I've noticed that some people are expressing skepticism that the DPRK could have acquired or developed a 1,500 km-range land-attack cruise missile. TL/DR: It's not 1978 any more.
A short thread.
Starting in 2014, North Korea showed ship-based copies of Russia's Kh-35 cruise missile. In 2017, North Korea test-fired a land-based variant of the Kh-35, called the Kumsong-3.
The Kh-35, also known as the Kharpunski, is a fairly capable 130 km-range cruise missile developed by the Soviet Union in the 1980s. It used the R-95-300 turbofan engine. (The engine produces 300-400 kgf of thrust and weighs 95 kg).
Here's the thing. This same engine was used on the much more capable Kh-55 (AS-15 Kent), which has a range ~2,500 km. The Kh-55 is just bigger and carries more fuel -- its like two or three times heavier than the Kh-35.
This technology was developed by the Soviet Union during the 1980s. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, these things were around. An entity in Ukraine exported 12 Kh-55s to Iran and China. armscontrol.org/act/2005-05/uk…
China and Iran both subsequently developed long-range cruise missiles that are probably derived, at least in part, from the Kh-55. These include China's CJ-10 and Iran's Hoveyzeh.
The R-95-300 engine was manufactured by Motor Sich, in what is now Ukraine. Motor Sich lost its contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense, but it will sell you a modern version of the same engine (similar thrust and size) under a new name.
A Chinese company tried to take a controlling stake in Motor Sich last year, which triggered alarms in Washington. Ukraine nationalized the firm under pressure from the US. wsj.com/articles/ukrai…
All of which is to say that this technology is out there. With the Kh-35, North Korea demonstrated access to the necessary technology and could have received assistance from any number of entities in countries like China, Iran, Russia or Ukraine.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
Why am I so unimpressed by these strikes? Israel and the US have failed to target significant elements of Iran's nuclear materials and production infrastructure. RISING LION and MIDNIGHT HAMMER are tactically brilliant, but may turn out to be strategic failures. 🧵 1/17
Netanyahu's justification for conducting this strike was that "Iran has produced enough highly enriched uranium for nine atom bombs -- nine." He refers to Iran's stockpile of ~400 kg of 60% U-235 which, if further enriched, would be enough for 9-10 weapons. Let's consider. 2/17
The 400 kg of HEU was largely stored in underground tunnels near the Isfahan Uranium Conversion Facility. Despite extensive Israeli and US attacks the facility, there does not seem to have been any effort to destroy these tunnels or the material that was in them. 3/17
References to "tactical" nuclear weapons in this otherwise great @guardian story by @hugolowell are misleading. The US would drop a strategic B61-11 nuclear earth penetrator with a yield of 300 or 400 kilotons. Hiroshima and Nagasaki were 15 and 21 kt. theguardian.com/world/2025/jun…
Here are the nuclear weapons in the US "enduring stockpile" from @ENERGY's stockpile management plant. Note that the B61-11 nuclear earth penetrator is labeled as a "strategic bomb" -- and for good reason. energy.gov/sites/default/…
The yield of the B61-11 is classified, but it is a converted B61-7 bomb. The yield of the -7 and -11 are usually given as more than 300 kilotons. @nukestrat says the B61-11 was increased to 400 kt. Either way, this is a very powerful nuclear weapon.
I see @SangerNYT asked why Israel hasn't hit the stockpile of enriched uranium. My understanding is that the hex is stored in the tunnels at Isfahan and Israel hasn't been able to destroy the hard, deeply buried targets. Thread.
Isfahan UCF has some tunnels that are are about 100 m under a mountain that Israel has not yet tried to hit. The Iranians were pretty proud of these tunnels, which were constructed around the same time as Fordow by the same dwarves (aka the Passive Defense Organization).
This is pretty esoteric knowledge that is only covered in specialists journals like ... the @nytimes. 😉 (Sorry, I just appreciate Bill Broad and want to give him some love.)
This is probably the the new North Korean uranium enrichment facility that @iaeaorg DG @rafaelmgrossi briefed the Board of Governors about. @sam_lair and I have a summary on the blog. Nice shot by our friends at @planet. armscontrolwonk.com/archive/122048…
The dimensions, layout and other features do resemble the Kangson UEP when it was constructed. Here is a 2002 image of the Kangson under construction -- the central enrichment hall is about 93 m long, which is the right length for two 164-centifuge cascades end-to-end.
Trump's offer to Iran, as reported by @BarakRavid, is a dollar-store-JCPOA.
The JCPOA -- which Trump abandoned -- had all of these provisions, usually in ways that were stronger or more carefully constructed.
He's trying to put Humpty Dumpty back together again. A thread.
@BarakRavid Here is the original story. The proposal was "described to Axios by two sources with direct knowledge — one of whom provided a point-by-point breakdown." This is a paraphrase, so sometimes its hard to know what they are getting at. axios.com/2025/06/02/ira…
@BarakRavid Here is the text of the JCPOA. You don't have to take my word for it; you can look it up yourself. europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/122460…
The claim of 25 missiles a month is falsely attributed to the @DI_Ukraine. What @DI_Ukraine says, according to other news outlets, is 25 IRBMs per YEAR, not per MONTH. babel.ua/news/113282-ro…
Oreshnik is the first two stages of the Yars missile. Oreshnik production rates should be similar to Yars production rates, which the Russians claim is "about 20 launchers and their supporting systems per year." web.archive.org/web/2021041112…