THREAD: Some highlights from TTC's Military Hypersonic Weapon Systems Conference.
Larry Wortzel discusses Chinese doctrine and compares capabilities. Notes that PLA hopes to "become capable of holding a potential enemy's mainland at risk." Raises concerns over mixing of nuclear and non-nuclear systems.
Wortzel suggests one additional reason why China was building siloes: "I think they were having trouble maintaining [their mobile missiles]."
Robert Taylor on the STRATCOM perspective: "Our nuclear threshold is high," allowing adversaries room to "rapidly escalate below that bar." Hypersonic weapons would "allow holding targets rapidly at risk without crossing the nuclear threshold."
...In other words, a Conventional Prompt Global Strike. Taylor notes that hypersonic weapons have "been a [STRATCOM] priority for over 17 years."
"Hypersonic weapons will be vital to this command from Day 1 of fielding...[but] we have a limited amount of platforms available to host these systems." "weapons on the shelf do not deter..."
On to Sarah Popkin, AFOSR: At least 6 program officers working on hypersonic basic science. "there was a recent BAA" from AFOSR, combining basic science and manufacturing, characterizing variance in high temp material performance.
Discusses one experiment refining numerical simulation of boundary layer transition on canonical flared-cone geometry, with improved models that conformed more with experimental results
BOLT: BOundary Layer Transition experiment: a study geometry that would be publicly releasable, but could be used to examine properties of sharp leading edge and concave surfaces. Flight test done June 2021 at Esrange, Sweden. Test had anomaly but was intended to test Mach 5-7.
More on modelling: improvements to ablation models; 4D x-ray tomography of carbon-carbon. Shows video of fibers degrading at various temps; at high temps, they degrade from the top, but at certain temps, oxidation comes from below and fibers collapse.
Lot of focus on intersection of atmospheric science and aerothermal physics; on atmospheric particulates, unpredictable behaviors in different parts of the stratosphere. Even terrain. "You wouldn't think mountains would have an impact on the stratosphere, but they do."
"It's a small investment trying to bite off a lot of risk...it's okay to fail." Projects range from single $millions to <20M. "It's high-risk, small investments; it's kind of how AFOSR operates."
Scott Morton from DoD's HPC modernization program lists the challenge involved with hypersonic system modelling.
Need to model for "Tens of minutes—this is scary to a computational fluid dynamicist" but necessary to model heat soak, thermal-structural interactions. "If the vehicle starts to bend, and you have a very tightly designed [inlet]," you can get engine unstart.
Current simulation codes "are research codes" instead of ones optimized for the production workflow.
Morton: "get rid of the valley of death" in S&T transition by developing a multi-fidelity, multi-disciplinary model. A an integrated tool modelling multiple disciplines (aero, thermal, etc) at different fidelities. Effort currently "funded in the single millions of dollars."
What experts thought were the major gaps in our hypersonic simulation codes:
A couple of fascinating presentations from industry. 1) Genrad: a startup that uses new signal processing backends to dramatically increase radar range resolution and sample rate. 2) Raytheon: did a great overview of various practical difficulties in hypersonic weapon design
Dr. Gillian Bussey of JHTO: "we don't have the luxury of having a thousand flowers bloom;" JHTO focused on "the clear pathway and intention of bringing that S&T into a weapons system." Emphasis on leveraging same tech across various services.
Bussey's S&T roadmap. The broad capability goals informed by COCOM requirements and S&T community feedback.
"Affordable fighter-class weapons are particularly important to the OSD portfolio." "we have lots of 4th-gen fighters that aren't going to be participating on the first day of war, but if we put on a hypersonic weapon, we have a lot more pylons, a lot more shooters."
"These hypersonic cruise missiles are more affordable [than hypersonic glide vehicles]...in the $2 to 3-4 million class." Notes they're a little more expensive than subsonic cruise missiles.
Closeup on JHTO's $53.4M FY21 projects breakdown.
