What are the hot issues from Member's 2562 questions?
Under WTO agreements:
China's implementation of WTO TFA;
consistency of its Cyberseucity law with GATS;
disclosure of info in IPR cases as per TRIPS requirements.
Questions beyond WTO rules:
China to further open up the market, relax restrictions on foreign investment access, reduce the negative list of foreign investment, and promote the innovation of the pilot free trade zone system to be replicated and promoted throughout the country.
There were also concerns on China's dual circulation strategy and forced tech transfer.
China on subsidies: 1. agricultural subsidies must be discussed simultaneously with industrial subsidies 2. discuss tightening trade remedy disciplines such as anti-subsidy and anti-dumping to solve the current abuse of trade remedy measures 3. restoring non-actionable subsidies
On developing country status:
China didn't get SDT in its accession, and have assumed obligations beyond normally required of developing countries since becoming a member, like in TFA & ITA, as I discussed with @WeihuanZhou at theconversation.com/myth-busted-ch…
On investment restriction:
The issue is beyond WTO but China is willing to deal with this issue through FTAs and BITs. For example, China has filed application to join the CPTPP. CPTPP has high standards for investment, and China is willing to deal with it through these channels.
Again, this confirms my observation in this op-ed with @WeihuanZhou last month, that China is serious about its CPTPP application and is willing to make meaningful concessions to get in. asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/China-…
On fisheries subsidies:
China issued document in May removing fuel subsidies.
On criticisms on China's trade policy during the TPR:
There are 2 types of comments: 1. those covered by WTO rules, which China will take seriously and fulfill them, 2. those beyond WTO rules, which are unfair, unreasonable, and unacceptable for China.
On China's alleged non-market trade practice and gov't intervention which resulted in overcapacity and market distortion:
Need to go back to the basics. What is the basics? It is China's Constitution, which states in Article 15 that China implements a socialist market economy.
From 2018 to 2020, China has compressed 150 million tons of crude steel production capacity. Now China’s crude steel capacity utilization rate is more than 80%, and the aluminum industry capacity utilization rate is more than 85%, so there is no overcapacity in these 2 industries
On WTO Reform: 1. It must not only resolve traditional issues and historical debts, but also formulate rules on some new issues and realize the modernization of rules.
More specifically, ag subsidy, public stockholding, e-commerce, investment facilitation, fisheries etc.
3. On issues like e-commerce, China hold an open attitude and adopt the joint declaration initiative. Some members first reach an agreement, i.e., plurilateral agreement to resolve some specific regulatory issues in these areas. Later other Members can join.
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Xi’s Feb speech to private firms is finally published—and it confirms everything I predicted before the meeting:
Private firms must fully align with China’s strategic competition vs the US.
Xi says private firms’ problems stem from external shocks (tech revolutions, trade restrictions) or internal missteps (over-diversification).
To Xi, the Party is not the problem, it is the solution.
Thus, firms must “unify their thoughts and actions with the Central Committee.”
Xi was even more explicit on measures to boost private firms: they should lead national science & tech projects, access major research infrastructure, and join state-led initiatives.
Exactly what I predicted 3 years ago in my @CIGI essay: private firms must be integrated into
What’s the biggest threat to China’s economy in the 2nd half of 2025?
It’s not the trade war, nor any new government policy. It’s a judicial interpretation from the Supreme Court.
On July 31, the Court issued Interpretation on Applicable Law in Trying Labour Dispute Cases (II).
Article 19 states:
“If the employer agrees with the employee, or the employee promises the employer, that there is no need to pay social security premiums, the people’s court shall find the agreement or promise invalid. If the employer fails to pay social security premiums in
accordance with the law, and the employee requests the termination of the labour contract in accordance with the third paragraph of Article 38 of the Labour Contract Law and demands economic compensation, the people’s court shall support the claim.”
The new tariff numbers confirm what I wrote 4 months ago in my @commonplc piece “The Art of a Trade Deal”:
1. I stressed that these negotiations aren’t just about trade-security alignment would be a key factor. This is now explicit in the executive order, which repeatedly cites
security considerations in setting final tariff rates.
2. I predicted countries would be grouped based on key criteria. That’s exactly what we see: broadly speaking, there are three groups—friends (10–15%), enemies (30%+), and frenemies (19–25%).
3. I anticipated aggressive transshipment controls targeting China. The executive order includes just that.
4. Perhaps most tellingly, the order hints what China—the last holdout from the Liberation Day Tariffs—is likely to face: at least 40%, matching the rate applied to
The US-UK trade deal is out—and it confirms most of my predictions in my @commonplc piece “The Art of a Trade Deal” 4 weeks ago:
1. Tariffs: The 10% tariff remains in place for now, but contrary to some interpretations, this doesn’t mean the UK failed to negotiate it down. The
Agreement explicitly states that both sides will enter negotiations to reduce tariff rates. As I noted, the likely landing point is around the US’s 3.4% rate-if the UK is willing to match it.
2. Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs): Just as I anticipated, NTBs is central to the next phase
For a developed country like the UK, the focus is on overregulation—technical barriers to trade, SPS measures, and similar restrictions—all explicitly referenced in the Agreement.
3. Supply Chains: I flagged this as a key issue, and the Agreement confirms it. It addresses supply
Today’s front page of People’s Daily features the Central Peripheral Work Conference—a major development, given this is only the second such meeting in the PRC’s 76-year history.
The first such meeting was in Oct 2013, when Xi launched the BRI, which
was elevated to a national strategy at the 3rd Plenum of the 18th CCP Central Committee held the following month.
As I argued in this @trade_review article 3 years ago, the BRI was China’s strategic response to US containment through the TPP, where the cambridge.org/core/journals/…
@trade_review US tried to “make sure the US—and not countries like China—is the one writing this century’s rules for the world’s economy.”
But the TPP was killed.
Now, as @realDonaldTrump tries to rewrite the rules of global trade through the Reciprocal Tariff Policy, China is striking back.