The CAC just issued its draft Cyber Data Security Administrative Rules for comments. Several interesting points:
1. it confirms my warning 2 weeks ago that even foreign firms like @google, @Meta
& @Twitter are required to comply with the new law even if they are not operating in China, and further expands the list of covered activities under Art. 3 of PIPL by adding
another category: involving important domestic data processing. If all these giant digital firms have not designated a China-compliance officer (even though they have no operation in China), they should do it now.
2. There now 4 categories of data: general data, important data, personal data and core data. Important data and personal data will get special protection, while core data will get strict protection.
3. Cyber security review is now mandated not only for IPOs in foreign countries, but even for Hong Kong!
Major platforms are also required to report to CAC when they set up headquarters or operation centers or R&D centers outside of China.
4. Art. 38 confirms my reading of Art. 38 of the new PIPL two months ago, i.e., international agreements like the RCEP can be used to allow data transfer out of China, which is also confirmed by China's former Minister of Commerce Chen Deming yesterday.
5. The biggest bombshell is Art. 41:
The state establishes a cross-border data security gateway to block the spread of information from outside the People’s Republic of China that is prohibited by laws and administrative regulations from being released or transmitted in China.
Nobody shall provide programs, tools, lines, etc. for penetrating or bypassing cross-border data security gateways, and shall not provide Internet access, server hosting, technical support, promotion, payment and settlement, application downloading for such activities.
"If domestic users access the domestic network, their traffic must not be routed overseas": this clause could potentially outlaw corporate VPNs for all MNCs in China!
Of course, these provisions are not really new. I've documented and discussed them extensively in my paper:
Gao, Henry S. “Data Regulation with Chinese Characteristics.” doi:10.1017/9781108919234.017.
I discussed extensively the requirement to use gov't-sanctioned international gateways for all Internet connections, a provision dating back to 25 years ago.
More recently, VPNs were explicitly outlawed in new rules.
however, AFAIK, this is the very first time the government openly recognizes the existence of the Great Firewall in a law/regulation.
But, for those who rush to conclude that this could violate China's @wto or RCEP obligations, the matter is not that simple as it works one-way,
i.e, by blocking info from entering China only. Apparently, it would not prevent data from being transferred out of China.
In other words, what China is building is a reverse osmosis system, just like the Great Wall.
6. Art 49 requires the platform companies to ensure "the authenticity, accuracy, and legality of the information" that they push to the users. This is the exact opposite of the safe harbor rule in the DMCA and really bad news for big companies like @BytedanceTalk!
7. There are also clauses on a National Cyber ID accreditation system (no more anonymity online); and requires platform companies to comply with government requests for data and info.
8. There's also an interesting definition section that defines what is important and core data, but my favorite is this definition on data cross-border security gateway:
an important security infrastructure that blocks access to overseas reactionary websites and harmful information, prevents cyberattacks from abroad, controls cross-border network data transmission, and prevents detection and combating cross-border cyber crimes.
Xi’s Feb speech to private firms is finally published—and it confirms everything I predicted before the meeting:
Private firms must fully align with China’s strategic competition vs the US.
Xi says private firms’ problems stem from external shocks (tech revolutions, trade restrictions) or internal missteps (over-diversification).
To Xi, the Party is not the problem, it is the solution.
Thus, firms must “unify their thoughts and actions with the Central Committee.”
Xi was even more explicit on measures to boost private firms: they should lead national science & tech projects, access major research infrastructure, and join state-led initiatives.
Exactly what I predicted 3 years ago in my @CIGI essay: private firms must be integrated into
What’s the biggest threat to China’s economy in the 2nd half of 2025?
It’s not the trade war, nor any new government policy. It’s a judicial interpretation from the Supreme Court.
On July 31, the Court issued Interpretation on Applicable Law in Trying Labour Dispute Cases (II).
Article 19 states:
“If the employer agrees with the employee, or the employee promises the employer, that there is no need to pay social security premiums, the people’s court shall find the agreement or promise invalid. If the employer fails to pay social security premiums in
accordance with the law, and the employee requests the termination of the labour contract in accordance with the third paragraph of Article 38 of the Labour Contract Law and demands economic compensation, the people’s court shall support the claim.”
The new tariff numbers confirm what I wrote 4 months ago in my @commonplc piece “The Art of a Trade Deal”:
1. I stressed that these negotiations aren’t just about trade-security alignment would be a key factor. This is now explicit in the executive order, which repeatedly cites
security considerations in setting final tariff rates.
2. I predicted countries would be grouped based on key criteria. That’s exactly what we see: broadly speaking, there are three groups—friends (10–15%), enemies (30%+), and frenemies (19–25%).
3. I anticipated aggressive transshipment controls targeting China. The executive order includes just that.
4. Perhaps most tellingly, the order hints what China—the last holdout from the Liberation Day Tariffs—is likely to face: at least 40%, matching the rate applied to
The US-UK trade deal is out—and it confirms most of my predictions in my @commonplc piece “The Art of a Trade Deal” 4 weeks ago:
1. Tariffs: The 10% tariff remains in place for now, but contrary to some interpretations, this doesn’t mean the UK failed to negotiate it down. The
Agreement explicitly states that both sides will enter negotiations to reduce tariff rates. As I noted, the likely landing point is around the US’s 3.4% rate-if the UK is willing to match it.
2. Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs): Just as I anticipated, NTBs is central to the next phase
For a developed country like the UK, the focus is on overregulation—technical barriers to trade, SPS measures, and similar restrictions—all explicitly referenced in the Agreement.
3. Supply Chains: I flagged this as a key issue, and the Agreement confirms it. It addresses supply
Today’s front page of People’s Daily features the Central Peripheral Work Conference—a major development, given this is only the second such meeting in the PRC’s 76-year history.
The first such meeting was in Oct 2013, when Xi launched the BRI, which
was elevated to a national strategy at the 3rd Plenum of the 18th CCP Central Committee held the following month.
As I argued in this @trade_review article 3 years ago, the BRI was China’s strategic response to US containment through the TPP, where the cambridge.org/core/journals/…
@trade_review US tried to “make sure the US—and not countries like China—is the one writing this century’s rules for the world’s economy.”
But the TPP was killed.
Now, as @realDonaldTrump tries to rewrite the rules of global trade through the Reciprocal Tariff Policy, China is striking back.