Thread by @dburbach

On the "its own asset" part, what if Russia values ISS less today than we might be used to thinking? I don't think they *want* to destroy it per se, but a short thread 1/

https://twitter.com/SciGuySpace/status/1460329043249840130

We know in recent months the Russian civil space budget has been slashed, Putin has been publically harsh on Roscosmos head Dmitri Rogozin, and there's been little movement on highly trumpeted things like a China-Russia moonbase. E.g., 2/
arstechnica.com/science/2021/1…

Add it up and is plausible the strategic value Putin's government sees from "global prestige & diplomatic capital from civil spaceflight" has gone down significantly vs a few years ago. That and specifically, much less leverage and payments from the US for Soyuz rides 2/

Does that mean Putin wants to blow up ISS? No. But might there be less consideration for risks to ISS, despite it being "their own asset"? Maybe. Even a desire to signal that civil spaceflight risks wont deter them from military actions they think useful? Again, maybe 3/

And even if not a clear strategic calculation ("rational actor model"), in terms of bureaucratic politics, if I'm the Russian MOD I probably see more room to steamroll or simply ignore Roscosmos today than I did a few years ago. 4/

per a comment, even if there's not a strategic calculation to divest from civil space just Putin angry at Rogozin's incompetence and corruption, that's _still_ an opportunity for MOD to increase its influence 5/

To be clear again, I'm not arguing Putin wants to blow up ISS. But for several reasons I suspect civil space and the diplomacy around it are relatively less important than they used to be for Russia. 6/

China clearly does want to work the "prestige & goodwill from space exploration" angle, though, and their own station is at risk from the Russian test too, so it will be very interesting to see how they react. 7/7