Here is some discussion of s38 of the EU (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 (slight slip by the chair, Bill Cash, in citing the Act).
This is s38
As Frost says, it is a “codification”: put more bluntly, it doesn’t say anything at all that isn’t orthodox English constitutional law.
It was always accepted during our EU membership that Parliament could legislate in breach of EU law and that if Parliament made it clear that that was what it intended to do, the UK courts would follow Parliament, not EU law.
The same applies to the incorporation of, and supremacy of, the Withdrawal Agreement and Protocol in our domestic law effected by s7A of the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (inserted by the 2020 Act).
No one disputes that Parliament could, by using clear wording, pass legislation inconsistent with the WA/Protocol which would have effect in U.K. law, even though that would be a breach of the WA.
(Though the House of Lords voted down, with a huge majority, such legislation when presented to it last year and the betting must be that it would do so again.)
Section 38 doesn’t alter that analysis at all. So it’s hard to see how it can be said to be “very important”, or “incredibly useful” (though since it was put in as a comfort blanket for the ERG, Frost perhaps felt he needed to genuflect to it).
Worth looking at the wording here.
Not having the ECJ “by another route” appears to rule out the “not Swiss” option.
But NB “final arbiter” and “direct settlement”: in the not Swiss model, the arbitration panel is the “direct settlement” forum: but it sends the ECJ all questions of EU law, and accepts the answers. And the “final decision” is (technically) made by the panel. Clever, eh?
Just to note that while EU law applies at all in NI, it will be impossible to avoid the ECJ having the final say in determining what it means: the EU cannot agree anything else.*
(*Irrelevant exception: the EFTA Court.)
The last sentence is an important acknowledgment of how Article 16 works.
On retained EU law. In answer to Frost’s last question, let me introduce the concept of an Act of Parliament, which will do the job. What else is needed?
(Justinian was an autocrat.)
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This is right and important. Though note that even if (which is unlikely) the EU agreed to rewrite the Protocol and to replace adjudication with the “not Swiss”* arbitration model, all disputes on the meaning of these obligations would end up in the ECJ. Just more slowly.
Note 2: what the High Court judge in Allister said about careless and silly use of words like “colonial”: -
(Incidentally, the “respondent” arguing that the effect of the Protocol was limited was the Secretary of State for NI in the current government this spring, before it suddenly decided that there was a serious democratic problem.)
I half agree. I’m a bit reluctant to suggest that lawyers stick to their silos, partly because I don’t stick to mine, and partly because cases don’t respect silos, so any of us might conceivably find ourselves having to argue out of silo at some point.
And there are brilliant legal journalists (some lawyers, some not) who manage to say perceptive things across the range.
But where lawyers do write out of their area of expertise, a certain diffidence is often a good idea: and certainly research and (perhaps) discussing with those who do know the area intimately.
@SBarrettBar@SteveBakerHW You’re muddling up the issue of independence with the question of what you call “politicisation”.
@SBarrettBar@SteveBakerHW I have never got anywhere near suggesting that the U.K. courts aren’t independent. And Rasmussen nowhere suggests that the ECJ isn’t independent.
@SBarrettBar@SteveBakerHW What I am saying - a point to which you have provided no answer - is that (as Sir David Edward explains in his article) neither the ECJ nor any other constitutional/supreme court can possibly avoid taking “political” decisions, in the sense that they involve “political” factors.
Quite some leap from saying that there’s an “ideological” element in the ECJ’s case-law (of which Supreme Court is that not true? Canada? UK? US?) to the (if I may so, highly political and IMO false) claim that it is so ideologically compromised as not to be a court at all.
One problem is, I think, that Steven sets up an ultimately incoherent divide between legal propositions and ideological/political ones.
But when courts decide constitutional questions - ranging from rights questions to eg questions about the powers of devolved parliaments - the answer is inevitably inflected by views about the content and importance of rights or how the balance of powers should work.
Indeed. These list the the areas of EU law that still apply to the UK in respect of Northern Ireland. (NB that in some cases - eg State aid - EU law applies to some UK or even GB measures if they affect NI.)
This is the idea - taken from the proposed model for 🇨🇭.