Saw a one-line tweet the other day mentioning McColls #MCLS as one of 2 highest conviction names.
I think I see why: there's a metamorphosis happening underneath and reasonable path to PE and FCF multiples between 2-3 plus a growth narrative, all under that lovely grim exterior
Story is that they're shrinking. 1500+ stores 2 years back, to 1050 by the end of FY21
Also changing: culling small newsagent shops to focus towards larger, more profitable grocery-heavy stores. So far, so worthy - but the real interest is the transformation into Morrisons Daily
Company raised recently to accelerate a programme converting 350 stores into these Mini Morrisons. They're at 56 today, will be 350 by end FY22
Cost is £90K per shop, what they call "cash payback" is 2-3 years and so far they're providing pretty immediate LFL sales growth of 25%
TLDR: model out the stores with and without Morrisons, give it a couple of years for the payback time to bed in and it's an annual Δ of ~£180m-£200m in revs. Low 20s GMs, into a (*very*) roughly breakeven cost base gives +£40M, ¼ off for tax and voilà: £30m on a £55m cap, PE <2
FCFs something like this, 6 monthly. Idea being somewhere north of £20M yearly before long. We're currently in between the two marked points. I stopped modelling conversions at 350 but the co has another 400 odd that they reckon are suitable and the mood music suggests it happens
That's pretty much it, the rest here is just a few bits around assumptions I've made.
Offending tweet that sent me down the rabbit hole is below and a bit of back and forth in the DMs with @here_there (whose idea it is) helped me out. Worth a follow.
So, for the details. This horrific wall of numbers is to get one thing: revenues. Company says the top 500 stores do 50% of revenues. I split that out and assume they convert those first. My only real input is rev per store.
I take the high end of recent perf in top 500, put an immediate +25% of those going into Morrisons and matured them both at +1.5% per half (a guess, I don't know how these things mature) For the rump McColls, +1% to reflect getting rid of the worst stores.
The last 3x 6M of MCLS' results. I remove all their one time adjust's (invariably recurring, esp given the turnover in the store base), add but mainly subtract a few genuine one-timers, for a stab at a normalised cost base.
And as God intended add back leases where they belong,
Stick the whole unholy lot together and it ends up like this. Not a single number in here will be right, it's full of false precision, off timings because I average stores, assumptions aren't wildly blue sky but towards the favourable side. It's just to see what may be there.
From this lot, just want to highlight 2 things. First is the EBITDA line. I came at this from top down - interestingly to me is that if taking what I assume the co would want you to look at: favourable recent annualised EBITDAs (£40M per year), a ~£30M payback naturally drops out
Second, last, those multiples. Of course the assumptions are just my stab at torturing the numbers but all told, RR doesn't seem too bad. Worst case, waste of time perhaps and could think of worse places to start from you wanted a takeout or an outside shot at multibagger
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$RADA makes small tactical military radars. The recent sell off hasn't made it cheap but it has begun to bring it closer to GARP territory
It's a rare pure-play on a theme that's perhaps not yet widely appreciated and is hard to access directly but you can see it in the numbers
Here's where it trades on a forward sales multiple against some of the big diversified defence majors - has lost much of the premium and now sits a little off the top end. Brits bottom of the pile.
Same group of majors but here on forward EBITDA multiples and towards the bottom end excluding the UK companies.
Naive view but I think Hunting #HTG may be on its way back to Covid lows because it's orphaned on the wrong market and there's an information disconnect - if so, my guess is that it's pretty oversold here.
The company isn't a pure play but it's good enough to say it's very shale exposed, towards the completion side vs the drilling side of things.
Three year chart to around May 2021: HTG in green vs several US oil services ETFs - as you can see, they trade in lockstep.
Same chart but on a 2021 YTD basis and it starts diverging somewhere around mid summer.
IG Design #IGR was a ten bagger in the 5 years leading up to Covid. An update a fortnight ago dropped the shares by half and erased all the gains in the most recent five years. Knife catching and broken growth this soon is almost always a mistake but IG may be an exception here.
My basic premise with it is that the accounts are a complicated nightmare (CTRL+f for "adjust" is 232 hits in the last FY report) but most immediately, that this is right now a gross margin story - I think there are grounds to at least consider whether IG can be given a pass here
Unfortunately, it does mean walking through it so grab a.. (just no) so anyway, here's the rough idea: Pre-covid in white, M&A growth darling, 20% gross margins. Forget the op margin for now - I'm stripping out the adjustments that made adjusted whatever go up and to the right
What does Sneller see to get such sudden FOMO for the old zombie that is Iofina #IOF? If you recall the name, it should produce revulsion but a few things have changed and there's a chance it may be about to make some money.
IOF produces Iodine in the US via O&G brine. Iodine is a beneficiary of industrial recovery generally and covid specifically - the largest use is used as x-ray contrast which may benefit demand from catch up on delayed hospital treatment.
And because it's 2021, inevitably:
Production is trapped on the wrong side of the Pacific: the two major production centres are Japan and Chile - so you have the obvious logistics issues for both and potentially politics for the latter.
I think it's worth revisiting Aquis #AQX here in light of a couple of data points that have since come out.
There are three main parts to the co: a stock exchange (AQSE); a tech licencing biz and their multilateral trading facility (AQXE) - it's this last one I want to look at.
First is the RNS from earlier this month announcing their MTF (investopedia.com/terms/m/multil…) had achieved 6.2% market share. Across the €53.6B traded on AQXE in July, this came out to €1.7B a day.
Those 6.2% and €1.7B are quite significant numbers and I'll come back to them later
In the period since the beginning of 2018 market share has risen from 1.72% to that 6.2% above. Here's how that value traded looks.
Someone else has also since mentioned $JAKK to me - it's a (shitco) toy maker, similar to Character Group #CCT in the UK. CC's tweet mentions the refi, he has a point - I think there may be something here to play for, perhaps towards a double or so before the end of the year.
Company has cash of $80M + new debt of $99M (pink) repays difference on prior debt of $129M with cash on hand (green) so $50M cash + debt $99M
6,395 shares at $10.6, converts at $5.65 (purple) into $18.9M (blue) so + 3,345 shares = 9,740 / $103 cap & $20M prefs (grey) $172M EV
As you can see it's highly seasonal into Q3. Mgmt mentioned in the last (Q1) call that inventories are low. Typically they would be about $20M higher than here in Q2, so if we penalise the cash in the EV by that amount to account for inventory build we're at $192M