There is a huge amount of focus on China contagion/Evergrande at the moment. Hence, it is a time to be precise. I will not do a comprehensive thread (yet). But just provide some specific color on the High Yield credit moves, which themselves are generating a lot of attention.
It is true that China (USD) credit indices moved a lot last week, after stabilizing briefly in early September.
And there are lots of fintwit comments on that: Here is a good (and sober) example:
It is worth thinking about what is going on under the surface, so I am going to plug in the first 10 names (highest weight in the index) and let them tell the story:
The first one is Bank of Communications (2.4%) weight in HY index. Yield is very stable. Not much contagion here.
The second on is Kaisa Group Holdings (a real estate developer), with 1.4% weight in HY index.
Yield is exploding, past the high from end-July (evergrande fears clearly spreading here)
The third one is a specific evergrande bond that is trading at 59% yield (price 26.6 vs par), this has 1.1% weight.
The fourth one is Lenovo (which took over IBM hardware assets as many know some years back), the specific bond here is 0.9% weight in index.
nothing to see here:
The fifth one is Well Hope (consumer electronics). 0.8% of index.
Yield has been grinding up for some months, but not obvious it is Evergrande linked
The sixth one is Sunac (also a real estate company), it is 0.7% of the index on the specific bond, and the yield is exploding (no surprise, real estate contagion is in motion, in the sector)
The seventh and eight bond in the index are also Kaisa group (together adding up to 1.4% of the index), but we showed Kaisa already (#2), so let is move to the ninth:
ENN Clean Energy: nothing to see, stable yield
The 10th biggest (and 11th biggest) bond in the HY index is Fortune Star (a financing company), together they are 1.2% of the index.
Yields are pretty stable in a range.
I will stop showing individual bonds here, and instead look at the index composition:
The Bloomberg China HY USD index is 66% real estate. Hence, when you look at the aggregate index, it is mostly a real estate picture you get.
If you dig into the other parts of the index, the message is quite different (at least for now). It is hard to find (big) companies outside real estate that have seen significant spread widening.
This is also the message from higher grade indices (note: not USD based): stable
This is not to see that 'everything is fine'. It is just to be precise about what type of contagion we are observing. Sector specific or broader; real or financial. So far mostly real estate specific (with some iron ore impact too)
China is a special case (always). So we cannot use the same template as we have used in the US in 2008, or other past crises. The banks will be dealt with differently and pricing signals (including from the housing sector) may not be entirely 'market driven'.
I will leave it at that.
Watching China contagion is very important now, and while it is unlikely to be a 'banking crisis' like the Global Financial Crisis, there could be other types of 'real contagion'.
We just have to monitor it very precisely.
(I will try to do a more big picture thread in coming days).
Here is the fresh Sunday morning thread addition (bigger picture)
(will try to squeeze in a few more still in coming days)
Last week, we hosted a call for @ExanteData clients on the ongoing asset allocation shift and (very negative) implications for the dollar.
Here I am just posting the opening slides from the call, that illustrates that there is nothing normal about the current regime...
short THREAD
It is highly unusual for the bond market to sell off at the same time as equities are tanking and short-end yields are going down. But this is what we have seen in April, and it is getting worse this week...
It is highly unusual for real yields to be moving notably higher (to a > 20 year high, except Oct 2008) when growth expectations are being revised notably down (recession fears etc)
Here are some basic observations about why the current US tariff policy plans are probably the absolute worst case scenario for US growth...
The cumulative tax effects are very large, and it is a complex system, hard to administer and entailing costly uncertainty.
THREAD
First,
Hitting the most integrated cross-border supply chains, at the core of US manufacturing, will entail a severe hit too US growth.
The tax effect of USMCA tariffs alone are > $200bn
(USCMA tariffs = ‘own goal’)
Second,
We are heading down a path of a complex set of individual tariffs, still ripe for circumvention (as not global). We think 8-10 different tariff pushes are now likely.
Here is a list of key proposals, some over-lapping (not including the agricultural-tariffs, that were added to the list yesterday)
Everybody knows the details of US used car prices, the technicalities of the rent calculation, and even the oddities around obscure CPI components such as medical services...
but perhaps it is better to look at the big picture (global trends and China)...
- just a few of charts
The trend in global core inflation is almost back to normal (chart above)
And when you look at China, you think; should we not worry about deflation?
Headline CPI is as negative as in the covid shock, and almost as negative as in the CFC shock
And when you look at the latest China data, things are getting worse (assuming that you do not like deflation)
Despite the re-opening in 2023, the Chinese economy is observing greater deflationary effects, with momentum getting incrementally more severe in recent months.
The higher for longer narrative is looking increasingly stale
(a few big picture charts)
First, the global trend in core inflation momentum is very clear. The worst is certainly behind us...
Second, while some economies have shown greater resiliency to higher rates than expected, global credit is very weak, especially vs 2022, but also vs pre-covid trend.