I have been waiting for months for this incredibly impressive demonstration of OSINT to come out - ever since I saw it presented at a @ChinaMaritime conference earlier this year.
The author (Mike Dahm) used AIS, commercial imagery, and other sources to weave an incredibly detailed picture of key amphibious assault exercises in 2020 and 2021 where the PLA experimented with the use of numerous civilian ships to supplement its organic sealift capacity.
Key takeaways IMO: the PLA and its reserve civilian fleet probably can't yet support a large-scale invasion of Taiwan, and the ships used so far to practice are a select cadre. But this capacity could expand rapidly after capabilities are formalized & expanded to other ships.
Another key takeaway: the PLA's ingenious floating pier systems could be used to cross Taiwanese coastal mud flats previously assessed as unsuitable for landings. If you've read many previous assessments of where/when the PLA could invade, you'll recognize this as a big deal. 👀
IMO the conclusions are spot-on: China probably can't do this now, but we shouldn't "underestimate the ingenuity and tenacity of the PLA", and efficiency may not be needed when a whole-of-society mobilization is behind the effort. And the PLA probably just getting started here.
And of course, the title, "Chinese Ferry Tales" is just...
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One key thing the armchair “wHY dIdN'T THe hELicOpteR SEe ThE airLinER On A CLeAr NiGhT” folks miss is a concept folks in the maritime business call CBDR: constant bearing, decreasing range.
What that means is that if you’re on an intercept course with another vessel (or airplane), they will have no apparent relative motion when you look at them. eoceanic.com/sailing/tips/2…
Put simply, if you can see the other party moving right or left across your field of view, then you’re guaranteed not to hit them (if you both maintain your course and speed).
They’ll either pass ahead or behind.
However, if the other vessel/plane stays in the same spot in your field of view, but is just getting bigger, then you have a problem - CBDR.
Many folks probably saw @CovertShores' recent find: that China is building multiple special vessels seemingly intended to transfer vehicles ashore in support of a PRC invasion of Taiwan.
Let's start with overall numbers. @CovertShores indicated in his article that there are, "3 but likely 5 or more...".
I'd put the emphasis on "or more", as I count what looks like 7 in this image of the GSI Longxue Island shipyard taken on 28 November 2024:
Next, let's zoom in, starting with #1 above.
Since I know of no designation for this type of vessel, I'm going to make one up: the T-LPT (i.e., civilian-crewed auxiliary landing platform—transfer). And I'll call this one the Type 1.
I'm pleased to announce the release of a new report I co-authored with @timothyawalton for @HudsonInstitute titled Concrete Sky: Air Base Hardening in the Western Pacific.
Some folks may recall a preliminary assessment I posted in 2023 on this topic, as I came to realize that China appeared to be engaged in a nationwide, robust effort to harden its air bases - and that the US was doing relatively little in this area.
"Rattner [sic] said Xi Jinping’s goal of having his military ready to carry out a “short, sharp invasion” of Taiwan by 2027 “is not possible right now.”"
I was at this event, and that is not what I recall them saying. What I recall is them saying is... news.usni.org/2024/12/19/chi…
...that invasion was "neither imminent nor inevitable", that the PLA faced obstacles in reaching Xi's 2027 goal, and in terms of a short sharp invasion at acceptable cost, "they're not there today".
But judge for yourself, that portion is around 12:00:
IMO my recollection is consistent with this statement, provided at a separate brief to reporters—and released by DoD.
Again: not imminent or inevitable, Xi remains committed to 2027 goals but corruption could slow them down (i.e., not "not possible" to meet 2027 goals). 🤷♂️
Moving on, here's part 3 of my thoughts on the 2024 China Military Power report. We'll start with the PRC's nuclear forces.
Overall, DoD estimates the PRC has 600+ warheads. Last year's report said 500, with 1000 expected by 2030, so this 20% increase isn't really a surprise. 🤷♂️
We also get news the PLARF is doubling the size of the DF-5 liquid-fueled ICBM silo force.
We also get a new discussion of possible reasons for the massive nuclear expansion: in part due to concerns about US BMD (note: not US nuclear modernization).
While US BMD could have something to do with it, I think there's more to it: Xi has said China will have a "world-class" military, and this is probably part of that.
Also, a robust nuclear force is insurance against a US nuclear response to large-scale PRC conventional strikes.