1/ I always joke that predicting the future of tech is way easier than most people think... the hard part is making any money off those predictions
This 2001 paper ("Big in Japan: iMode and the Mobile Internet") is one of the best examples I've ever seen- core.ac.uk/download/pdf/3…
2/ Looking back, the modern smartphone era didn't begin until the launch of the iPhone in 2007
But this paper makes it clear: even in 2001, it was obvious to pretty much everyone that the future of the internet was going to be mobile
3/ Moreover, all eyes pointed to Japan as a template for the rest of the world: in 1999, the Japanese telco NTT DoCoMo had launched "iMode," the world's first mass-adopted mobile internet service. By 2001 it had over 20 million users (15% of the Japanese population)
4/ iMode was vertically-integrated: NTT DoCoMo bundled 2G internet connectivity with its own proto-smartphone hardware (in partnership with OEMs), custom web browser, proprietary web standard (a modified version of HTML), and in-house index (a portal of 1480 'approved' websites)
5/ In case it's not clear, this is super weird by today's standards! The telcos didn't just control internet service - they basically controlled the INTERNET
To get your website on iMode, you had to pay DoCoMo an upfront fee + a *9% take rate*. This was $3.4B business in 2001
6/ Imagine you're a tech executive or investor looking at Japan in 2001. What's the takeaway?
You should be getting into the telecom business! After all, who wouldn't want to get their very own 9% cut of what is obviously going to be a trillion dollar mobile internet TAM?
7/ Of course, that's not what happened. Instead, Japan proves to be a dead end
6 years later, Apple launches the iPhone... and turns the tables on the telcos by seizing full control over the hardware, the OS, the browser, and the app store. Telcos remain a dumb pipe to this day
8/ What's the lesson here?
Predicting the general contours of the future is easy ('people will browse the internet on their phones'). However, it's the details that ultimately matter, ie who / when / where / why?
Case studies can give false comfort. Precedent is not destiny!
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2/ This paper shows autonomous driving follows the same scaling laws as the rest of ML - performance improves predictably on a log linear basis with data and compute
This is no surprise to anybody working on LLMs, but it’s VERY different from consensus at Waymo a few years ago
3/ Waymo built its tech stack during the pre-scaling paradigm. They train a tiny model on a tiny amount of simulated and real world driving data and then finetune it to handle as many bespoke edge cases as possible
1/ Was this the biggest miss in the history of pharma? Apparently in 1990, Pfizer preemptively abandoned development of the first GLP1 drugs
Ozempic, Zepbound, Wegovy, Mounjaro, etc. were doing $60B+ in runrate revenues at the end of last year. None are made by Pfizer
2/ Source is this retrospective written by Jeffrey Flier (former dean of Harvard Medical School) about his biotech startup MetaBio in the late 1980s: muse.jhu.edu/article/936213
3/ MetaBio was founded in 1987. That was the year Joel Habener first reported GLP-1’s ability to stimulate glucose-dependent insulin secretion - in retrospect, the moment of “discovery” for GLP-1s
MetaBio became the first company in the world to license Habener’s GLP-1 patents
1/ If you really believe LLMs will dramatically compress the cost of software development in 3-5 years, doesn't this obviate the reason for independent software vendors to exist?
This doesn't seem obviously crazy to me - it'd just be a return to the days of mainframes
2/ When IBM invented the mainframe in the 50s, there were no independent software companies - IBM bundled their hardware with a COBOL compiler, which customers then used to write custom software themselves
3/ The world's first independent software vendors (e.g. ADR, Informatics, MSA) all started in the 60s as contract programmers - basically, consultants hired to write custom COBOL for clients - who then realized they could resell that custom code to multiple customers
1/ This internal 2007 Nokia presentation on the first iPhone is a really good example of how incumbents actually get disrupted
Oftentimes, the incumbent already knows what needs to be done. It's just that organizational incentives inhibit the incumbent from doing it
2/ This slide deck was posted on Hacker News earlier this week but just got taken down
I have no idea how they got their hands on a copy but it does look like a legit internal Nokia presentation from strategy team at the timenews.ycombinator.com/item?id=427247…
3/ Contrary to popular belief, people at Nokia in 2007 understood that the iPhone was a big deal
The iPhone's touchscreen would "set a new standard of state-of-art"
Nokia's own user interface paradigm was "in decline"
1/ I just finished a 2.5 week trip through China today, my first visit in about a decade. I was there for family reasons, but it also happened to be my first time in the country as a tech industry observer
My amateur travel journal on the China tech market -
2/ OBSERVATION #1 - Yes, everything really does run on WeChat
If you're a foreign traveler visiting China, you really must set up WeChat Pay and Alipay beforehand. For me, this was the Chinese equivalent of Whatsapp + Chrome + Venmo + my credit card + my subway card + Doordash
3/ I didn't use cash a single time on my 19 day trip. Everybody took WeChat Pay, from Michelin-starred restaurants, to McDonalds, to butchers at the farmers markets in tier 3 cities, to performing musicians in national parks