So this is completely unsurprising - the Kremlin instituted highly insecure, unauditable and non-transparent online voting for the parliamentary elections, and Putin's party wins huge, even in Moscow where there's great opposition to Putin's party. 1/ nytimes.com/2021/09/20/wor…
Pretty much EVERYONE, including the @DHSgov 's @CISAgov has said online voting is insecure and untrustworthy. So it's not so surprising that Putin might use online voting to tamper with results. You might think that a mature democracy, like the US, would reject online...2/
...voting out of hand. Yet, here in the US, where we should be focusing on strengthening our elections and building confidence in the process with greater transparency, auditability and more trustworthy systems, 32 states allow some online voting for a non-trivial number of...3/
voters. Instead, the dysfunctional EAC is promoting online voting without considering or discussing the security risks. 4/ eac.gov/election-offic…
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🚨This is important - for too long our election system risk model was predicated on the faulty concept "security by obscurity." A partisan CO election official has published previously concealed election data, blowing that concept up, once and for all. 1/ washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/…
We don't need to panic, but we do need to admit that the previous risk model is wrong, and recalibrate our procedures to reflect that. This means: hand marked paper ballots as the primary vote recording method, accessible tech for those who need it, compliance audits, ballot...2/
...accounting, robust canvassing and routine, MANDATORY, risk-limiting audits. In this article CISA claims this has always been its risk model and the recommendations are unchanged BUT the problem is that election officials and state lawmakers have set the policies and ...3/
🚨Anyone interested in election integrity should pay attention to this lawsuit. LA's deeply flawed, $300M voting system was sold to voters as providing a voter-verified paper ballot,but the poor design makes recounts of the paper practically impossible.1/ presstelegram.com/2021/06/26/fut…
This system was the brainchild of @LACountyRRCC which spent the $300M for this system, which can't provided a meaningful recount. A ballot measure in Long Beach lost by only 16 votes, but the County refused to do a recount. A local group raised the money to pay for a recount, 2/
but LA County then claimed the recount would actually cost more than 10x the published estimate, putting it out of reach. @LACountyRRCC then suggested that a recount be done on the electronic ballot records created by the computers. This goes against all principles & best 3/
We sued the @EACgov bcz it held closed-door meetings w/voting system vendors, then quietly changed provisions in the federal voting system guidelines to let vendors include wireless networking devices in federally certified voting machines. Sound crazy? It is. THREAD 1/
Especially because, years ago, the @eacgov chair testified to the senate, wrongly, that federal voluntary voting system guidelines (VVSG) DO BAN internet connectivity. They didn't in 2019, but this showed that EAC recognized the PR value. 2/
See at 3:30.
From 2015-2020 EAC was actively developing new VVSG, VVSG 2.0, and there was a huge push from the computer security community and the public to ban all devices that may be capable of connecting to the internet in voting machines. @Public_Citizen 3/ citizen.org/news/advocates…
I'd just like to clear up some misinformation here for the record - the claim that voting machines cannot be hacked because they are never connected to the internet is FALSE.
This is often accompanied by another claim from states that use wireless modems, who insist that...1/
...the wireless modems don't connect to the internet. This is also FALSE.
The @WI_Elections has made claims that its voting machines don't connect to the internet but this is FALSE because WI has jurisdictions that use modems to send unofficial election results back to...2/
...headquarters. This operation means that BOTH ends of the connection- the voting machine and the county election management system - are connected to the internet and exposed to internet based attacks. This is established unequivocally by the @NIST who said use of modems...3/
This👇 This is the problem with most states’ post election audits - they are not structured or implemented to serve as a check, or allow for a correction, of a possible incorrect election result. When VA’s legislature was writing this bill, lawmakers...1/ wusa9.com/article/news/p…
...tried to write the bill to conduct the audit before the election is certified, so that if the audit uncovered miscounted ballots, ballots could be recounted and the election corrected. Local election officials opposed these provisions. Why?Because election officials have ...2/
...been misinformed about the risk to election systems. Specifically, they have been told vote tallies can’t be corrupted because “voting machines aren’t connected to the internet” so these audits are viewed as a needless burden, not as an important security safeguard. This...3/
🚨This! What is going on in GA is deeply disturbing. The @GaSecofState's foolish choice to force GA to continue to vote on touchscreen machines (even if they print a barcode ballot) is imploding every min as more problems w/the machines crop up & the SOS tries to cover up...1/
...the defects in this janky system. Just a few weeks ago we found out the ballot was not displaying all the candidates in the special senate race, mere weeks before the election. The state tried to downplay the problem, saying the vendor @dominionvoting only needed to...2/
...update the software in all 34k voting machines in GA(!) NBD. They then told the federal court that it was only a minor change,"de minimus" & that Dominion had already submitted it to the @EACgov for them to approve the tiny change & give it rubber stamp approval w/minimal...3/