Henry Gao Profile picture
Oct 28, 2021 15 tweets 6 min read Read on X
State Council Info Office held a special press con today on China's 8th TPR:
scio.gov.cn/xwfbh/xwbfbh/w…
What are the hot issues from Member's 2562 questions?
Under WTO agreements:
China's implementation of WTO TFA;
consistency of its Cyberseucity law with GATS;
disclosure of info in IPR cases as per TRIPS requirements.
Questions beyond WTO rules:
China to further open up the market, relax restrictions on foreign investment access, reduce the negative list of foreign investment, and promote the innovation of the pilot free trade zone system to be replicated and promoted throughout the country.
There were also concerns on China's dual circulation strategy and forced tech transfer.
China on subsidies:
1. agricultural subsidies must be discussed simultaneously with industrial subsidies
2. discuss tightening trade remedy disciplines such as anti-subsidy and anti-dumping to solve the current abuse of trade remedy measures
3. restoring non-actionable subsidies
On developing country status:
China didn't get SDT in its accession, and have assumed obligations beyond normally required of developing countries since becoming a member, like in TFA & ITA, as I discussed with @WeihuanZhou at
theconversation.com/myth-busted-ch…
On investment restriction:
The issue is beyond WTO but China is willing to deal with this issue through FTAs and BITs. For example, China has filed application to join the CPTPP. CPTPP has high standards for investment, and China is willing to deal with it through these channels.
Again, this confirms my observation in this op-ed with @WeihuanZhou last month, that China is serious about its CPTPP application and is willing to make meaningful concessions to get in.
asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/China-…
On fisheries subsidies:
China issued document in May removing fuel subsidies.
On criticisms on China's trade policy during the TPR:
There are 2 types of comments:
1. those covered by WTO rules, which China will take seriously and fulfill them,
2. those beyond WTO rules, which are unfair, unreasonable, and unacceptable for China.
On China's alleged non-market trade practice and gov't intervention which resulted in overcapacity and market distortion:
Need to go back to the basics. What is the basics? It is China's Constitution, which states in Article 15 that China implements a socialist market economy.
From 2018 to 2020, China has compressed 150 million tons of crude steel production capacity. Now China’s crude steel capacity utilization rate is more than 80%, and the aluminum industry capacity utilization rate is more than 85%, so there is no overcapacity in these 2 industries
On WTO Reform:
1. It must not only resolve traditional issues and historical debts, but also formulate rules on some new issues and realize the modernization of rules.
More specifically, ag subsidy, public stockholding, e-commerce, investment facilitation, fisheries etc.
2. Bring back the AB, as @gregorycshaffer & I discussed here:
thehill.com/opinion/intern…
3. On issues like e-commerce, China hold an open attitude and adopt the joint declaration initiative. Some members first reach an agreement, i.e., plurilateral agreement to resolve some specific regulatory issues in these areas. Later other Members can join.

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
 

Keep Current with Henry Gao

Henry Gao Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @henrysgao

Jan 31
Today PLA Daily finally published another editorial on the Zhang Youxia case, which in itself is not surprising. What is striking are the following:
1. The editorial came a full 6 days after the case was first reported, during which time Zhang’s name never appeared at all. Image
2. Despite the strong rhetoric, there is still no pledge of loyalty from commanders across the various regions.

3. The editorial openly acknowledges the need to “face short-term difficulties and periodic pains,” implicitly admitting that things didn't go as smoothly as planned. Image
4. It goes out of its way to spell out that the CMC Chairman Responsibility System means "to resolutely follow Xi’s commands, be responsible to Xi, and reassure Xi".

This appears to be a response to arguments that the system means loyalty to the position, not to the person. Image
Read 4 tweets
Jan 26
Today’s PLA Daily editorial on anti-corruption offers a textbook example of how to read CCP propaganda:
Read it backwards.

The key message is that “a few corrupt elements can’t make any waves.”

