1/ There's a well known anecdote from The Everything Store about Jeff Bezos visiting Harvard Business School in 1997. The students told Bezos "you really need to sell to Barnes and Noble and get out now"
Less well known: you can read the actual 1997 HBS case study from the class
2/ It's easy to laugh at predictions in retrospect - but with the information available at the time, would you have known better?
3/ In 1997, Amazon was 3 years old and generated $148M in sales, entirely in the book industry. Barnes and Noble was 26 years old and was 15x bigger, at $2.5B in sales
4/ In contrast to the vertically-integrated Amazon of today, the Amazon of 1997 held little inventory and relied on its wholesaler Ingram to ship 59% of its books
In other words: in 1997, Amazon was really just an outsourced website layer built atop an Ingram warehouse
5/ To compete with Amazon, Barnes and Noble launched BarnesAndNoble.com in 1996 as an internal 50-person startup
Unlike Amazon, BarnesandNoble.com shipped books from their own warehouse from the get-go, resulting in *faster* delivery times than Amazon
6/ In other words: In 1997, Amazon was a money-losing niche vertical ecommerce player with no hard assets, facing entry from a much larger incumbent with a comparable (or arguably superior) value prop
7/ But everybody knows how this story ends! BarnesandNoble.com's revenues permanently flatline after the tech bubble at around $400M. Amazon kept growing, from $150M in 1997 to $2.8B in 2000 and $7B in 2004
Could anything in the HBS case have foreshadowed this?
8/ First hint: Barnesandnoble.com wasn't allowed to leverage the distribution of physical Barnes and Noble stores, because that would have subjected them to sales tax. In other words, B&N handicapped itself to compete on the same playing field as Amazon
9/ Second hint: Even in 1997, Jeff Bezos didn't stand still. Barnesandnoble.com's in-house warehouse was the catalyst for Amazon to pivot away from the asset-light model and vertically integrate into fulfillment and logistics
10/ What's the takeaway here? The Amazon of 1997 was not the Amazon of today. Frankly speaking, it was a much weaker, much less defensible business.
For early stage companies, you're not really betting on a business as it is. You're betting on a business as it *could* be.
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2/ This paper shows autonomous driving follows the same scaling laws as the rest of ML - performance improves predictably on a log linear basis with data and compute
This is no surprise to anybody working on LLMs, but it’s VERY different from consensus at Waymo a few years ago
3/ Waymo built its tech stack during the pre-scaling paradigm. They train a tiny model on a tiny amount of simulated and real world driving data and then finetune it to handle as many bespoke edge cases as possible
1/ Was this the biggest miss in the history of pharma? Apparently in 1990, Pfizer preemptively abandoned development of the first GLP1 drugs
Ozempic, Zepbound, Wegovy, Mounjaro, etc. were doing $60B+ in runrate revenues at the end of last year. None are made by Pfizer
2/ Source is this retrospective written by Jeffrey Flier (former dean of Harvard Medical School) about his biotech startup MetaBio in the late 1980s: muse.jhu.edu/article/936213
3/ MetaBio was founded in 1987. That was the year Joel Habener first reported GLP-1’s ability to stimulate glucose-dependent insulin secretion - in retrospect, the moment of “discovery” for GLP-1s
MetaBio became the first company in the world to license Habener’s GLP-1 patents
1/ If you really believe LLMs will dramatically compress the cost of software development in 3-5 years, doesn't this obviate the reason for independent software vendors to exist?
This doesn't seem obviously crazy to me - it'd just be a return to the days of mainframes
2/ When IBM invented the mainframe in the 50s, there were no independent software companies - IBM bundled their hardware with a COBOL compiler, which customers then used to write custom software themselves
3/ The world's first independent software vendors (e.g. ADR, Informatics, MSA) all started in the 60s as contract programmers - basically, consultants hired to write custom COBOL for clients - who then realized they could resell that custom code to multiple customers
1/ This internal 2007 Nokia presentation on the first iPhone is a really good example of how incumbents actually get disrupted
Oftentimes, the incumbent already knows what needs to be done. It's just that organizational incentives inhibit the incumbent from doing it
2/ This slide deck was posted on Hacker News earlier this week but just got taken down
I have no idea how they got their hands on a copy but it does look like a legit internal Nokia presentation from strategy team at the timenews.ycombinator.com/item?id=427247…
3/ Contrary to popular belief, people at Nokia in 2007 understood that the iPhone was a big deal
The iPhone's touchscreen would "set a new standard of state-of-art"
Nokia's own user interface paradigm was "in decline"
1/ I just finished a 2.5 week trip through China today, my first visit in about a decade. I was there for family reasons, but it also happened to be my first time in the country as a tech industry observer
My amateur travel journal on the China tech market -
2/ OBSERVATION #1 - Yes, everything really does run on WeChat
If you're a foreign traveler visiting China, you really must set up WeChat Pay and Alipay beforehand. For me, this was the Chinese equivalent of Whatsapp + Chrome + Venmo + my credit card + my subway card + Doordash
3/ I didn't use cash a single time on my 19 day trip. Everybody took WeChat Pay, from Michelin-starred restaurants, to McDonalds, to butchers at the farmers markets in tier 3 cities, to performing musicians in national parks