[THREAD] The Islamic State of Iraq released a new video entitled "So await; we are awaiting with you.", a reference to a line in Surah at Tawbah (Verse 52). A better title for it is "more of the same" as it is a showcase of typical IS tactics in 2020 & 21.
The video covers various attacks across Iraq from early 2020 until just last month. They're in all of IS' usual areas of operations; Diyala, Anbar, Salahuddin, North Baghdad, Kirkuk, etc. There is no major tactical shifts although I do note some interesting aspects.
In terms of small arms, it's all standard stuff- M16A4 & A2, along with M4 variants, are the favourites as ever, along with AK variants, PK(M), RPG-7/Type 69 (Uusually with PG-7VM, OG-7V, PG-7V, T69-1, etc), and a couple of bigger pieces. Mortars too, usually 60mm.
A good example of the "highest grade" IS unit seen in the video is an Anbar cell seen preparing for a raid. It's rather rare to see HMG (Here it's a Type 54) plus a 23mm 2A14 autocannon. These cells are considered "Elite" internally, are well armed w/ M4/M16A4/MG-1M/T69 & PG-7M.
There is a few M4geries seen in the video, along with some probably real M4 variants, VHS-K2, AKS-74U (That cell actually got blotted out by Tribal forces a while later), etc. Now to TTPs and related observations.
As I alluded to in the first tweet; the attacks seen are to be expected, including:
- Serious quantities of IEDs
- Close range rural ambushes
- Semi-urban assassinations & raids
- Simple mortar attacks
- A few complex raids (Such as Rashad) involving "come on" tactics, TWS, etc.
Again, IS make heavy use of their traditional suppressed M16s (Pic 1: Hit, July 31st 2021), suppressed Glock 19 Gen3, TWS (Pulsar Apex XD75 juust about spotted), suppressed Beretta 70-series pistols. All of these are effective in the hands of what I term "semi-urban" raid cells.
Not to say small rural cells can't be effective; the close range RPG (PG-7VM, OG-7V) use in the dense vegetation of Salahuddin is startling both in simplicity & probable effectiveness. Really showcases the difficult job that the ISF have on their "sweeps" even w/ coalition cover.
Other rural attacks include simple car spraydowns in Tigris, more IEDs, and so on. This has been the bread and butter of the insurgency for not all that far off 20 years now; long before dramatic events like the town takeovers in the 2000-10s.
We get some more media of a less common tactic, the use of 122mm "Grad" rockets too. This really seems to me to be a status action to a degree; single rockets are unlikely to be seriously damaging but are a reminder of present danger. Some crop/equipment burnings, too.
Video has less of a desperate air than the one in May & if I was to try to separate the carefully selected footage from reality, likely does show a more emboldened and capable organisation overall since the beginning of 2020. The successful penetration into cities is celebrated.
That said, there is nothing that indicates a serious qualitative (or quantitative) leap forward. This is a complex and dangerous organisation that must be kept under constant pressure; hopefully recent CT successes can keep that so. I suspect escalation is coming.
It is clear that the group cannot operate as openly as it would like. I do suspect that IS' ability to penetrate into secure areas will be both limited but very much trumpeted by the group when they occasionally manage it. The warning signs are there.
Aspects of the #Aleppo Campaign that are proving to be essential, according to local news, open sources, and some of my sources.
Drones. Rebels using drones for expansive command and control, continuous monitoring of front lines, much better than SAA
Also using small kamikaze UAV extremely intensely, including blunting at least two 25th Division counter attacks.
Drone dropped nades also massively used.
Rebels using Elite Units like actual special forces. This includes in the genuine spotter/recon role, deep in front of light infantry. Said units also cooperating with UAV units and directing fire.
Extensive thermal optics use, including by small recce units.
One aspect that many miss RE:AA FPV UAV is that these are a reaction to a lack of MANPADS, particularly those not from the Cold War.
Sure FPV can work, but if every AFU unit had plenty of LMM or Starstreak, esp. w/ extended range, the need would be met much more efficiently.
The innovation shown in 🇺🇦 is excellent, lessons learned should be diffused into other allied militaries, but we shouldn't fetishize systems that have developed because of specific local conditions. Some of the situation now is because the AFU has not been efficiently resourced.
Ofc, as the drones develop, they will become more and more like MANPADS. The cost will rise, especially as features such as passive radar/ELINT targeting become more common than they already are.
I am not bashing what Ukrainians are doing, I'm just pointing out the reality.
According to some local reports & the ISIS claim, the attackers withdrew successfully. They will have communicated with IS-K/Central, poss. including videos/images of them carrying out the massacre.
They are still at large. This is exactly what security forces don't want.
Usually they don't manage. But if your security forces don't arrive for an hour, this can happen. So they can sleep, rearm, and do it again. Inghimasi don't expect to survive, so for them this is a bonus.
When they kill these guys, they will find a phone with either SMS, WhatsApp, Telegram or maybe Viber msgs to an account with a central asian or Afghan number. That account will have been assisting, directing & encouraging them live. Non-0 chance US SIGINT can see said messages.
Your reminder btw, because I know people will be doing it, deaths of civilians is never, ever to be celebrated. I hope the vermin who carried this out are slotted with all rapidity
From the video: At least 5 men with AKs, probably 74s. Can't see PBIED, although given IS-K to be expected. This is worse case, nightmare scenario stuff that Western forced worry about and train for constantly.
No, not doing any ID, it's not healthy for the mind and soul
Random thoughts on the al Qassam footage from the IDF ground incursion in no particular order.
Firstly- Clear that the en mass production of the "Yassin" PG-7VR copy was a very sensible decision. This was the most achievable way for them for them to create a potent anti....
armour weapon, with good penetrative capabilities against IDF armour. Even more sensible was the adoption of the main warhead of the Yassin (Essentially the same as a PG-7L) as a static charge IED. That way, the same production line(s) could be efficiently used to boost..
..al Qassam et al anti-armour capabilities in a simple to use package. So far, this seems to have been effective, although the daring IED-placing rambo probably wasted his actions, as the directional charge wouldn't have gone in the right...direction.
This is not *why* I am leaving all of this, but rather just some notes to whoever might find them useful.
Why does someone do the stuff I have? Why does someone write thousands of words and spend so many hours?
It's because yes, you enjoy it, but it makes you feel like you are making a positive difference. But then it starts feeling like a job, a job that gives you no earnings.
Then you find that dozens, if not hundreds, of organisations, companies, large (evidently revenue earning) accounts, YouTubers etc, are very, very happy to use your expertise and your time, and *will not* compensate you for it. Sometimes you get credit, which is nice.