A small thought sparked by the always excellent @pmdfoster FT Brexit bulletin on the role of the ECJ in the Protocol. Given EU law directly applies to Northern Ireland I don't think you can have the same mechanism as the Withdrawal Agreement, referring only where EU law aspect.
However it should be possible to have a new mechanism where both UK and EU agree that all disputes go in the first instance to a special body before reference to ECJ. Not sure if that would suit either side completely, but it would be a compromise, if that's the aim.
As I was saying yesterday... (Northern Ireland Protocol redux) - this is the compromise, side letter of procedure on how different understandings of EU law in NI would be handled. telegraph.co.uk/politics/2021/…
Such compromises are normal in negotiations and thus available without threats of trade wars. Indeed, one might dare to suggest that you might get better compromises without threats (certainly the case for example last year on the famed level playing field now forgotten...)
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
Still unfortunate for this government that they can't move the UK and therefore have to deal with the Europeans it really wants to leave behind. Exhibit 1, the migration crisis, where we are kind of dependent on the neighbours but still hope we don't have to be nice to them.
Exhibit 2, if only our neighbours couldn't inflict huge economic pain on us and we could do what we wanted in Northern Ireland. Even worse when the US agree with the neighbours and not us.
As one or two wise folk suggested (probably @garvanwalshe) the vote to leave the EU meant we'd be spending a lot more political time talking to and about the EU. That's the inevitably of living in the cottage within a major estate. Your independence is never total.
Limited but welcome progress. No longer clear what the UK's negotiating aims are, which may well be because having failed in threatening the EU, the UK no longer knows what they are.
UK still seeking substantial change in Northern Ireland evidently, but without any means to do so (including Article 16 which as has been said often, can't really be used in this way). Or could be the prelude to climbdown, hard as ever to tell.
We are where we have been since July 2019. A UK government believing 'something' can remove the need for GB-NI-Ireland checks, against an EU and US who collectively disagree and insist upon a protocol. The stalemate goes on.
A new reality not necessarily to the UK's advantage.
But then I think we've all lost track of what the UK government is actually trying to achieve with the Northern Ireland Protocol. Is ECJ still a red line? EU law? State aid?
The honest version would read "The UK government only signed the NI Protocol to win an election, and we've been trying to get rid of it ever since. Unfortunately the EU and US have seen through our shallow narratives and threats, and still do. We don't know what to do now."
Useful long read on the current state of Brexit and Northern Ireland, except for being mostly focused on the PM and Whitehall it more or less ignores all the different players in NI. Which one suspects tells its own story of what London thinks. ft.com/content/4678cf…
If the view in Whitehall and Parliament is that we have to move on from Brexit (not surprisingly) then that doesn't unfortunately sit well with the promises to unionists of fundamentally changing the Northern Ireland Protocol. Showing a short-sighted approach caused damage.
Which at risk of constant repetition (but still necessary) shows the UK needs a post-Brexit plan for EU (and Northern Ireland) handling. We don't have one, never did. Just some tactical aggressions amid wishful thinking of major change that could not be, and now leave a mess.
Sorry but this thread and article are disingenuous and horribly skewed towards the UK government's view that it can blackmail the EU to reject the protocol. There is no attempt currently being made to find a consensus in NI, there is a UK government trying to abandon a treaty.
Yes there are problems with unionist opposition to the protocol as has been the case since 2019. But there is no proposal on the table which offers greater cross community consent. If that's the aim, a good one, then the process would not involve current threats.
There are undisputed issues with political stability ahead of Northern Ireland elections, and largest parties. But let's not pretend this motivating the UK government, otherwise it would be behaving differently. Still, if it wants to change, that's great.
Afraid I disagree with this article almost entirely. Most notably it almost completely lets the UK government off the hook for signing an agreement and then seeking to undermine it rather than building a political package with unionists. theatlantic.com/international/…
This could be seen as generous. I regard it as completely incorrect. The UK government are seeking to gut the protocol and force the EU to undermine a single market. The command paper repeats the internal market act provisions of 2020 which failed.
Unionists rejected the protocol in 2019. The UK government ignored that then, didn't seek to change it, and now seek to use it in a threatening way. It is this bad faith negotiating that so infuriates the EU, and the US as well. Again, an essential part of the story.