Thread by @PeterSalmon7

Only a quarter way through reading judgment in @fruitbatmania's pioneering case in the Investigatory Powers Tribunal on human rights abuses by #spycops. and already a devastating indictment of the police operation right up to senior management. A truly immense victory.

Summary from the Tribunal itself:"Our findings that the authorisations under RIPA were fatally flawed and the undercover operation could not be justified as ‘necessary in a democratic society’... reveal disturbing and lamentable failings at the most fundamental levels." #spycops

More from IPT: "Our conclusions on training are as follows... As a result, male UCOs, though aware of the formal prohibition [on sexual relationships], appear to have regarded it as a minor matter and one which they did not have to take too seriously...

Given the serious consequences of disobeying this prohibition – including the possibility of violating Art 3 of the ECHR – we have no hesitation in saying that the training provided was grossly inadequate and failed to meet the Respondents’ positive obligations under Arts 3 and 8

On collateral intrusion: "To place a UCO in [the Sumac Centre] for what was intended to be, and was, a lengthy deployment was to subject significant numbers of people and whole groups to an interference for which there was no legitimate basis. ...

...This was not an operation to embed a UCO in a suspect organisation; it placed him within a legitimate organisation in the hope and expectation that he would come within the orbit of suspect groups and individuals and thereby obtain valuable intelligence. ...

This, in our view, is akin to a fishing expedition... As Mr Perry [for the Met] concedes, they are over broad and treat collateral intrusion as largely irrelevant." A damning criticism of how #spycop operations targeted entire communities.

The authorisations, under RIPA, themselves are also shredded, something that has major implications for all the #spycop operations post 2000. "

"Our findings of fact based on the above are threefold. First, that the breadth and open-ended quality of the authorisations rendered them virtually meaningless as a limit on the UCO’s activities and as any kind of protection for those affected by the operation.

Second, that much of MK’s activities in insinuating himself into the private life of the Claimant fell outside the remit of the authorisations insofar as they can be read as imposing any limits. Third, that the reviews and renewals were conducted on a largely perfunctory basis,

with the emphasis given to the value of the intelligence gathered, and we are not satisfied that even that aspect was conducted with any rigour. " Police case relied heavily on authorisations providing legitimate basis and covered their ass. #spycops

Next - harsh words for competency of #spycop managers: Reference is made to the fact that engaging in a sexual relationship whilst deployed would be a breach of professional conduct by MK... such conduct would have been contrary to MK’s authorisation and management instructions.

These arguments, are materially undermined by the sheer frequency with which MK (and other UCOs) did conduct sexual relationships without either questions being asked or action being taken by senior officers.

... we are driven to the conclusion that either senior officers were quite extraordinarily naïve, totally unquestioning, or chose to turn a blind eye to conduct which was, certainly in the case of MK, useful to the operation."

IPT basically saying #spycop managers were either complicit or incompetent, and gives them no other choice. Frankly, the evidence points at the former.

IPT struggle with some of the police's tortured excuses: Perry [for MPS] points to the fact that MK regarded the sexual relationships he conducted as being by a different persona, that of Mark Stone, his UCO alias, and thus involved no deception and was conducted outside his job.

"Since Stone was his UCO alias and the relationship came about only because of his deployment, it is difficult to make any sense of this or accord it any relevance."

On police argument that other #spycops didnt report Kennedy's relationships: "It seems close to inconceivable that [Kate Wilson] and MK were acting as a couple, that the activists saw them as such, but the other UCOs such as Lynn Watson and Marco Jacobs did not notice."

IPT find the unit head DCI 'O-24' knew of MK's relationship with Kate: Looking at the totality of the evidence, we have come to the conclusion that O-24 knew or turned a blind eye (i.e. constructive knowledge) to the fact that the relationship with the Claimant was a sexual one.

Note: O-24 was in charge of the NPOIU at the time, and the Senior Investigation Officer who had responsibility for not just Kennedy but all #spycops deployed by the NPOIU. This is a significant finding of fact and has implications for knowledge of other such relationships.

A bit further down the IPT adds more on O-24's knowledge of Kennedy & Kate's relationship: "In our view, the logical conclusion is that he either knew or did not want to know." For the first time, clear findings that knowledge went up the management chain.

While we all knew there were question marks over the integrity and culture of the NPOIU as a whole, it is a finding the rot came from the top, not the 'rogue apples' of the police's narrative. And more question for the brass with responsibility for the unit as well.

IPT ahead of me: "We have had close regard to the evidence of the dissemination of information within the NPOIU, which strongly suggests that more senior officers were sufficiently 'in the loop' to have had reason to believe MK and the Claimant were in a sexual relationship."

