Nate Cohn Profile picture
Oct 1, 2021 29 tweets 5 min read Read on X
A few extra thoughts on this thread, mainly responding to various questions, criticisms, etc.
One overarching point, which I think is fairly obvious but worth stating: this is not a comprehensive account of everything that led to Trump. It's account of the effect of an inaccurate electoral narrative, which is hardly the only thing that helped Trump!
To take one obvious example: Clinton's unpopularity, emails, sexism, etc., does not get mentioned once. That is not because it's unimportant! It's because it's a different issue; it does not stem from bad exit polls or something.
One thing that I should have mentioned, though, is the effect of overestimating racial demographic shifts on the right--not just the moderate GOP
It exacerbated concerns about immigration or a possible 'minority-majority' America. In doing so, it heightened the salience of race at the very moment that the GOP estab would try and moderate on the issue. Trump exploited it in his campaign.
A second issue: did the Democrats really ignore the white working class post-2012?
Most of the critiques center on race/immigration, and basically say that the Dems continued to embrace moderate rhetoric and policies, no the left. I think that's largely true. But...
The traditional Democratic message to the white working class on economics--especially the kind of industrial-era messaging of the Democratic Party, which is the source of their strength in the Midwest--basically evaporated
Obama ran on the autobailout. He attacked Romeny as a rapacious plutocrat who would outsource jobs and help corporations. Bain Capital It's hard to remember now, but for 40 years Dems ran on outsourcing in the Midwest
That aspect of the Democratic Party--in many ways the foundation of the late twentieth century Democratic Party in the northern US--simply disappears, and that's before talking about TPP
It creates an opening for Trump, who gets to run on all of those issues. He runs against trade, runs against China, etc.
Clinton has nothing, and basically just has the fundamentally liberal 'stronger together' take
I don't know what the counterfactual looks like: I don't know what it would look like if Obama's second-term was predicated on the recognition that he won with northern working class voters, with a traditional working class pitch. What I know is they went the *opposite* direction
Not only is there no messaging to the white working class on those kind of issues, the second Obama term leads off by emphasizing all of their worst issues for this group: immigration, guns--and that's before ISIS, refugees, BLM/race/policing add to the challenge
All of this plainly added up to a huge weakness for Democrats, that Trump was obviously exploiting by June 16
nytimes.com/2016/06/30/ups…
Another set of questions mainly relates to the future for Democrats, in particular. My own view is that the changes from 12-20 are largely baked. The idea that Iowa's going to lean Blue again, or that Dems are going to 60% in the Mahoning Valley, seems far-fetched
There are lots of reasons. Things are really polarized; it's harder to go back than get here. D coalition has changed in ways that make it almost comical to go back, too. That's not to say there's nothing Dems could do to soften the edges, but nothing fundamental is available
But maybe most of all, the Democrats don't really have a credible set of economic messages for the Midwestern working class anymore. That will probably provoke a whole new thread of criticism, but I'd just consider Obama '12 for a moment
Think about what Obama ran on in 2012: outsourcing, private equity, protecting the autoindustry.
This is not twentieth century welfare state liberalism, it's not industrial unionism. It's defensive job protection in an era of globalization
The rise of globalization, an intra-national race to the bottom stuff, automation, and environmental regulations (like getting rid of the coal industry) are basically eliminating the old industrial base of the democratic party, here and across the western world
As far as I know, there are no credible policies to really address that.
For a long time, Dems got by with general anti-corporatism, opposition to outsourcing, etc.
They were aided in that by the GOP being the ones in power, presiding over steady manufacturing job losses etc
Even if Dems did go back to that message, it wouldn't be as credible as it was, their contrast w GOP wouldn't be as clear, it wouldn't have as broad of a base of people to buy it, and they'd have the added challenge of having moved left on other issues since '12
And even if the Dems did go back to that message, there's no way it could be as central as it was. It's not 2004 anymore--there are other groups and states that Democrats have to address now.
I said a few days ago that a lot of political commentary is fantasy politics, and I'd say that for anyone who thinks the Democrats can *actually* go back to their 2004-2012 messages and numbers. There are a few issues where... maybe. But it's usually a little ridiculous
Since a few people have misread this aspect of the thread, I'd like to explain how my emphasis on an economic message here interacts with the fact that Democrats have plainly lost ground because of cultural/racial issues
Let's start by noting what question I'm addressing: can Democrats *win* white working class voters back? That's actually not the same as why did Democrats *lose* white working class voters over the last decade.
Lots of people act like those are the same thing. They seem to suppose that Democrats would suddenly snap back among white working class voters, if only race became less salient in politics or if Democrats would start talking to white rural folks
But undoing and preventing losses are really not the same thing. Now that the GOP *has* won these voters, Democrats wouldn't rebound back to '12 levels even if no one talked about race for the next three years. The old bonds of Democratic loyalty and identity are gone
And that's entirely leaving aside the possibility that new bonds of Trumpy loyalty has taken hold, which would probably be impossible for Democrats to overcome.
To rebound, today's Dems wouldn't merely need to avoid alienating these voters on racial issues. They would need a real message to win them back.
And that message would have to be an economic message.
Any reasonable historical analysis would find that Democrats *win* white working class voters on economic issues, even if they lose them on race/culture/etc.
If Dems don't have as strong of a message as they had in '12--and I don't think they do--they don't have anything.

