Costa Group Holdings $CGC $CGC.AX is Australia’s largest grower, packer and marketer of fresh fruit and vegetables. If you like your berries, mushrooms, tomatoes, avocados and citrus, maybe you’ll like the taste of Costa Group.
Let’s take a deep dive. 👇
1. Investment thesis:
✅Stalwart.
✅Market leading position in multiple growing consumer staples lines.
✅International expansion.
✅Generating decent operating free cash flow.
✅Trading at 52 week lows.
🚩CAPEX requirements
🚩Margins & growth rates.
2. Costa’s has grown over the years by modernising fruit and veg growing – bringing new varieties, 52-week availability to supermarkets, economies of scale, and locations near to major urban centres.
3. Costa's aim to be a diversified sustainable commercial agriculture firm.
While this approach is capital intensive, this is also creates barriers to entry and potentially market power.
4. The crops Costa focuses on tend to be higher margin: tomatoes in greenhouses, vertical farmed mushrooms, year-round berries, avocados for millennial renters, etc.
5. The main segment for Costas is Australian produce supply – typically been +75% of revenue with around 10% EBITDA margins. This has been growing slowly, and can be quite volatile.
6. An example of volatility in a key market is the price of avocados have plummeted due to oversupply – finally perhaps some of those millennials may be able to afford avocado on toast and a home mortgage? bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
7. Farms and logistics provides supply chain support to third parties. While it’s ~12% of revenues, it has thin EBITDA margins of ~10% and has not been slow growing if you remove the acquisitions.
8. International has been a major growth area.
While it’s only ~25% of revenue, it has contributed 60-70% of EBITDA over the past 12 months due to it’s high margins. It is a fast growing segment across both their Africa and China berry footprints.
9. Using their patented jumbo berries and IP in efficient growing, they have been able to get footholds into the larger Africa/European and Chinese market. However, while they don’t have the duopoly supermarkets to deal with, they also don’t have strong retail channels.
10. The recent 2PH acquisition is also interesting. While it’s low-margin high-volume citrus, they are buying a range of trademarked varieties in established yet young (growing) orchards.
11. 2PH is also a massive shift from domestic to export focused production. Margins are higher, EBITDA is accretive instantly, and could become a platform for other exports. But at $190m (or 7xEBITDA), it will require decent growth.
12. Costa sells mostly into a concentrated market of Woolies $WOW Coles $COL and Metcash $MTS – so they don’t have a lot of pricing power. afr.com/companies/reta…
13. Labour shortages for fruit / veggie producers is a major risk. This is driving up costs, and literally harvests are being left to rot. They can’t pass on a lot of these costs. abc.net.au/news/rural/202…
14. Weather and disease risks are always present – the outlook for FY22 already sees an avocado glut exacerbated by poor berry volumes. It’s a fine line to get strong volumes and prices.
15. CAPEX remains very high. In 2018-20, they depreciated ~$210m and invested in ~$300m CAPEX (+$90m net growth CAPEX), contrasted with a total ~$290m of cash flow from operations.
16. Future plans are to continue growth CAPEX in the face of high maintenance CAPEX. Resultantly, there has been increasing debt (+800m/3yrs) and shareholder dilution ($175m or 27% / 3yrs, 100% / 7yrs).
17. Despite the share price catering 40% past six months, it’s still trading at PE=22. While it’s not so bad on EV/EBITDA=10, the massive CAPEX requirements makes this immaterial. Even factoring in accretive 2PH earnings, the PE=20.5.
18. Where’s the growth going to come from?
Personally, I don’t see any real catalyst beyond the organic growth of international sales – which I also think is the riskiest as it is an area that is farthest from their circle of competence.
19. h/t @berthon_jones who also has been highlighting some of the terrible momentum and valuations
The global salmon industry is in turmoil as fears of contagion of the Norwegian resource tax hits the Faroe Islands.🐟
P/F Bakkafrost $BAKKA is down another 12% overnight, while the big Norwegians $MOWI $SALM $LSG continue to slide.
Let's take a look at the Faroe Islands 🧵👇
1. Yesterday I looked at Norway's resource tax and figured it was too difficult to find a good risk/reward bet. Right now the best forecasters of European monetary and fiscal policy seem to be a random number generator. Today I'm looking at Faroe Islands.
Norway produces over 50% of the world's Atlantic salmon. So this is kind of a big deal.
Unsurprisingly, the largest salmon companies in the world are also in Norway. In fact, the four largest are from Norway. This is because they have a huge cost advantage in the cold fjords which provide better growing conditions.
Delorean's $DEL $DEL.AX update to the market has left a fair bit to be desired. Engineering division has been decimated, financing remains out of reach, though retail is doing alright. Time to hit the panic button? 🚨
Let's take a closer look 🤏🧵👇
If you don't know what Delorean is, please don't @ me, just look at the original deep dive.
Clean Seas $CSS $CSS.AX FY22 results look really good. I recently spoke with Rob Gratton (CEO) and got to understand more of their business model and strategic direction.
Here's a short thread on my thoughts and why I don't hold 🤏🧵👇
The FY22 results look very strong. Volume growth (3.7kt), ~20% increase in pricing, ~37% revenue increase, 19% reduction in production costs, etc. And for the first time, profitable! 🎯
But I have mentioned before, this is really a bull-whip effect from the diabolical FY20 which saw inventory build up etc, and now being sold in FY22.
Treasury Wine Estates $TWE $TWE.AX FY22 results came out, and they're good considering the China wine-ban is still being flushed out. Total revenues down, but margins and NPAT are both up 🍷😋
Let's take a quick look 👇
You can find my original thread here where I outlined TWE as an asset play, with the hope that profits may return in due course.
To put in perspective the FY22 results, you can see here the 1H22 results were less negative than the market expected. But 2H22 has been pretty strong, which is why NPAT is up *only* 4% but almost 10% if you annualise 2H22.