Thread by @HamdiAMalik

1. As expected the struggle over the appropriation of the brand Hashd is intensifying between the pro-Sistani forces (who call themselves Hashd al-Atabat (HA)) and the pro-Khamenei factions. The Shia holy cities and Shia rites are now at the center of this struggle.

2. During the Arbaeen pilgrimage, Maytham al-Zaidi, leader of Abbass Combat Division (ACD), the most important force in HA, took the podium in the Imam Hussein shrine in Karbala to promote HA. “This name [HA] which is used officially for the first time in the Arbaeen pilgrimage…

3. ...this name and this slogan and this cover is a religiously sanctioned and legal cover… it’s religiously sanctioned as it’s clear for you [to which institutions they are] linked and how their religious position is…

4. ….and legally, this title [HA] gained its legal position from the satisfaction, acceptance & support of the Iraqi commander in chief [the PM]”. Zaidi didn’t say anything new, but because he said it in Imam Hussein shrine during the Arbaeen, it caused a much stronger reaction.

5. Choosing the timing and location to prompt AH is part of an aggressive campaign to further secede from the Iran-backed Hashd (PMF) commission and to popularize the brand AH. They are now promoting their activities like never before.

6. Leaders of AH met with all sorts of security/military figures, from the Iraqi chief of staff of the army to the interior minister and intelligence commanders in the ministry of defense. But, they did not have a single meeting with anyone from the PMF commission.

7. ACD also deployed its combat vehicles as part of providing security for the pilgrimage. They are very proud of their armored force. Zaidi talked about it in the speech he gave inside the Imam Hussein shrine, calling it “the biggest”.

8. The HA is aggressively introducing itself as the real Hash, the Iraqi hashd (as opposed to the Iran-aligned Hashd), the hashd that enjoys the blessing of Sistani, via the support it gets from the atabat, which are supervised by Sistani. And this is hurting the muqawama a lot.

9. The muqawama’s strategy to deal with this situation is all over the place. Some muqawama social media accounts posted a video of militia members/supporters inside the Imam Hussein shrine during the Arbaeen as a defiant response to Zaidi.

10. In the video a young man is seen addressing a group of people inside the shrine by shouting: “We are sons of Muhandis and sons of Soleimani. We are sons of Sayyed Ali al-Sistani, Sayyed al-Khamenei and Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah".

11. Abu Ali al-Askari, the security spokesman of Kataib Hezbollah (KH) was fuming. He said in a statement: “What some opportunists [who are like] the impurities of the bottom of a well, did in announcing their exit from the Hashd, makes people of the Hashd happy…

12. ...[but] their heavy weapons & combat vehicles must be taken from them & returned to the [Hashd] commission”. He knows this is impossible as HA accused Muhandis of usurping Imam Ali Combat Division (IACD) in 2016. If anything HA think the PMF owe them some heavy weaponry!

13. The other strategy is to claim HA is not affiliated with the shrines! Some muqawama social media channels claimed that the first deputy of Imam Hussein shrine, Hassan al-Abaychi contacted the head of the PMF commission, Falih al-Fayyadh…

14. ... and the PMF’s chief of staff, Abu Fadk one day after Zaidi’s speech, reassuring them the shrine does not have any military unit and that it didn’t have anything to do with what happened the day before.

15. Abaychi’s office was quick to deny he had contacted any PMF leaders! When the attacks on HA and the fake news about them intensified, some figures asked Ahmad al-Safi, Sistani’s representative and confidant about his stance towards these attacks.

16. He described the campaign against HA as: “only insults and arbitrary accusations, without any religious or moral considerations”. He asked anyone who wants to know the reason behind the secession of HA from the PMF to ask to be offered the reasons behind this move.

17. He clearly defended HA and their moves. This enormous religious credibility and legitimacy forced some other muqawama groups to stop stirring up animosity towards HA, as it seems to be a losing strategy and only damages their own religious legitimacy.

18. That's why groups such as Sabereen news chose to keep quiet about it & refrained from reporting what happened in Imam Hussein shrine & the subsequent developments altogether. Simply the muqawama doesn't know how to deal with HA. They feel defenceless.

19. They however have devised another strategy to use the Shia rites in their favour. I'll write about what they're doing as soon as I find some time. END