1. Is it really just “a few,” when 5 of the 6 CMC members other than Xi are gone? Image
2. Among the 5 major crimes listed in yesterday’s PLA Daily piece, corruption was only the 3rd. Even then, Zhang and Liu were not accused of corrupting themselves, but of “seriously promoting political and corrupt problems that affect the Party’s absolute leadership of the army.” Image
Notably, "political" comes before "corrupt" — and promoting corruption is not the same as engaging in corruption.

3. Can they “make waves”?
Perhaps not the generals promoted by Xi.
But Zhang, a veteran commander with deep roots and a long history in the PLA, is different.
Read 5 tweets
Jan 26
Interesting story by @Lingling_Wei & @ByChunHan, but I have several questions:

1. @WSJ reports that the evidence against Zhang came from Gu Jun, former general manager of China National Nuclear Corp. But anyone familiar with the Chinese system knows that a suspect under Image
investigation may say virtually anything (in response to leading questions) in exchange for mitigation.

Moreover, this is almost impossible given how siloed the Chinese system is, as @neilthomas123 pointed out here:
@neilthomas123 2. I’m not convinced by the claim that the investigation of Zhang is “a sign of strength, not weakness, for Xi”, esp as the same article notes that the investigation team in Shenyang chose to stay in local hotels rather than military bases! Image
Image
Read 5 tweets
Jan 25
What is Zhang’s real crime?

It has nothing to do with corruption, despite what People’s Daily (and many pundits here) have claimed. The issue is far more fundamental: who controls the PLA.

Art 29 of PRC Constitution states that PRC armed forces belong to the people. Image
In reality, however, the army belongs neither to the people nor even to the People’s Republic.

It belongs to the CCP.

This principle was established under Mao and has been reaffirmed repeatedly. Most recently, the 2019 CCPCC Decision on Several Major Issues of Adhering to and
Improving the Socialist System with Chinese Characteristics and Promoting Modernisation of the National Governance System and Governance Capacity explicitly calls for upholding the “absolute leadership of the CCP over the army” and for “resolutely resisting wrong political views Image
Read 7 tweets
Dec 30, 2025
China has just revised its Foreign Trade Law, and the signal is unmistakable: Beijing is preparing for a long, tougher trade war with the US—for the next 3 years and beyond.

At the core of the revision is a new willingness to use unilateral trade countermeasures. Under the Image
revised Article 40, China can restrict or ban trade with foreign individuals or firms that harm China’s sovereignty or development interests, disrupt “normal” market transactions with Chinese entities, or discriminate against Chinese firms.

Crucially, the law also goes after Image
circumvention. Logistics providers, platforms, and other intermediaries can be penalised for helping firms evade Chinese measures.

This is clearly aimed at the “poison pill” clauses in recent US trade agreements, which try to lock partners into coordinated actions on China.
Read 8 tweets
Nov 20, 2025
Finally had time to read this, but I could barely get past the opening pages. Still, I’ll try.

This is how Kuo begins his essay:
“This essay doesn’t rehearse the familiar bill of particulars on China—constraints on political pluralism and independent media; expansive security Image
powers and preemptive detention; pressure on religious and ethnic expression; and episodes of extraterritorial coercion—not because those concerns are trivial, but because the task here is different.”

This has become the now-standard preface in China-defender discourse:
“the task here is different”, but different in what?

According to Kuo, “the aim here is to confront, with intellectual honesty, what China’s achievements oblige us to reconsider about modernity, state capacity, forms of political legitimacy, and our own complacencies.”
Read 16 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!


This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Don't want to be a Premium member but still want to support us?

Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal

Or Donate anonymously using crypto!

Ethereum

0xfe58350B80634f60Fa6Dc149a72b4DFbc17D341E copy

Bitcoin

3ATGMxNzCUFzxpMCHL5sWSt4DVtS8UqXpi copy

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us!

:(