"We know how to make these things fly now. We're now more focused on how to make them into reliable, robust weapons systems."
In a new development from previous presentations, the university consortium now includes UK and Australian universities. Dedicated slide on allied co-development.
Next steps: JHTO strategy document to release this fall. Mentions a search for other allies to participate in research collaboration.
"There's this misperception that hypersonics is too expensive." "we've seen some great analysis...that show that hypersonics are really necessary to do what we need to do." Emphasis on weapon open system architecture/plugin, modular systems to reduce cost.
I want to go back to this bit. Dean Wilkening has made this point: scramjets might be simpler to make than turbofans. Right now, we view hypersonic weapons as an expensive, exquisite capability. But maybe not forever.
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Key details in the White House "Iron Dome for America" missile defense EO: 1) High-level callout to HBTSS. With two demo satellites in orbit, HBTSS will transfer from MDA to Space Force in 2026. The language implies a need to preserve fire control requirements...
...something we repeatedly argued for last winter. There was a real danger that high-fidelity hypersonic tracking would be made into a reach goal. So this is an important intervention from the top.
2) Space-based interceptors. Prior NDAAs often called for studies, but tech is changing. Launch costs, a major expense, are down 10x, and satellite unit costs also seem to be declining (look at the megaconstellations). Some issues with punch-through, but we'll see what comes.
Old news, but man, RU munitions look ancient:
🧨 Obsolete through-hole construction (wire leads connect components to board surface)
🧨 Thin, slathered-on encapsulation compound (red, used to insulate/protect parts)
🧨 No potting (filling empty space w/ shock-cushioning plastic)
For comparison, some early 2000s NDIA slides on the U.S. GMLRS system electronics. SMT instead of through-hole components, which are hermetically sealed in metal and plastic potting material.
Lot of gold in the replies. The broader significance here: these choices have disproportionate impact on the whole design. They limit maneuverability: under 100G maneuvers, each 4-gram capacitor becomes nearly a pound, stressing the leads. Potting helps you survive that.
USAF Chief Scientist Victoria Coleman later noted ARRW was "the most mature weapon that we have" Disclosed prev. unreported successful Tactical Boost Glide flight test on Dec 8, 2020, over the Pacific, "an amazing day." Was coy on whether ARRW was fully zeroed out
Progress continuing on HACM, Congress and Global Strike Command apparently "huge fans and can't wait" for it to be in inventory. flight test next year will happen in Australia. This is why AUKUS matters.
Here's the top-level portfolio from Dr. Weber on current hypersonic acquisition programs.
[1/3] Real vs. AI-generated images: check out the Fourier patterns yourself. At right: the FFT output, which captures info on repeating patterns in images. You can generate them easily with ImageJ, as I've done here.
Fake:
Left: the infrared scene data we imported into our simulation. Right: a more detailed pic of the hypersonic model, with diff temps assigned to the leeward & windward sides, leading edges, and rear. It's not just distance; the diff in viewing aspects are modelled in.
It won't just be IR. @tomkarako and I have prev said that hypersonic weapons have unique kinematic vulns. But they also have unique, exploitable signatures. We don't model those, but see slide from Dr. Iain Boyd—complex interactions on vehicle surface => novel plumes & sigs.
There's so much buzz around new missiles; rockets are inherently attention-grabbing. But over time, you learn that it's everything upstream—the sensors, battle management systems, comms, command & control—that matters most. defensenews.com/opinion/commen…
But those things are murky. There's no easy way to prove to adversaries that you have software that speeds up your targeting cycles, or EW/cyber that bogs up theirs. Russia could see Ukraine's meager missile stocks, but couldn't see the murky stuff that actually wins wars.
Massive stakes on the assumption that deterrence works. As wars are increasingly decided by the murky stuff, that gets harder. The fact Russia was caught unprepared represents a failure of deterrence; their failure to understand they'd lose, our failure to show why we'd win.