The author argues that OSINT is distinct from other INT sources (SIGINT, HUMINT, IMINT etc) because it is defined by how accessible it is ("publicly available",) rather than the nature of the source (signals, human, images etc).
2/n
The impact of this confusing taxonomy is that OSINT becomes a "junk drawer" of ill-defined types of information.
Unlike other INTs, the source type is vague and unclear.
3/n
Another very different true story from intelligence history.
It's certainly the most disgusting act of intel gathering I've ever heard of.
Here's how poor opsec and the careless toilet habits of Soviet soldiers became a reliable source of intel for NATO in the Cold War... 1/
After WW2 Germany was divided into Allied and Russian occupation zones.
Mistrust and paranoia between the two sides was rife and each was afraid of the other side launching a surprise attack on the other... 2/
To counter this, each side agreed to allowing a military mission from the opposing side to be stationed on their territory and observe military exercises.
That way it would be impossible for NATO/Soviet forces to prepare for an attack without being observed by the other. 3/
I've been reading up on the history of OSINT recently (although it wasn't always called "OSINT" of course...).
I found an interesting early example of image-based intelligence going back to WW2.
These days we'd call it "crowdsourced"... 1/
In 1942 the allies were struggling for reliable images of locations in Nazi-occupied Europe. These were needed to plan bombing raids and operations like D-Day.
The allies had reconnaissance planes, but they were limited by range and weather, and were often shot down. 2/
So in 1942 the head of British intelligence, Admiral Godfrey, put out an appeal on BBC radio for listeners to send in photographs and postcards they had from mainland Europe, especially if the area was of military interest. 3/