I have been waiting for months for this incredibly impressive demonstration of OSINT to come out - ever since I saw it presented at a @ChinaMaritime conference earlier this year.
The author (Mike Dahm) used AIS, commercial imagery, and other sources to weave an incredibly detailed picture of key amphibious assault exercises in 2020 and 2021 where the PLA experimented with the use of numerous civilian ships to supplement its organic sealift capacity.
Key takeaways IMO: the PLA and its reserve civilian fleet probably can't yet support a large-scale invasion of Taiwan, and the ships used so far to practice are a select cadre. But this capacity could expand rapidly after capabilities are formalized & expanded to other ships.
Another key takeaway: the PLA's ingenious floating pier systems could be used to cross Taiwanese coastal mud flats previously assessed as unsuitable for landings. If you've read many previous assessments of where/when the PLA could invade, you'll recognize this as a big deal. 👀
IMO the conclusions are spot-on: China probably can't do this now, but we shouldn't "underestimate the ingenuity and tenacity of the PLA", and efficiency may not be needed when a whole-of-society mobilization is behind the effort. And the PLA probably just getting started here.
And of course, the title, "Chinese Ferry Tales" is just...
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Hot off the presses: I'm pleased to announce the release of this @ChinaMaritime Note covering China's new Shuiqiao landing barges, which I co-authored with Michael Dahm. I hope that folks find it a useful source of info on this important new development. digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-notes/14/
@ChinaMaritime Some highlights: first, our key takeaways.
@ChinaMaritime Next, we found patents for these or similar barges in filings from several years ago. In other words, this project has been in the works for a while now - not a reaction to the 2022 Pelosi visit, or the DPP's election win, etc. (not that I ever thought it was).
In this 9 March image, we can see that three of the LPTs have left (numbers 6, 2, and 1 from the previous thread).
As such, one 4-, one 6-, and one 8-pillar LPT have departed, with one of each still under construction.
After seeing the departure of these vessels, I went back & observed AIS data to see if the vessels were using AIS.
What I saw was indications of tugs getting these ships underway, but no AIS from the ships themselves, unlike other commercial vessels. marinetraffic.com/en/ais/home/ce…
@rand recently published this piece by Dr. Timothy Heath, in which he voiced substantial doubts about the PLA's combat readiness. It's received a fair bit of attention since then.
Having read it & examined the evidence he cites, I have some thoughts:
NOTE: if this thread looks familiar, it's because I put it up yesterday with a link to the article at the top. I'm re-upping it today as ab experiment to see if there's a difference in reach from not putting the link at the top (plus I'll fix some typos). rand.org/pubs/perspecti…
Anyway, let's look at his key takeaways:
- the PLA is focused on upholding CCP rule rather than preparing for war
- PLA modernization is mostly to bolster CCP credibility
- over the PLA’s history it's prioritized political loyalty & CCP rule over combat readiness
- As China declines, the PLA’s mission of upholding CCP rule will become more important, combat readiness less so
- large-scale, high-intensity US-PRC war is improbable. If US-PRC tensions escalate, China will face strong incentives to favor indirect methods
- US defense planning elevate a broader array of threats versus remote possibility of war w/ China
@rand recently published this piece by Dr. Timothy Heath, in which he voiced substantial doubts about the PLA's combat readiness. It's received a fair bit of attention since then.
First, let's look at his key takeaways:
- the PLA is focused on upholding CCP rule rather than preparing for war
- PLA modernization gains are designed first/foremost to bolster the credibility of the CCP
- over the PLA’s history, it's prioritized political loyalty and CCP rule over combat readiness
- As China declines, the PLA’s mission of upholding CCP rule will become more important, its combat readiness less so
- large-scale, high-intensity US-PRC war is improbable. If US-PRC tensions escalate, China will face strong incentives to favor indirect methods
- US defense planning should consider a threat framework that elevates a broader array of threats versus the remote possibility of war with China
It will surprise no one who follows me that, while some of his points on the history of the PLA and CCP are valid, I disagree with his larger overall conclusion: that the threat of military aggression from the PLA in the future is remote due to a lack of combat readiness.
One key thing the armchair “wHY dIdN'T THe hELicOpteR SEe ThE airLinER On A CLeAr NiGhT” folks miss is a concept folks in the maritime business call CBDR: constant bearing, decreasing range.
What that means is that if you’re on an intercept course with another vessel (or airplane), they will have no apparent relative motion when you look at them. eoceanic.com/sailing/tips/2…
Put simply, if you can see the other party moving right or left across your field of view, then you’re guaranteed not to hit them (if you both maintain your course and speed).
They’ll either pass ahead or behind.
However, if the other vessel/plane stays in the same spot in your field of view, but is just getting bigger, then you have a problem - CBDR.
Many folks probably saw @CovertShores' recent find: that China is building multiple special vessels seemingly intended to transfer vehicles ashore in support of a PRC invasion of Taiwan.
Let's start with overall numbers. @CovertShores indicated in his article that there are, "3 but likely 5 or more...".
I'd put the emphasis on "or more", as I count what looks like 7 in this image of the GSI Longxue Island shipyard taken on 28 November 2024:
Next, let's zoom in, starting with #1 above.
Since I know of no designation for this type of vessel, I'm going to make one up: the T-LPT (i.e., civilian-crewed auxiliary landing platform—transfer). And I'll call this one the Type 1.