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More from @Nate_Cohn

Apr 13
One thing I've been experimenting with since our GOP oversample this summer: weighting our polls by each partisanship subgroup, which has the consequence of ensuring that each subgroup used in weighting has the right number of Dems and Republicans
The main downside is that our estimates for self-reported education by voter file party are modeled, and that's something I've had pause about. I'm gradually getting more comfortable with it, as the party x edu tallies for the typically weighted sample seem consistent with subgroup
Perhaps surprisingly, there's essentially no difference in our topline results between polls weighted by party and those weighted across the full population. The differences by subgroup are surprisingly minor, as well
Read 8 tweets
Apr 10
I happened to be looking a lot at Pew data last few weeks, even before this most recent partisanship study, so I wanted to share a few interesting observations about trends I noticed in their data
pewresearch.org/politics/2024/…
One thing I noticed: subtle but persistent, multi-year differences between the partisan splits by demographic on the Pew ATP -- the mostly mail-to-web panel they use for this study -- and the Pew NPORS study (the one-off high-incentie mail survey they use for weighting the ATP
The most striking thing, IMO, is that the Pew ATP consistently has more age and racial polarization than the NPORS Image
Read 10 tweets
Feb 14
*Tosses meat into cage* nytimes.com/2024/02/14/ups…
A few outtakes:
-- By our (rough and preliminary) estimates, this looks to be yet another zero-persuasion (off Biden '20) special. We'll have to see final vote history, but at least in Nassau it looks just as we'd expect given the party reg turnout
-- We'll see how the dust settles, but I do think it could be significant if the result is interpreted as showing Dem strength on the border messaging. If that narrative takes hold + Dems are emboldened to follow on, that's quite helpful on their worst issue
Read 5 tweets
Jan 17
lol well did I get replies to this!
A few notes on special elections / clarifications
1) Specials are driven by turnout. The data is unequivocal as long as I've been looking at them with our rich data, going back to 2017. That should not be remotely surprising, as the as the people who know about/vote in specials are highly parstisan -- just like all of you!
2) Special elections therefore tell us something about enthusiasm/engagement among highly engaged voters, which is helpful in predicting low turnout contests. It is less significant as turnout increases, but may still helpful to Dems (see favorable LV/RV gap in NYT/Siena '23)
Read 11 tweets
Dec 19, 2023
We have a new NYT/Siena national survey, and it's an interesting one -- with the public sympathetic toward Israel but disapproving of Biden on the issue and split on whether Israel should continue military operations.
It also has interesting '24 numbers...
nytimes.com/2023/12/19/ups…
Trump leads 46-44 among RVs, but *Biden* actually leads in our first measure of the likely electorate nationwide, 47-45.
The split is driven by a huge gap in vote choice by turnout history: Biden+6 among '20 voters; Trump+22 among 2020 nonvoters
nytimes.com/2023/12/19/ups…
We've seen a similar pattern in our polling over the last year, with Biden excelling among regular and esp '22 voters.
But this is the largest split by '20 vote, and as a consequence it's a bigger LV gain for Biden than prior polls would have shown.
Read 6 tweets
Nov 22, 2023
One thing I've seen over the last few days: a lot of people asserting that, in a variety of different ways, pre-election polls aren't very useful for demographic subgroups
I have to completely disagree.
Stepping back, it's my long-standing view that the pre-election polls are the best basis for post-election estimates -- and, in particular, better than exits.
For ex, all these estimates were based on pre-election polling:
nytimes.com/2016/06/10/ups…
This was already true back in 2012 and 2016, but it's become indisputable in the era of early voting. The exits are mostly pre-election polls at this point. AP/Votecast is just a pre-election poll. Catalist is also derived from pre-election polling. And so on.
Read 13 tweets

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