Thread by @ahmadjavid

How Pakistan enabled the Taliban's takeover—an insider account. (THREAD)

Afghanistan’s collapse was no accident. It was a culmination of many failures—internal and external—but the nefarious role Pakistan played in the Taliban takeover was significant. 1/
wsj.com/articles/how-p…

Pakistan’s long-running dual-track approach in Afghanistan is no secret, but it became significant after the 2019 Doha negotiations. In Doha, Pakistan played Taliban whisperer and vowed to facilitate a political deal between Taliban/non-Taliban Afghans. Yet its role was vague. /2

But, in Afghanistan, Pakistani intelligence shrewdly expanded the scale/scope of its covert campaign in Taliban's interest. There was indeed no love lost between Afghanistan and Pakistan; in fact, the profound mutual mistrust regularly cast a dark shadow over the relationship. /3

Pres @ashrafghani was convinced that Afghan war keys were in Pakistani cities of “Islamabad, Quetta, and Rawalpindi.” Despite Pakistani machinations, Afghan leaders proceeded from the assumption that Pakistan would choose an imperfect negotiated settlement over state collapse. /4

For a while, these assumptions were borne out, but in time, Pakistan's calculations changed. In April, after @POTUS announced a complete withdrawal, Pakistani position effectively shifted away from facilitating a broader political deal to ensuring a Taliban military settlement./5

The consensus among Pakistani military ranks about a military settlement was shaped by the debilitating political crisis of confidence in Kabul, the crippling leadership vacuum within Afghan forces, and the pressure from Taliban hardliners that a military solution was possible./6

But in the months before collapse, Afghan/Pakistani leaders held serious talks over several issues, to which I was privy. Two sets of requests were presented to Afghan govt by Pakistani army chief (Gen. Bajwa) and ISI chief (Gen. Hameed). They expected a gentlemen’s agreement. /7

The first set concerned the Taliban.

During their one visit to Kabul, Gen. Bajwa and Gen. Hameed came with a delicate proposition. They sought an understanding with Pres. Ghani on a transition, which involved offering all Pashtun-held seats to the Taliban in Ghani's govt. /8

In practice, this swap of sorts included the presidency, foreign/security ministries, governorships, and embassies, among others. The idea was first pitched by Pakistan to some non-Pashtun Afghan leaders. Ghani, who favored stepping down for early elections, snubbed the idea. /9

On ceasefire w/ the Taliban, Bajwa/Hameed were not in favor. They reasoned that a ceasefire (comprehensive or otherwise) would upset Taliban's position in Doha. Instead, they urged Ghani to release Taliban prisoners and cease special operations and airstrikes as a concession. /10

The Afghans judged that Pakistani emphasis on a no-ceasefire was grounded in fears that a ceasefire will disrupt Taliban momentum to create conditions for a military settlement. They believed Pakistan was enforcing its rules of engagement, without offering anything in return. /11

These judgments were informed by other Pakistani requests, urging Ghani to not push for Taliban disarmament in Doha talks, incentivize the Taliban to make money by giving them a share in customs revenues, and not question Taliban's religious legitimacy, including thru ulemas. /12

Meanwhile, Gen. Bajwa was alarmingly sensitive to the media impact of Taliban sanctuaries inside Pakistan. He asked the Afghan side to limit their media campaign about the havens and to stop questioning why Taliban negotiators travel between Doha & Pakistan for consultations. /13

Pakistan's second set of requests concerned bilateral issues. Bajwa wanted an ISI liaison team in Afghanistan to monitor Indian activities. Ghani wanted a reciprocal arrangement—an Afghan team in Pakistan to monitor Taliban with UK as third-party verifier. Bajwa rejected it./14

A sensitive ask involved the Durand Line. After fencing the frontier, Bajwa sought a joint security commission and urged Afghans to secure their side & pay half of the fencing costs. Any bargain risked a de facto recognition of the frontier as a border, which Ghani snubbed. /15

Another sensitive issue involved the presence of Pakistani Taliban—the TTP—and the Baloch nationalists in Afghanistan. Soliciting access to information about both groups, the Pakistani generals sought specific details about individuals and support networks within Afghan govt. /16

When Afghans asked to see Pakistani intelligence findings, the generals refused. Bajwa sought unhindered land access to Central Asia via Afghanistan. Ghani requested access via Wagah-Attari border for two-way trade w/ India. Bajwa refused, despite @ImranKhanPTI agreeing to it./17

By June, no progress was made on these issues, and then, as the Taliban's offensive raged, none of it mattered. The ISI expanded/resourced an organized tactical presence in Taliban units—especially the Haqqani Network, which included map readers and operational coordinators. /18

A deluge of militant fighters arrived in Afghanistan. The ISI, meanwhile, galvanized its elaborate network of human informants in major cities from local travel agencies to commercial banks, restaurants, hotels, bakeries, and taxi drivers. /19

Operating out of leased facilities, special Haqqani units conducted extensive mapping of govt installations and individuals. The ISI-cultivated elements inside the Afghan govt delivered sensitive information about Afghan officials to Haqqani units—including their whereabouts. /20

Publicly, this sprawling campaign was overshadowed by Pakistan’s spirited diplomacy. In their smoke and mirrors, Pakistani officials made boilerplate statements, proclaiming that there could be no military solution to the Afghan problem. /21

Despite early intel warnings, Afghan leaders failed to make swift adjustments to their approach. Some viewed the US pullout as a bluff, others were in denial or blinded by subterranean rivalries. In July, as most US operations ended, Kabul resembled a political sand castle. /22

In the end, Pakistani intelligence succeeded in enabling the Taliban takeover, turning Afghanistan into a plaint, half-state. Going forward, the ISI would play the leading role in directing affairs in the Taliban government to include bullying decisions from Taliban leaders. /23

The IS chief (Gen Hameed) would arguably play an unparalleled role in his forthcoming assignment as Corp Commander Peshawar, a militants’ pit. He will reorganize and negotiate new agreements with a basket of old, new, good, and bad jihadi groups—and the shadow war will rage. /END