The CAC just issued its draft Cyber Data Security Administrative Rules for comments. Several interesting points:
1. it confirms my warning 2 weeks ago that even foreign firms like @google, @Meta
& @Twitter are required to comply with the new law even if they are not operating in China, and further expands the list of covered activities under Art. 3 of PIPL by adding
another category: involving important domestic data processing. If all these giant digital firms have not designated a China-compliance officer (even though they have no operation in China), they should do it now.
2. There now 4 categories of data: general data, important data, personal data and core data. Important data and personal data will get special protection, while core data will get strict protection.
3. Cyber security review is now mandated not only for IPOs in foreign countries, but even for Hong Kong!
Major platforms are also required to report to CAC when they set up headquarters or operation centers or R&D centers outside of China.
4. Art. 38 confirms my reading of Art. 38 of the new PIPL two months ago, i.e., international agreements like the RCEP can be used to allow data transfer out of China, which is also confirmed by China's former Minister of Commerce Chen Deming yesterday.
5. The biggest bombshell is Art. 41:
The state establishes a cross-border data security gateway to block the spread of information from outside the People’s Republic of China that is prohibited by laws and administrative regulations from being released or transmitted in China.
Nobody shall provide programs, tools, lines, etc. for penetrating or bypassing cross-border data security gateways, and shall not provide Internet access, server hosting, technical support, promotion, payment and settlement, application downloading for such activities.
"If domestic users access the domestic network, their traffic must not be routed overseas": this clause could potentially outlaw corporate VPNs for all MNCs in China!
Of course, these provisions are not really new. I've documented and discussed them extensively in my paper:
Gao, Henry S. “Data Regulation with Chinese Characteristics.” doi:10.1017/9781108919234.017.
I discussed extensively the requirement to use gov't-sanctioned international gateways for all Internet connections, a provision dating back to 25 years ago.
More recently, VPNs were explicitly outlawed in new rules.
however, AFAIK, this is the very first time the government openly recognizes the existence of the Great Firewall in a law/regulation.
But, for those who rush to conclude that this could violate China's @wto or RCEP obligations, the matter is not that simple as it works one-way,
i.e, by blocking info from entering China only. Apparently, it would not prevent data from being transferred out of China.
In other words, what China is building is a reverse osmosis system, just like the Great Wall.
6. Art 49 requires the platform companies to ensure "the authenticity, accuracy, and legality of the information" that they push to the users. This is the exact opposite of the safe harbor rule in the DMCA and really bad news for big companies like @BytedanceTalk!
7. There are also clauses on a National Cyber ID accreditation system (no more anonymity online); and requires platform companies to comply with government requests for data and info.
8. There's also an interesting definition section that defines what is important and core data, but my favorite is this definition on data cross-border security gateway:
an important security infrastructure that blocks access to overseas reactionary websites and harmful information, prevents cyberattacks from abroad, controls cross-border network data transmission, and prevents detection and combating cross-border cyber crimes.
A close reading of MOFCOM’s press conference today revealed more than the ministry likely intended to admit.
In response to a @Reuters question, the spokesperson stated:
“After the Madrid Talks, despite China’s repeated dissuasion, in just over 20 days the US intensively
introduced 20 repressive measures against China, seriously damaging China’s interests and undermining the atmosphere of the talks. In particular, at the end of September, the US issued a ‘penetrating rule’ for the export control entity list, effectively expanding it to thousands
of Chinese enterprises. At the same time, despite China’s sincere consultations, the US insisted on launching the Section 301 investigation on port fees related to China Shipbuilding on October 14, causing serious harm to China’s interests. The negative impact is extremely bad.”
I’m tired of people claiming that China and US reached an agreement in Madrid last month to refrain from introducing new restrictions.
That is simply not true — even by China’s own account.
1. People’s Daily editorial published the day after the talks quoted He Lifeng saying
“China HOPES US and China would go hand in hand, cancel the relevant restrictions on China as soon as possible, jointly safeguard the hard-won results of the talks with practical actions, and continue to create a good atmosphere for stability of economic and trade relations.”
2. The next day, another People’s Daily editorial made it even clearer:
“It must be pointed out that after a series of economic and trade consultations, the wrong practice of the US to unilaterally impose economic and trade restrictions on China has not stopped. The US has
Why the sudden wave of retaliations and escalations from Beijing?
The answer lies in the eight editorials published in the People’s Daily over the past few days.
Written under the pen name 钟才文, these pieces are widely understood to represent the views of the Office of the
Central Financial and Economic Commission, headed by He Lifeng — China’s economic tsar.
The Oct 4 editorial proclaimed that China has become “the main contributor to global economic growth and an anchor of stability,” attributing this to the “certainty” of China’s development
strategy - a pointed contrast to the “back-and-forth” policies of “some Western countries.” It went on to mock US inconsistencies: “In the past, they championed globalization; now they turn inward. In the past, they vowed to fight climate change; now they withdraw from Paris Agr”
Xi’s Feb speech to private firms is finally published—and it confirms everything I predicted before the meeting:
Private firms must fully align with China’s strategic competition vs the US.
Xi says private firms’ problems stem from external shocks (tech revolutions, trade restrictions) or internal missteps (over-diversification).
To Xi, the Party is not the problem, it is the solution.
Thus, firms must “unify their thoughts and actions with the Central Committee.”
Xi was even more explicit on measures to boost private firms: they should lead national science & tech projects, access major research infrastructure, and join state-led initiatives.
Exactly what I predicted 3 years ago in my @CIGI essay: private firms must be integrated into
What’s the biggest threat to China’s economy in the 2nd half of 2025?
It’s not the trade war, nor any new government policy. It’s a judicial interpretation from the Supreme Court.
On July 31, the Court issued Interpretation on Applicable Law in Trying Labour Dispute Cases (II).
Article 19 states:
“If the employer agrees with the employee, or the employee promises the employer, that there is no need to pay social security premiums, the people’s court shall find the agreement or promise invalid. If the employer fails to pay social security premiums in
accordance with the law, and the employee requests the termination of the labour contract in accordance with the third paragraph of Article 38 of the Labour Contract Law and demands economic compensation, the people’s court shall support the claim.”