Thread by @RALee85

Some initial conclusions from the Zapad 2021 exercise. The most notable difference between Zapad 2021 and Zapad 2017 is that Russia conducted two Yars ICBM launches during Zapad 2017, one at the beginning and end. We didn't publicly see any nuclear weapons used during Zapad 2021.

Does that tell us something about how conflict termination could occur in a conflict with NATO? Is Russia more confident in its conventional deterrence vis-a-vis NATO? There wasn't any escalate to deescalate either. Or would this be reading too much into the exercise? 2/

The Russian MoD said that a Tu-95MS bomber took part in the exercise, but as part of the OPFOR and reportedly focused on testing Russian air defenses. There didn't appear to be any strategic bombers involved in delivering simulated nuclear strikes. 3/
function.mil.ru/news_page/coun…

The Northern Fleet's Verkhoturye Project 667BDRM SSBN also left port as part of Zapad, and it is important to note that the Russian MoD doesn't publicize everything that happens during their strategic exercises. 4/

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1436799987111841792

We didn't see any public indication of Russia's "superweapons" during Zapad. We are awaiting an imminent underwater test of the Tsirkon hypersonic missile, and we could have seen a redeployment of MiG-31K with Kinzhals. No indication the Peresvet or Avangard took part either. 5/

Also notable is that the units from the Central Military District that were moved to the Pogonovo range in March-April (when the photo was taken) don't appear to have played much, if any, role in Zapad, but that was Shoigu's justification for moving them in the spring. 6/

Which is just another indication, if one was needed, that the Russian buildup of forces near Ukraine's borders in March-April was coercive in nature primarily designed to send a signal and not just a normal training exercise. 7/

In most ways Zapad 2021 was similar to other annual strategic exercises and like Zapad 2017, but at a larger scale, with new equipment and testing new TTPs. For new equipment, we saw the first use of UGVs (Uran-9 and Nerekhta) and UCAVs (Orion and Forpost-R) at Zapad 2021. 8/

They tested the B-19 BMP with the Epokha turret for the first time as part of a strat ex as well as Zemledeliye minelayers. They likely also tested the PTKM-1R anti-tank mine and UMZ-K Klesh minelayer as part of the exercise. 9/

There was a greater number of airborne operations than normal during Zapad 2021, including the first night battalion-level airborne operation on the first night with 39 BMD-2/BTR-D armored airborne vehicles. 10/

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1436594881275772928

Most of Russia's annual strategic exercise involve foreign troops; however, this was by far the largest foreign contingent for a Zapad exercise (they're more common in Kavkaz, Tsentr, and Vostok exercises), where normally only Russian and Belarusian troops take part. 11/

The Northern Fleet played a larger role this time than in Zapad 2017, both on and off-shore. This isn't surprising given the Northern Fleet is now a fully-fledged military district and Russia's emphasis on the Arctic has only grown since then. 12/

As with every annual strat ex since Vostok 2018, the VDV's 31st Air Assault Brigade conducted a helicopter air assault operation (battalion size). They tested a new vehicle that can be carried by helicopters, the Sarmat-2, and they have tested others in previous exercises. 13/

As expected, there was an amphibious assault/counter-amphib assault exercise at the Khmelevka range in Kaliningrad, as well as other exercises in Kaliningrad. Bal and Bastion coastal defense systems engaged surface ships, and Baltic fleet ships engaged enemy ships/subs. 14/

Aviation played its standard role, air defenses countered mass cruise missile strikes and UAV attacks, Iskander-M systems launched R-500 cruise missiles, military police countered saboteurs, and armor and arty destroyed the enemy. All as expected. 15/

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1437820191497465861

What was notable was that the main exercises that occurred in Belarus happened closer to the border with Poland this time, at the Brestky and Obuz-Lesnovsky ranges, including an airborne operation a couple of kilometers from Poland. 16/

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1437829421864476682

Regarding the stated troop figure for the exercise, the 200k figure is almost certainly exaggerated (unless they are counting all servicemen in the area even ones who didn't take part in the exercise), but it was certainly larger than Zapad 2017. 17/

One of the questions was the degree of Russian-Belarusian integration during the exercise. There were more Russian troops in Belarus this time, but, for the most part, this didn't seem too different from Zapad 2017 and Lukashenko and Putin watched the festivities separately. 18/

The one change was the opening of a joint training center in Belarus, which involved Russian sending two S-300PM2 TELs and 2-3 Su-30SM fighters. The Su-30SM reportedly went on combat duty during the exercise, which means they could have an operational role after Zapad. 19/