1/ FATF published its recommendations. It's so bad that it makes the infrastructure bill look reasonable.
TLDR: Only permissioned DeFi is allowed. An intermediary must be inserted to serve as a VASP. The global impact of these recommendations is an attempted kill shot at DeFi.
2/ Several takes today reflect less concern because they are not focused on DeFi in particular. When looking at DeFi, it is clear that the implications are brutal. They start out ok and then it gets worse from there. fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/doc…
3/ Paragraphs 58-61 provide definitions particularly relevant for DeFi. These terms were had been used in prior guidance but were not defined, so they could be interpreted broadly. Other than the use of "active facilitation" in the definition of "conducts," they aren't horrible.
4/ But they blow it all up when they start explaining those definitions or telling countries how to implement rules based on those definitions. Pay particular attention to paragraphs 67, 80, 91, and 92.
5/ In paragraph 67: "However, creators, owners and operators ... who maintain control or sufficient influence in the DeFi arrangements ... may fall under the FATF definition of a VASP where they are providing or actively facilitating VASP services."
6/ Begs the question of what "sufficient influence" and "actively facilitating" mean, which we don't know, though there are many random tidbits of possibilities thrown in the guidance in different places, all of which imply an all-encompassing view.
7/ Paragraph 80: "... the FATF envisions very few VA
arrangements without VASPs involved at some stage if countries apply the definition correctly." That really tells you everything you need to know about how this guidance was approached, but they mean it even more for DeFi.
8/ Paragraph 91: "The FATF ... considers most arrangements currently in operation, even if they self-categorize as P2P platforms, may have at least some party involved at some stage of the product’s development and launch that constitutes a VASP." But that's not the worst. 👇
9/ Specifically, "[a]utomating a process that has been designed to provide covered services for a business does not relieve the controlling party of obligations." Is a DAO a "controlling party"? Is it only certain participants of a DAO?
10/ Saving the best for last. Paragraph 92: "The use of an automated process such as a smart contract to carry out VASP functions does not relieve the part(ies) of responsibility for VASP obligations."
11/ "In such instances, controlling parties qualifying as VASPs should undertake ML/TF risk assessments prior to the launch or use of the platform and take appropriate measures to mitigate risks."
12/ To be clear: all DeFi protocols use "an automated process such as a smart contract to carry out VASP functions." So, the FATF believes that a developer must put controls in place before deploying smart contracts to be able to undertake all obligations of a VASP forever.
13/ FATF claims to be technology neutral but that can't be true where it requires removing key benefits of the technology to comply. It is gutting DeFi in favor of TradFi.
14/ Also, check out this thread for even more detailed thoughts:
Although the Wyoming DAO bill that @AWright01 helped draft is imperfect, I disagree with the framing by @lex_node, @prestonjbyrne and @stephendpalley. I feel this way mainly because it solves a huge issue: unlimited liability of DAO members. Thread on the good and the bad 👇
1. Good: DAOs currently operate without regard to the possibility of being general partners in a general partnership for US law purposes, making each of them liable for the actions of each other one. This is a particular risk with a DAO consisting of only a few members.
2. Alternatively, there is no general partnership, but each individual is still liable for his or her own actions. The Wyoming DAO bill would eliminate this risk by wrapping a shell of limited liability around the DAO members.
1. The SEC released a set of proposed rules for loosening up current exemptions to registration requirements of securities offering. Details are below 👇 and they include increases to Reg A and CF offering limits. Here are the proposed rules: sec.gov/rules/proposed…
2. The approach to integration (when 2 different securities offerings are treated as one) would change and 4 safe harbors would be created in a new Rule 152. Integration is a more important concept than appears at first blush because it can really restrict offering flexibility.
2a. An offering launched more than 30 days after another is announced or completed would not be integrated with the announced or completed offering, essentially, as long as the rules regarding general solicitation were followed in the prior offering.
1/ @blockstack is not the only #RegA+ to have been qualified. The @YouNow Reg A+ offering also has been qualified but it is much different. The offering is to distribute #Prop tokens as rewards in its video app and for developing the network / apps on the network.
2/ Like Blockstack, YouNow has taken the position that the distribution of the tokens does not require a BitLicense in New York. The offering is available to NY residents. Reisdents of Arizona, Nebraska, North Dakota and Texas are exluded.
3/ Like Blockstack, YouNow believes that the network may become so decentralized that the Props tokens will no longer be securities.
1/ Boston Security Token Exchange LLC (BSTX) filed a proposed rulebook for its security token exchange that is a JV between Box Exchange and @tzeroblockchain. Rather than going through the rules, here is a description of key aspects of how BSTX will work 👇
2/ All security tokens traded on BSTX will be registered with the Commission under both Section 12 of the Exchange Act and Section 6 of the Securities Act of 1933.
3/ BSTX will not support trading of security tokens offered under an exemption from registration for public offerings, with the exception of certain offerings under Regulation A that meet the proposed BSTX listing standards.
1/ According to the Director of Corp Fin, Bill Hinman, a security can morph into a non-security and morph back into a security. Not a new concept coming from him. But how does this work? 👇
2/ Remember two key prongs of Howey: (i) expectation of profit that is (ii) predominantly based on the efforts of others. Now let's think through how investment contracts can morph nonstop.
3a/ Issuer sells to Party A a token and Party A thinks it'll make a bunch of money from Issuer's efforts (security).