1. The numbers of migrants departing Zaranj in Nimroz for Pakistan en route to Iran has increased exponentially. Reports indicate most are ex employees of the former Republic, some leaving along with their families, highlighting the desperate situation for many in Afghanistan.
2. We have been documenting these departures for some time. As early as June 2021 -some 2 months before the govt collapsed- we pointed to the dramatic rise in the number of migrants & the growing proportion of ANA/ANP amongst them.
3. Since capturing Zaranj the the people smuggling business has been “regulated” by Taliban. Akin to other businesses, regulation has been minimal & often taken the form of restating pre-existing practices. Further evidence of the Taliban’s “small govt” approach to the economy.
4. In the people smuggling business regulation has largely involved restating the number of people who can travel in each vehicle, differentiating between those transporting males & those transporting families, as well as the payments for minors. None of this was new.
5. However, business has also been more intermittent since the Taliban takeover. Departures have been restricted by the Pakistan authorities on the border and more recently by the Taliban, resulting in migrants accumulating in the hotels of Zaranj unable to leave.
6. On 8 October one of these temporary closures came to an end. Due to the backlog of migrants that had built up as many as 1500 pickups left that day, a further 800 on the 9th. It is thought that as many as 60% of those leaving are former employees of the Republic.
7. The exodus led to a backup of cars of stretching 800 metres - 4 cars wide in places - from a checkpoint 4km south of the Customs House on the main road heading south to Charburjak.
8. Now the business has the sanction of the new authorities the route is not as covert as it was in the days of the Republic. Whereas in the past the journey for migrants went from the hotels in the city to Masoomabad via 3 wheel vehicles.
9. From there they boarded pickups & passed through the desert to Charburjak dc paying many checkpoints en route. Once across the river the vehicles took the long desert road to Dak on the Pakistan border where passengers would disembark before boarding another pickup to Iran
10. In Dak the Taliban would collect a nominal fee from each pickup arriving from Zaranj, as well as those departing Dak for the Iranian border - a total of $6.25 for each vehicle (around $0.28 per passenger).
11. It was a circuitous route to Iran-200 km to Dak then another 150 km to the Mashkel mountains-with plenty of bribes to pay, the vast majority to corrupt officials from the Republic. While long & difficult it is easier than risking the more direct route over the Iranian border
12. Now the journey to Charburjak dc is more straight forward. No need to travel to Masoomabad & the desert road to Charburjak. Instead the journey goes via the main road, reducing the travel time & vehicle damage. And there are none of the multiple checkpoints and fees.
13. Now there is just one payment to the Taliban of 1000 Afs per vehicle (about $0.54/passenger) collected on the main highwayand no fee in Dak. As such there are much fewer transaction costs & potentially greater profits for the smuggler, especially now the fee has increased.
14. Positioned on the junction of the two roads heading south from the city, and boxed in by an irrigation ditch, the checkpoint is perfectly situated to capture all those vehicles heading south and ensure everyone pays.
15. It’s hard to see the disadvantages for those involved in people smuggling: costs have gone down & there is greater certainty in their ability to move volume-which is where the real profits lie in the cross border trade of goods be it fuel, minerals, drugs, or even people.
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1. I’ve had a lot of emails from governments, institutions and individuals following UNODC’s recent report on methamphetamine in Afghanistan. unodc.org/documents/data…
2. Most are sceptical of the findings & UNODC’s claim that OTC & bulk pharmaceuticals are the primary precursors for meth in Afghanistan & what they see as a corresponding lack of evidence. Further confusion is expressed over the press coverage that has accompanied the report.
3. Particularly the claim that methamphetamine trafficking is rising in response to the Taliban ban. reuters.com/world/asia-pac…
1. Warning - “anorak” thread: Having read the Taliban finance section of the latest UNSMT report it would seem to contain a lot of confusing lines, many because there isn’t a clear indication of time, others because the team have been drawing on dated data or ideas.
2. The most obvious errors relate to the failure to engage with a timeline on agricultural seasons for drug crops & therefore address what can realistically be done by the Taliban authorities re drug control. A common error that has become a bit of an issue in wider reporting.
3. The current 2022/23 poppy season began in Nov/Dec 2022 when the primary crop was planted in the fall. The harvest of that crop is largely in April/May 2023. This fall planted crop typically constitutes about 90% of the annual poppy crop in Afghanistan
1. Ok, so here is an interesting story in the Times about opium production in Afghanistan. It centres around an anonymised opium trader “Habibullah”, & a farmer “Ahmadullah” both of whom reside in the province of Uruzgan in SW Afghanistan. thetimes.co.uk/article/cash-s…
2. Ahmadullah is a bit of a sideshow to the story but he owns 4.5 acres of land which he typically dedicates to wheat & poppy, but in the 2022/23 growing season has planted a much smaller amount of poppy within his compound walls.
3. The reader is left with the impression that Ahmadullah & other farmers in SW Afghanistan will persist with poppy in the current season, on the basis that they’re poor & the Taliban will not impose a ban for fear of a backlash from its supporters in the rural heartlands.
1. A thread: Now the planting season has begun there is a lot of debate about what the next poppy season brings. A reference point for many commentators is how little was done about the 2022 crop, which @UNODC reports covered 32% more land than the previous year.
2. What is not considered is the action taken against ephedra based methamphetamine over the course of the summer where the Taliban closed the primary market hub & surrounding labs in the SW.
3. Further ephedrine labs were closed in a variety of districts across the country revealing just how extensive production has become. Meth prices rose by more than three-fold following these closures but there were also significant reverberations across the opium economy.
1. You ever feel your life is a little too much rinse repeat? Crop substitution with an emphasis on replacing poppy with wheat? Now I am sure we’ve been here before? Oh yeah, there was HFZ 2008-2011) and before that again (2004-2005) but hey why not go round the buoy again?
3. “From a drug control point of view, the Helmand Food Zone took the form of a crop substitution programme-the kind abandoned in the 80s due to a systemic failure to address the wider market, infrastructural & social factors that led to widespread drug crop cultivation”
1. There are growing reports of eradication in SW Afghanistan. It has caused some confusion, particularly the sight of tractors ploughing fields of emergent poppy, next to a neighbouring field of undamaged poppy ready to harvest.
2. Such scenes have been met with understandable scepticism: accusations that “this is all for the cameras”, “surely if it were otherwise the entire crop would have been destroyed regardless of its size or maturity?”This is not an unreasonable response.
3. There is a long history of exaggerated reports of eradication in Afghanistan & not just by those in the Afghan govt also by USG. With eradication used as a measure of CN commitment there are often theatrics that accompany crop destruction that need to be charted & understood.