There seem to be a significant number of economists and economics-adjaent people who generally support strong demand and increased public spending, but are deeply worried about inflation. I'm genuinely curious how they'd answer the following questions.
First, do you think that some (not necessarily all) of the slow growth in employment and GDP after the Great Recession compared to before it was due to the ongoing effects of weak demand (hysteresis)?
Second, if weak demand caused a lasting fall in GDP and employment below the earlier trend, could a sustained period of strong demand (with GDP above current estimates of potential) reverse that damage?
Third, would an extended period of demand above (current estimates of) potential be likely to generate higher inflation, at least during the period in which potential output was returning to its old trend?
And fourth, if it was possible to reverse at least some of the damage from the Great Recession, and put employment and growth on a permanently higher trend, would that be worthwhile even at the cost of a period of higher inflation?
If, like Larry Summers, you think that current inflation proves we've had "far too much fiscal stimulus and overly easy monetary policy," then you must think at least one of the answers is No. But I am baffled which one it is.
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You often hear that higher inflation is associated with higher real interest rates - that's supposed to be one of its major costs. I don't know where this bit of folk wisdom came from, but the reality is exactly the opposite. Higher inflation almost always means lower real rates.
The US has experience many episodes of inflation (and some of deflation) over the past century, and the early 1980s is the *only* case in which higher inflation has been associated with higher real interest rates.
To the extent that interest rates are linked to inflation, this is entirely mediated by the central bank. Higher inflation may cause the central bank to tighten, and bond yields do (slowly and incompletely) move with the policy rate.
Here is one way to think about the inflation we are seeing now. (a thread)
Over much of the past two years, large parts of the economy were unable to operate as normal. Schools and daycares were shut down. Airports were operating at 5 percent capacity. No one was going to the gym or eating in restaurants. You probably remember this! 1/
Though you might have forgotten the scale of it. For example: In March of 2020, fewer than 100,000 people passed through TSA checkpoints each day, compared with 2.5 million a day in 2019. 2/
A funny thing about "labor shortages" is that with the end of pandemic UI we just had a very powerful experiment on the effect of changes in work incentives on employment, and yet no one seems to be drawing any broader lessons from it.
If ending pandemic UI did not raise employment, that is not just a fact about pandemic UI. It is very informative about how important labor supply is to employment in general.
A nice example of the refusal to learn from this is the beltway journalist who admits that non-effect of expiring UI on employment is surprising, but then just goes on with his but-this-one-goes-to-11 insistence that employment problems are all about labor supply, not demand.
The only way you could see today's rising prices as the beginning of a 1970s-style inflation is if you knew literally nothing about either period except that measured inflation was high.
A sustained period of strong demand-led growth has nothing in common with a sudden, exogenous interruption in production. To see them as equivalent requires a deliberate effort to ignore everything we know about what was happening in the world.
Between 2019 and 2020, worldwide auto production fell from 92 to 78 million vehicles. What is the scenario in which this *doesn't* cause an increase in auto prices? And why should we think this is at all informative about production capacity in 2022 or 2023?
This piece on inflation by @BuddyYakov gets it exactly right: the problem we need to be addressing - in both the short term and long term - is not excessive growth in demand, but sluggish growth in supply. noemamag.com/how-to-put-the…
In retrospect it's strange that "supply side economics" has been associated with conservatives - in general, raising the economy's productive capacity is going to require a bigger public sector, not a smaller one.
The idea that there is a direct link between labor supply and employment needs full debunking elsewhere. But I'm just following textbook economics when I say: Demand determines employment, then labor supply conditions determine the wage at that employment level.
Over on the right, you see how home purchases went up, and then when prices rose, purchases went down and construction went up? It's almost like there's a market or something. theovershoot.co/p/us-housing-n
No who knows anything about me would describe me as a great believer in markets. But I'm always struck by the extreme pessimism about market adjustment shown by inflation hawks.
In the world of inflation hawks, prices carry no information. When input prices rise, producers never find substitutes; they just pass it on. When output prices rise, no one finds ways to produce more of it. When goods prices rise, it never means we should consume something else.