Interesting article in QS where Xi explains reasons behind the "common prosperity" drive: 1. Taking the promotion of common prosperity for all people as the focus of seeking happiness for the people, and constantly consolidating the foundation of the party’s long-term governance;
2. High-quality development requires high-quality workers. Only by promoting common prosperity, increasing the income of urban and rural residents, and enhancing human capital, can we increase total factor productivity and consolidate the foundation for high-quality development.
3. The problem of global income inequality is prominent. Some countries are divided between the rich and the poor, ...leading to social tearing, political polarization & populism. China must resolutely prevent polarization, & achieve social harmony & stability.
so how to achieve this? Xi laid down the following principles: 1. everyone has to take part in, avoiding "involution" and "laying flat".
2. Adhere to the basic economic system. Public ownership is the mainstay & plays important role in promoting common prosperity, at the same time promote the healthy development of the non-public economy and the healthy growth of people from the non-public economy.
"healthy"...
3. Don't try to raise your appetite & make promises that cannot be fulfilled. The government can't pay everything. Don't fall into the trap of "welfare states" and raise lazy people.
4. "Common prosperity" can't be achieved overnight. It will be with us for a long time.
& now some practical advice: 1. "Coordinated development of finance and real estate with the real economy". So the days of big profits for big banks and developers are over?
2. "Attract more high-quality talents to join the team of skilled workers". Good news for college graduates!
3. "Adhere to the positioning that the house is used for living, not for speculation, rent and purchase at the same time, implement policies in accordance with the city, and improve the long-term rental policy".
More bad news for the developers?
4. "Strengthen the regulation and adjustment of high income".
How? income tax, capital tax, property tax, consumption tax.
So what exactly constitutes "excessively high income"? I tweeted this 2 months ago:
& this part is so loaded:
"We have a complete solution to the problem of poverty, but we still need to explore and accumulate experience on how to get rich. It is necessary to protect property rights and intellectual property rights, and protect legal wealth".
"We must resolutely oppose the disorderly expansion of capital, draw a negative list for access to sensitive areas, strengthen anti-monopoly supervision. At the same time, we must mobilize enthusiasm of entrepreneurs to promote the healthy development of various types of capital"
5. "Promote the common prosperity of the people's spiritual life", in line with the drive for “online civilization" that I discussed in @china_neican earlier this month. neican.org/p/civilizing-c…
6. "Accelerate the industrialization of agriculture" and "revitalize rural assets", which is coded language for lifting the restrictions on sale of rural land.
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Today PLA Daily finally published another editorial on the Zhang Youxia case, which in itself is not surprising. What is striking are the following: 1. The editorial came a full 6 days after the case was first reported, during which time Zhang’s name never appeared at all.
2. Despite the strong rhetoric, there is still no pledge of loyalty from commanders across the various regions.
3. The editorial openly acknowledges the need to “face short-term difficulties and periodic pains,” implicitly admitting that things didn't go as smoothly as planned.
4. It goes out of its way to spell out that the CMC Chairman Responsibility System means "to resolutely follow Xi’s commands, be responsible to Xi, and reassure Xi".
This appears to be a response to arguments that the system means loyalty to the position, not to the person.
Today’s PLA Daily editorial on anti-corruption offers a textbook example of how to read CCP propaganda:
Read it backwards.
The key message is that “a few corrupt elements can’t make any waves.”
1. Is it really just “a few,” when 5 of the 6 CMC members other than Xi are gone?
2. Among the 5 major crimes listed in yesterday’s PLA Daily piece, corruption was only the 3rd. Even then, Zhang and Liu were not accused of corrupting themselves, but of “seriously promoting political and corrupt problems that affect the Party’s absolute leadership of the army.”
Notably, "political" comes before "corrupt" — and promoting corruption is not the same as engaging in corruption.
3. Can they “make waves”?
Perhaps not the generals promoted by Xi.
But Zhang, a veteran commander with deep roots and a long history in the PLA, is different.
Interesting story by @Lingling_Wei & @ByChunHan, but I have several questions:
1. @WSJ reports that the evidence against Zhang came from Gu Jun, former general manager of China National Nuclear Corp. But anyone familiar with the Chinese system knows that a suspect under
@neilthomas123 2. I’m not convinced by the claim that the investigation of Zhang is “a sign of strength, not weakness, for Xi”, esp as the same article notes that the investigation team in Shenyang chose to stay in local hotels rather than military bases!
It has nothing to do with corruption, despite what People’s Daily (and many pundits here) have claimed. The issue is far more fundamental: who controls the PLA.
Art 29 of PRC Constitution states that PRC armed forces belong to the people.
In reality, however, the army belongs neither to the people nor even to the People’s Republic.
It belongs to the CCP.
This principle was established under Mao and has been reaffirmed repeatedly. Most recently, the 2019 CCPCC Decision on Several Major Issues of Adhering to and
Improving the Socialist System with Chinese Characteristics and Promoting Modernisation of the National Governance System and Governance Capacity explicitly calls for upholding the “absolute leadership of the CCP over the army” and for “resolutely resisting wrong political views
China has just revised its Foreign Trade Law, and the signal is unmistakable: Beijing is preparing for a long, tougher trade war with the US—for the next 3 years and beyond.
At the core of the revision is a new willingness to use unilateral trade countermeasures. Under the
revised Article 40, China can restrict or ban trade with foreign individuals or firms that harm China’s sovereignty or development interests, disrupt “normal” market transactions with Chinese entities, or discriminate against Chinese firms.
Crucially, the law also goes after
circumvention. Logistics providers, platforms, and other intermediaries can be penalised for helping firms evade Chinese measures.
This is clearly aimed at the “poison pill” clauses in recent US trade agreements, which try to lock partners into coordinated actions on China.
Finally had time to read this, but I could barely get past the opening pages. Still, I’ll try.
This is how Kuo begins his essay:
“This essay doesn’t rehearse the familiar bill of particulars on China—constraints on political pluralism and independent media; expansive security
powers and preemptive detention; pressure on religious and ethnic expression; and episodes of extraterritorial coercion—not because those concerns are trivial, but because the task here is different.”
This has become the now-standard preface in China-defender discourse:
“the task here is different”, but different in what?
According to Kuo, “the aim here is to confront, with intellectual honesty, what China’s achievements oblige us to reconsider about modernity, state capacity, forms of political legitimacy, and our own complacencies.”