IPT patiently take apart the police's logic that officers were unaware of relationships, but repeatedly point out that the police did not call any witnesses with direct knowledge of the NPOIU and the dissemination of information with in it. They are clearly not happy about this.

IPT draw more conclusions: "First, senior officers failed in their duty to provide adequate and sufficient training which addressed the risks that MK would face given the nature of the operation to which he was assigned....

This was inadequate for an intelligence operation designed to last for a significant period in which it was expected that MK 'would establish and maintain personal relationships' with persons in the Sumac Centre."

"Secondly, senior officers failed to take steps to mitigate the risk by providing any false romantic attachment or other legend that might have obviated the risk of such relationships forming. Thirdly, they failed to put in place and maintain sufficient oversight."

"Fourthly, senior officers either knew of the relationship, chose not to know of its existence, or were incompetent and negligent in not following up on the clear and obvious signs that MK had formed a close personal relationship with the Claimant which might be sexual in nature"

"There is, however, no evidence to support a finding that UCOs having sexual relationships was a deliberate tactic of the NPOIU. There is no documentary evidence ... . In our view, the true position is closer to being one of 'Don’t ask don’t tell'." #spycops

An important aspect of human rights is there are positive obligations to proactively avoid breaching them. The IPT finds that due to the poor supervision the police failed to meet Articles 3 & 8 obligations and also that there was a failure to protect against collateral intrusion

For those not familiar with the law, Article 3 is the human right prohibiting degrading behaviour (in this case). Article 8 is the right to private family life, both of which the @metpoliceuk have admitted were breached by #spycop Mark Kennedy in Kate's case.

@metpoliceuk A point Kate loses is the IPT finds the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, which sets the legislative framework for undercover policing, is in accordance with the law. They are satisfied the provisions in RIPA protect against arbitrary interference if correctly applied.

In this case "the authorisations did not comply with the requirements of RIPA", and that is where the fault lies. However, they join in with criticism of the weakness of the regime as it applied to undercovers - something that has since undergone legal amendment.

They do recommend however that: "undercover operations should be seen as major and not minor interferences with privacy rights and are at least as intrusive as those RIPA powers with much more stringent safeguards" Something they recommend the UPCI looks at.

IPT finds that on the basis of the defence advanced by the Metropolitan Police and the facts in the case, there is no evidence demonstrating a 'pressing social need' for the surveillance that Kate Wilson and others will have experienced due to the Mark Kennedy operation.

"evidence of a pressing social need is.. thin and fails to distinguish between domestic extremism potentially involving serious criminality and public order issues. The safeguards to ensure the surveillance was.. focused on a pressing social need were without doubt inadequate."

"There was no rigorous assessment of continuing necessity; wholly inadequate (or ineffective) oversight; and in practice the operation and its intrusion into the Claimant’s life continued for years without proper scrutiny or oversight."

If this is the case for Kate and Mark Kennedy, it also raises similar questions for other #spycops such as Rod Richardson, Marco Jacobs and Lynn Watson, or any NPOIU undercover operation.

"For all these reasons we find that MK’s deployment, and the consequent interference with the Claimant’s Art 8 rights, was not necessary in a democratic society and not proportionate based on the need for intelligence on the protest movement." -108 pages in but worth it! #spycops

The IPT upholds Kate's case that the police failed to protect against discriminatory practice against women in their undercover operations (Article 14). Though not a headline point, it is potentially very significant finding of institutional sexism in the #spycop units.

"It appears from the evidence that the [Police] had very little concern about the impact of the highly intrusive surveillance by MK, and others, on women in particular. Given the very obvious risk of placing heterosexual male UCOs, for long periods...

...into the lives of young women, including the Claimant, the failure to take adequate steps to protect them from breaches of their human rights is particularly stark."

On why Kate' Art 10 claim succeeds: The right to hold opinions and exchange information and ideas must, in our view, include the right to do so without attracting the attention of the police and being monitored and placed under surveillance....

...The [police] would say that their interest in [Kate] was not on account of her opinions but because of her role in being able to provide intelligence regarding potential public disorder. But it was her opinions that underpinned her association with like-minded individuals ...

...and placed her in a situation where she became the object of an undercover police operation found to be without justification" The importance of the implications of this should not be underestimated. It challenges to police assumptions about the right to spy on protestors.

"It is clear from the evidence that, during [Kate]’s relationship with MK, he directly influenced not only her political opinions but also her movements. To that extent he directly interfered with her right to assembly and association with others... a violation of Art 11."

Another important door opened as this could apply to many of the women targeted for relationships by #spycops, or even just close friendship.