Here's are some of the points discussed in my @guardian op-ed on the populist right and Covid conspiracy theories. /thread
The populist right dallying with conspiracy theorists is the last chapter of a longstanding culture war on values and identity. The idea was popularised back in 1992 by republican pundit and pres candidate Buchanan and it has become the standard strategy of the hard right. 1/
Initially culture war was on abortion, feminism, LGBT rights accused of destroying the family. It has since expanded to immigration, environment and now Covid-19 2/
Basic idea is seducing workers disgruntled with neoliberal turn of the left, by showing that progressive elites are distant in outlook and life-style from ordinary people. 3/
Since explosion of the pandemic populist leaders such as Trump, Bolsonaro, Salvini and many others espoused Covid scepticism, on origins and actual danger of the virus and on contagion prevention policies. 4/
The aim was clear: showing the gap between the priorities of virologists, epidemiologists, doctors and other "experts" and those of ordinary people angry at the suspension of everyday habits as well as people losing money because of restrictions (restaurants, shops etc). 5/
Yet, almost 2 years since beginning of the pandemic, and after over 4 million deaths, this strategy is backfiring and the right finds itself in a position that is difficult to navigate: between conspiracy radicalism and political necessity. 6/
Some figures and parties (Salvini, Le Pen, AfD etc) are finding themselves outflanked by even more radical populist right formations that have espoused wholeheartedly conspiracy theories. The risk for the right now is splitting the vote. 7/
Furthermore, anti-vaxx sentiment is very vocal but hyperminoritarian. 80% of US citizens want to be vaccinated, and figure is higher in other countries. Identifying with such a marginal position is electorally risky. 8/
Covid culture war has created fracture within the right between true believers on the one hand and more moderate voters with little patience for popular superstitions. For the populist right increasingly difficult to hold together this brittle electoral coalition. 9/
In coming years the culture war is only bound to become more intense and toxic. Especially around climate change and green transition policies. However the right is becoming aware of the costs involved in riding the tiger of conspiracy theory. 10/
/end

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More from @paologerbaudo

21 Oct
Sottosviluppo italiano deriva da assenza storica di una "grande borghesia" degna di tale nome. La borghesia che abbiamo è piccola/media di stampo familiare e mentalità da orticello. Divisione proprietà/gestione propria del capitalismo moderno ha funzionato poco nel nostro paese.
Le grandi imprese italiane, eccetto per banche e poche altre, sono o 1) partecipate statali o 2) imprese parafamiliari, con controllo stretto della proprietà.
Abbiamo un'eccedenza di borghesi (e di città borghesi che da tempo immemore vivono sulle province, le 100 città di Gramsci) che però non sono in grado di fare i borghesi e creare egemonia stabile. Per quello spesso la borghesia italiana si è affidata all'estrema destra.
Read 8 tweets
12 Oct
The culture war is now eating the right from within.
/thread
Over the course of the last decades the growing consensus of the populist right has been partly built by pursuing a culture war against liberal elites and the left accused of imposing on ordinary people alien ideas. 1/
This culture war is multifarious. On the one hand it revolves around conservative rejection of progressive values (LGBT rights, racial equality etc). On other hand it comprises a suspicion of science and technique, seen as a means of imposing progressivism and rationalism. 2/
Read 13 tweets
9 Aug
While we wait for release of new IPCC report it is ever more apparent that to avert climate disaster we need massive state interventionism, the like of which we have not experienced for decades, and we are not culturally/psychologically prepared for. /thread
1/ For a long time climate policy discourse was framed either as changes in individual consumption patterns or local areas (do you remember transition towns?) or multilateralism and action at global level. "Think global act local" or "planetary solutions to planetary problems".
2/ Fact that changes in individual consumption patterns is only an illusion (for how it may give a little help) has already been demolished (at least in the activist milieu). But idea that only planetary solutions will deliver us from global problems is more stubborn.
Read 13 tweets
7 Aug
If Italy is the country of the future, expect to have not just one rightwing populist party but two (Lega + Brothers of Italy). I struggled a bit yesterday to explain to foreign journalist why this is the case.
My sense is that there are 2 parties because of 2 main reasons: 1. territorial divides, 2. divides within the Italian bourgeoisie. Ideology also matters ("post"-fascism in case of Brothers of Italy vis-a-vis post-regionalist populism in the case of Lega). But not as important.
In terms of territorial divides despite Lega becoming national party its heartland still very much in the Po valley, and its free market policy reflects it. Brothers of Italy strong in Centre-South and more economically marginal areas. Its economic policy is more protectionist.
Read 8 tweets
5 Aug
The problem of Agamben and philosophical allies is not that they are Foucaultian, but that they are not Foucaultian enough! It is as if they have only read Discipline and Punish skipping the lectures at the College de France.
Discussing rise of political economy Foucault says that entire point of biopolitics is circulation, facilitating movement of people and things. Agamben and the like instead operate with a vision of government as confinement, using the concentration camp as paradigm of modernity.
For example vaccine passports are not about confining people at home. Much to the contrary they are about persuading them to get out of their homes, winning over their reluctance for fear of contagion. It is a means of circulation not confinement.
Read 4 tweets
5 Aug
We are moving from 'exopolitics' of neoliberalism (externalisation, outsourcing, offshoring, exports) to 'endopolitics' of postneoliberal era (reterritorialisation, isolationism, rescue-repair-recovery, domestic demand, insourcing, onshoring).

(The Great Recoil, Intro) Image
1/ Idea here is that we are facing a topological inversion in contemporary politics. Outwardness of high globalisation gives way to a countervailing trend. This is not just a moment of involution/backlash, but also of re-centering and internal re-organisation of political units.
2/ This trend is similar to many previous Polanyian counter-movements. Globalisation's expansionist drive was unsustainable politically (as shown by populist revolts) and economically (global supply chain disruption, stagnating domestic demand).
Read 11 tweets

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