Thread by @ahmadjavid

The news that Qatar will now serve as a "protecting power" for US interests in Afghanistan is a good development. While the designation is a common practice in the absence of formal diplomatic ties, how might things shape up moving forward? (1)

THREAD

reuters.com/world/exclusiv…

The US has neither broken off diplomatic ties with Taliban authority nor had ever formally/informally established one. But considering US refusal to formally recognize the ruling authority, the opening of US Interests Section is a *creative* way to engage w/ Taliban authority. /2

The US position on formal recognition is highly likely to stand until after the midterm elections. But in the interim, its Interests Section would serve as a semi/conditional recognition to protect US interests and to create a space for urgent humanitarian support/protection. /3

For the Taliban, the likely provisions of the arrangement are for the Afghan assets to be selectively unfrozen/disbursed, removal of Taliban leaders from sanctions list, and an understanding with the US on non-interference in Taliban's internal affairs, political or military. /4

Other provisions may include a joint security/monitoring commission for threats. Apart from two or more US hostages, the Taliban don't have any US hostages nor is there any occupied territory to be dealt with by the sides. There are, however, Taliban detainees in Guantanamo. /5

But the most significant provision of the opening of the US Interests Section in Kabul is that it would effectively kickstart the process of the Taliban’s recognition—de facto or de jure, conditional or otherwise—by regional and other countries. /6

Some regional countries are likely to formally recognize the ruling authority, most European countries would adopt a mixed approach of operating through ‘protecting powers’ and formal recognitions with/without reopening their embassies in Kabul. /7

Most European countries are likely to conduct diplomatic engagements through their makeshift missions in Doha or through their non-resident embassies in the UAE. However, the US Interests Section under Qatari Embassy is unlikely to have a comprehensive mandate. /8

Qatar is likely to conduct limited functions on Washington's behalf in Kabul. It would be somewhat similar to the Swiss Embassy in Tehran representing American Interests. In turn, Iran’s interests in Washington are represented by the Pakistani Embassy in Washington since 1992. /9

Considering their cozy ties with Taliban, it won't be surprising for Pakistan to take the mandate as Taliban protecting power in Washington. Should Washington accept it, the Taliban Interest or Liaison Section under Pakistani Embassy would serve as a Taliban virtual embassy. /10

Sooner or later, 1-2 Taliban officials would be allowed to staff its Interests Section in Washington. If Pakistan becomes a harder sell as protecting power, Taliban would ask Doha to represent them in the US either thru Qatari embassy, its UN mission, or directly out of Doha. /11

It's important to stress that not every country has the same level of relationship with Taliban authority as Pakistan and Qatar do. But then, there's arguably no country that’s comfortable with Pakistan’s lead in directing affairs in Taliban regime, from policy to personnel. /12

While Pakistan is tight with Taliban hardliners i.e., the Haqqanis, Qatar is struggling to solidify its relationship with Taliban moderates, to whom Doha played a generous host. Here, a likely Qatar-Pakistan competition for Taliban will grow, possibly creating some tensions. /13

The Taliban moderates (the fmr. Quetta Shura who constitute Taliban’s numerical majority) prefer Qatar as a Big Brother over Pakistan. Meanwhile, several regional countries like India and Turkey would also instrumentalize their ties with Qatar and likely align with Doha. /14

India seems to be aligning itself with Taliban's former Doha politicos—e.g., Indian ambassador met with them in Sept.—while concerned about Taliban hardliners and the quite likely reorganization/reorientation of Taliban's many ideological siblings to theatres closer to India. /15

Meanwhile, there also appears to be a growing Turkey-Qatar understanding on Afghanistan—i.e., inclusive governance, women’s rights, CT engagement—and Turkey is increasingly leveraging its close ties w/ Pakistan to sell that understanding, which Islamabad might not entertain. /16

While Taliban are likely to adopt (perhaps favor) a diversified approach, the possible Pakistan-Qatar competition for Taliban is a space to watch. This winter, we’d likely see changes in Taliban’s structure—and perhaps some senior Taliban assassinations to ensure compliance. /17

For the next steps, Pakistan/US would formalize (in writing) the agreement for Pakistan's airspace access, or the air lines of communication (ALOC). It'd likely happen with Taliban's understanding. In the past, unlike the GLOC agreement, ALOC was merely a verbal arrangement. /18

On US basing rights: While Pakistan is divided on the issue, it'd publicly resist US bases for over-the-horizon engagement. But, privately, they'd find a creative way, perhaps by offering a joint base or hosting US teams on Pakistani bases, with likely Taliban understanding. /END