I know this is cliche, but the Dems really are a grab bag of disparate special interests who throw all their policy ideas into one giant bill. This approach worked well in the New Deal because the scale of the crisis gave Dems the political capital to do many different things...
The grab-bag approach also worked in the 60s and 70s because the GOP was largely on board with the need to Do A Bunch of Stuff -- Nixon wanted to pass a bunch of programs so he could be as great as LBJ, etc.
That ended in the late 70s and 80s.
Now, the GOP just comes in every time and does a big tax cut. That's it. Other than that, they rely on corrosive executive power to erode the liberal state, and on state government action. This makes them fairly effective even though Dems are generally more popular.
Without GOP support or a crisis the size of the Great Depression, it's just very hard to pass transformative policies in many areas at once. But Dems are so weakly united that leaving out any one thing results in a firestorm of criticism -- so they have to try to do everything.
If the big grab-bag passes, every Dem subgroup -- the climate activists, the supporters of universal benefits, the health care enthusiasts -- will (quite rightly) think they got a half-assed policy, and redouble their efforts to get more attention for their area next time.
And anyone who points out the impracticality of this approach to governing (e.g. me, in this thread) will inevitably be challenged by people demanding "OK, what would you leave out?!", and then castigated for leaving out something Very Very Important.
In the end, everyone will be mad, and everyone will blame the malapportionment of the Senate. Which isn't wrong, but also ignores the likelihood that if the Senate were well-apportioned, the demands from each interest group would increase til everyone was mad again.
Ultimately this is the problem with having one party that knows very clearly who it is and what it wants to do, and one party that exists as a fragile, shifting equipoise between various competing groups with different ideas of what the part is and wants.
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Idle thought: Traditionally, campaigns of conquest were used as pressure valves, to give ambitious aggressive men something to do other than overthrow the government. But China is just way too big for this, especially compared to the size of the territories it might conquer.
If ambitious Chinese men get mad at the Xi Jinping regime in the wake of its crackdowns on business, there's no way Xi can say "Here, instead of getting mad at me, go conquer Taiwan and the little bits of India, Japan, and Vietnam that we claim." Those are just too small.
I wish all the San Francisco people who love to cry crocodile tears as they remind us that we're living on Ohlone land would actually consider letting the Ohlone develop the land!!
A Time of Unrest produces a general political energy that causes people to go in search of causes. During this time, many small cults arise that promise to give restless people the framework, purpose, and direction they seek.
My guess is that one sign that unrest has peaked is when these cults start trying to woo each other. It suggests that their individual growth has peaked and they're looking to merge, like companies in a mature industry.
Me, 1999: Why does anyone call themselves a "fiscal conservative"?
Me, 2021: ...I see.
Basically I think America is an inherently liberal society where people who fear social change generally don't feel comfortable just saying "I fear social change", so they use fear of deficits as an excuse to block spending on actual change.
Meanwhile, crusading American liberals tend to become dissatisfied with the sort of ubiquitous grassroots cultural shifts that are their actual praxis of change, and demand big spending measures. When those are blocked by our kludgey system, they feel frustrated ("owned").
In addition, the seeming popularity of means-testing suggests that the suspicion and resentment that drive American politics are not aimed entirely at the poor.
The theory behind universality is that Americans don't like welfare because they imagine that it goes to undeserving poor people -- so if everyone gets the welfare, people will rest assured that their money isn't being redistributed to the undeserving poor.
Americans are obsessed with the idea that some other American is getting something they don't deserve. Universal resentment leading to an attitude of artificial scarcity.
We always talk about this in terms of White Republicans terrified of Black people being "welfare queens". And of course that's the biggest single piece of it. But Americans' resentment of each other goes far beyond that. It's kaleidoscopic. It's fractal. It's everywhere.