3/ Put it another way, the CEO has already decided their reasons weren't good enough, so that when you make the same arguments, they'll decide your arguments aren't good enough.
4/ Among the many failed arguments is those claiming "we just need a little bit more". You haven't done a rational analysis of how much budget you need, you've done an irrational analysis of "whatever that is, we need more".
5/ Everyone thinks there's a slush fund sitting around, money that's not being used, and want that.
In fact, it's all being used. To give you more money means taking away money from another department -- a department using the same arguments as you for why they need more
6/ This desire for infinite budget warps our thinking. Take "defense in depth". In military strategy, it means removing forces from the perimeter toward the center. In cybersecurity, it doesn't mean removing protections from the perimeter, but only adding more.
7/ What you haven't done is a rational analysis of how to spend the budget you are given. Is your department spending money the optimal way? You can't answer that and yet you want more.
8/ How do you know that this extra chunk of money can't be better spent on more marketing? Better HR benefits package? Upgrading the offices? etc. That's what the CEO has to decide and you provide ZERO information to help them.
9/ "But if we spend $10 now we can save $100 later". You lie. You don't know that. It's the same lie everybody tells the CEO. They are very good at spotting such lies. That money must come from some other department who made the same claim.
10/ The trick to getting a bigger budget is to spend that time with the CEO explaining how you want to address ransomware within the current budget, like not renewing AV licenses to use that money to move to a tiered domain model.
11/ It builds trust. It communicates you actually have a serious plan for addressing ransomware and that you aren't using it as an excuse to increase your budget.
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FYI: "audit" logs and "forensics" logs are different beasts.
Traditionally, an "audit" is when the auditor is trying to confirm something specific, like whether your numbers add up or you correctly followed procedures.
A "forensics" investigation is open-ended, indeterminate.
An audit starts with something is known, such as reporting quarterly results, and seeks to confirm that they are actually true.
A forensics results with an unsolved crime, and hopes to maybe find out what happened, and half the time, comes to no conclusion.
They do overlap. Forensic auditors seek to find money that people try to hide off books or embezzle, for example. Before computer logs, I'm not sure if there was an important distinction.
One drive failed completely. Another reported recoverable SMART read errors, so it, too. Now a third is reporting recoverable SMART errors.
I think maybe it's time to replace all the drives. With bigger ones of course.
For the non technical:
NAS = server on my local network
RAID = extra ("redudant") drives so that if one fails, it can be replaced without losing data
SMART = a feature of modern disk drives that record events, from temperatures, how many hours it's been on, and various errors
"Errors" can be recoverable -- the read head repeatedly reads the chunk of data until it gets back a valid chunk. But when they start happening, it means unrecoverable errors are likely to start happening.
It's not technical experts evaluating products that put them in the Magic Quadrant. It's marketing experts evaluating marketing messages that put them in Magic Quadrant.
Gartner's customers, those buying Magic Quadrant reports, aren't the techies in the trenches using them, but high-level management who'd prefer to listen to Gartner market analysts than their own techies.
I went to the eye doctor today. I shouted (well raised my voice slightly) "you aren't listening to me".
I finally got my eyes diagnosed in ways that should've been done when I was a kid. My eyes have many small problem that have been ignored forever.
I can see the same confirmation bias that I see in my own industry, where evidence is simply pigeon holed into what they already know, so there's terrible inertia if something doesn't quite fit an existing pigeon hole.
I have three separate problems but they are all minor. But they mean that whenever I get glasses, they don't help much, which is why I don't wear glasses.
You've seen "no trespassing" signs like this one.
Prosecutor: did you see the sign?
Trespasser: yes, but the fence was so easy to climb over it posed no barrier
Prosecutor: but did you see the sign?
Trespasser: yes
Prosecutor: so you knew you were trespassing?
Trespasser: yes
Computer trespass works the same way:
Hacker: yes, but base64 isn't serious encryption and easily bypassed
Prosecutor: but you knew you weren't authorized to see that social-security number?
Hacker: yes, but...
Prosecutor: so you knew you were trespassing?
Hacker: yes, but
A governor of a state sent the police to harass to a journalist who exposed embarrassing information. I'm not sure how that's not "pile-on" worthy. You don't need any technical knowledge to understand why this is a problem.
What techies understand is how when a website publishes something in a webpage, it's their fault for doing so, and that obfuscating it requiring extra steps to "decode" is not protection, and bypassing obfuscation is not a crime.
You untechies may be confused about this, but it's a principle techies have understood since the 1880s ("Kerckhoff's Principle"). This is not a typo. I didn't mean we've known since the 1980s, I mean it's a principle of the 1880s.