3/ Perhaps you thought it was a one time off incident and I am making assumptions that it’s his wallet. Let’s examine some undisclosed $EULER shilling.
a) Received 78,610 EULER on 5/3
b) Shilled on Twitter on 5/4
4/ Let’s look at $SAVE which which was a BSC coin advertised as a “charity coin”
From BSC scan you see he received coins for promoting which wasn’t disclosed.
6/ Now let’s move over to his paid group WWG so we can examine if it’s any different.
They have thousands of paying members with a monthly membership fee of ~$175
I would hope you’re not taking advantage of people with your “signals”
7/ Let’s examine this TRB signal by CryptoEliz.
a) Call made at 11:28 pm
b) Exits 3 minutes later & posts screenshot
c) Significant volume & price surge immediately after the signal from 11:28 pm to 11:31 pm
Perhaps this was a one off incident!
8/ Here’s another TRB call made by CryptoEliz
a) Entry signal made at 3:04 pm
b) Exits 5 minutes later and posts screenshot
c) Significant volume & price surge immediately after the signal from 3:04 pm to 3:09 pm
Not so much of a coincidence now anon?
9/ Let’s look at one more for good measure. Here’s a LIT signal given.
a) Entry signal made at 11:32 am
b) Exits for a “scalp” 8 minutes later
c) See chart for evidence.
Imagine paying this much monthly just to get dumped on.
10/ Lastly here’s the WWG analyst BullChain calling out anyone promoting the token $LEGS
Hours later CryptoEliZ tweets about $LEGS pretending to have genuine interest. Another shill not disclosed…
Another WWG fail
11/ Another sketchy tactic used by the group is their marketing & branding.
By using wealth/warren buffet memes they look to attract as many newbies as possible.
Avoid anyone with “god” in their username.
12/ For a while during spring when it was up only I did follow him for a bit thinking he was legit but little did I know.
These people do not want to help you and are not your friend.
I’m sure his army will come attacking but they are naive and it’s hard to continue to watch
13/ Well that concludes this thread!
Follow for more in the future.
Oops
From the WWG Discord
“Why do you spend all this time”
So John claims he “reimbursed” everyone in the Discord.
@SECGov@GaryGensler@FBI Instead of going after legit projects trying to innovate when can we go after bad actors like the ones displayed in this thread that investors keep getting wrecked by.
This is where protection should be given.
Further evidence this is Johns wallet.
More like EliZ losing money from less people to dump on
I’m not too well versed in this area but everyone involved is under US jurisdiction.
Would be happy to formally file a complaint or take legal action granted someone can help guide through the process.
1/ Meet Haby (Havard), a Canadian threat actor who has stolen $2M+ via Coinbase support impersonation social engineering scams in the past year blowing the funds on rare social media usernames, bottle service, & gambling.
2/ On Dec 30, 2024 Haby posted a screenshot in a group chat showing off a 21K XRP ($44K) theft from a Coinbase user.
rN7ddvk4DrGHZUrBfNARJEEAbPkky9Mwcz
3/ On Jan 3, 2025 Haby posted a screenshot from his Exodus wallet showing his Telegram & IG accounts.
I matched up the historical balances to the screenshot and found the XRP address linked to two other Coinbase user thefts for ~$500K total.
1/ An investigation into how I identified one of suspects tied to the $28M Bittensor hack from 2024 by identifying anime NFT wash trades linked to a former employee and earned a whitehat bounty for my efforts.
2/ 32 $TAO holders experienced unauthorized transfers in excess of $28M from May to July 2024 and the Bittensor network was temporarily halted on July 2, 2024.
A post-mortem published by the team revealed the thefts were the result of a supply chain attack after a malicious PyPi package was uploaded in late May 2024
Victims who downloaded the package and performed specific operations accidentally compromised private keys.
3/ I began tracing the stolen funds from two initial theft addresses, TAO was bridged to Ethereum via Bittensor native bridge, and then transferred to instant exchanges where the attackers swapped to XMR.
1/ An unnamed source recently compromised a DPRK IT worker device which provided insights into how a small team of five ITWs operated 30+ fake identities with government IDs and purchased Upwork/LinkedIn accounts to obtain developer jobs at projects.
2/ An export of their Google Drive, Chrome profiles, and screenshots from their devices was obtained.
Google products were extensively used by them to organize their team’s schedules, tasks, and budgets with communications primarily in English.
3/ Another spreadsheet shows weekly reports for team members from 2025 which provides insight into how they operate and what they think about.
“I can't understand job requirement, and don't know what I need to do”
1/ An investigation into how @cryptobeastreal scammed followers by lying they were not behind the $190M -> $3M $ALT market cap crash where 45+ connected insider wallets sold $11M+ on July 14, 2025.
2/ Earlier this month Crypto Beast began aggressively promoting $ALT on X and TG.
On July 14, 2025 ALT crashed from 0.19 to 0.003 after insiders sold a large percent of the total supply.
All of these posts promoting the token. have since been deleted.
3/ Crypto Beast previously shared a public wallet on X & TG in now deleted posts.
1/ My recent investigation uncovered more than $16.58M in payments since January 1, 2025 or $2.76M per month has been sent to North Korean IT workers hired as developers at various projects & companies.
To put this in perspective payments range from $3K-8K per month meaning they have infiltrated 345 jobs on the low end or 920 jobs on the high end.
2/ Here’s a look into one of the six clusters I have been monitoring and was able to attribute 8 different DPRK ITWs that obtained roles at 12+ projects.
I traced out the payment addresses from the table to two consolidation addresses.