information might have been accessed by a third party. See: christopher-parsons.com/questions-surr…
Stanford professors urge U.S. to end program looking for Chinese spies in academia reuters.com/world/us/stanf…
The FBI has a track record of laying charges against American faculty for inappropriately working with Chinese institutions. But it’s critical that observers recognize that a large number of these investigations are subsequently dismissed.
Canada is adopting American methods of scrutinizing academics, with an expected focus on Asian (and specifically Chinese) collaborators. We will likely see similar charging behaviour, harassment, and bias against scholars based on ‘national security’ concerns and investigations.
This announcement has the potential to really gum up academic research protocols by disincentivizing researchers from doing certain classes of work in Canada due to adding bureaucracy or fear of security review and its consequences.
Funding in Canada is often hard to come by and so researchers are naturally disincentivized from publicly complaining about problems in obtaining funding. But they do talk quietly and create whisper communities of ‘problem funders’.